

DISSERTATION

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Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition:
The Emergence of Kantian Culture in Turkish
Foreign Policy
(A holistic Constructivist Approach)

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Abstract

The last decade has witnessed an unprecedentedly hyperactive Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party's administration, which has brought Turkey to the spotlight of world attention. The question "*What is happening to Turkey?*" has been raised many times by scholars of Turkish foreign policy in the West, some of whom have found a shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy. They claimed that Turkish foreign policy is turning away from the Western world towards the Middle East and Asia. Yet, given the history of Turkish foreign policy one may claim that it is not a recent development since Turkish foreign policy has been going through a transformation process for quite a long time. This study argues this transformation may be traced back to as early as 1980, when Turkey started the liberalization of the Turkish economy, which opened Turkish society and the Turkish economy to the outside world. Since then, Turkish state identity and interests have been going through a massive transformation process in order to adapt to the profound changes that have taken place in Turkey and in the international arena.

Along with liberalization some internal and external factors, such as globalization, the end of the Cold War, the rise of the JDP, the EU membership process and the "strategic depth" doctrine have been also influential in the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and interests. Consequently, Turkey's foreign policy making culture has experienced a transformation from a Lockean culture based on rivalry and suspicion to a Kantian culture based on friendship and cooperation. This transition will be analyzed in the wider context of the transformation and liberalization of the Turkish state and society in the last three decades. Furthermore, the process of Europeanization in Turkey and its effects on Turkish foreign policy making will be also examined. Additionally special attention will be paid to the role of Davutoglu's new foreign policy doctrine, "strategic depth", in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. Finally, this study will apply holistic constructivism as a theoretical framework with special emphasis on Alexander Wendt's culture of anarchies theory in order to provide a fuller picture of the JDP's foreign policy and the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and its foreign policy in the last three decades.

Zusammenfassung

Im letzten Jahrzehnt haben die Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Aufschwung Regierungen (JDP) eine beispiellose hyperaktiv türkische Außenpolitik betrieben, welche die Türkei zum Fokus der Aufmerksamkeit der Welt gebracht hat. Im Westen wurde die Frage "Was ist mit der Türkei passiert" mehrfach von Wissenschaftlern der türkischen Außenpolitik erhoben, von denen einige eine Verschiebung der Achse in der türkischen Außenpolitik gefunden haben. Diese Wissenschaftler behaupteten, dass die türkische Außenpolitik eine Abkehr von der westlichen Welt zum Nahen Osten und Asien erlebt. Doch die Geschichte der türkischen Außenpolitik zeigt, dass es sich nicht um eine neue Entwicklung sondern um eine schon in den 80er Jahren begonnene Transformation der türkischen Außenpolitik handelt. Diese Studie argumentiert, dass der Transformationsprozess relativ früh so um 1980 begann, als die Türkei die Liberalisierung der eigenen Wirtschaft startete, welche die türkische Gesellschaft und die türkische Wirtschaft nach außen geöffnet hat. Seither haben die Identität und Interessen des türkischen Staates einen massiven Transformationsprozess durchlaufen, um sich den tiefgreifenden Veränderungen, die in der Türkei und in der internationalen Arena stattgefunden haben, anzupassen.

Zusammen mit der Liberalisierung einiger interner und externer Faktoren, wie der Globalisierung, das Ende des Kalten Krieges, der Aufstieg der JDP, der EU-Beitrittsprozess und die strategische tiefe Doktrin haben eine wichtige Rolle in der Umgestaltung der Identität und Interessen des türkischen Staates. Infolgedessen, hat die türkische Außenpolitik eine Transformation von der „Lockean Culture“, die auf Rivalität und Misstrauen basiert ist, zu „Kantian Culture“, die auf Freundschaft und Zusammenarbeit basiert ist, erlebt. Dieser Übergang wird in den breiteren Kontext der Transformation und Liberalisierung des türkischen Staates und der Gesellschaft in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten analysiert werden. Darüber hinaus wird der Prozess der Europäisierung in der Türkei und deren Auswirkungen auf die türkische Außenpolitikgestaltung ebenfalls untersucht werden. Zusätzlich wird bei der Transformation der türkischen Außenpolitik die Rolle von Ahmet Davutoglu und seinen neuen Außenpolitik Doktrin "strategische Tiefe" ebenfalls analysiert. Letztendlich wird in dieser Studie der holistische Konstruktivismus mit besonderem Schwerpunkt auf die Kultur der Anarchien Theorie der Alexander Wendt's als theoretischer Rahmen anzuwenden sein, um ein vollständigeres Bild der Außenpolitik der JDP und die Transformation der türkischen Staats- Identität und seiner Außenpolitik in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten zu bieten.

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Enes Bayraklı

List of Abbreviations

AU -African Union

BSEC- Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organisation

BTC- Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline

CFSP -Common Foreign and Security Policy

CIA- Central Intelligence Agency

CUP- Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti)

D8- Developing 8 Countries

DP- Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti)

EEC- European Economic Community

EU- European Union

FP - Felicity Part (Saadet Partisi)

FPA -Foreign Policy Analysis

GASAM -South Asia Strategic Research Center

HRDF- Human Resources Development Foundation

IHH- Humanitarian Relief Foundation

IKV- Economic Development foundation (İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfi)

IMF -International Monetary Fund

IOs - International Organisations

IR -International Relations

ISAF- International Security Assistance Force

JDP -Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)

JP-Justice Party (Adalet Partisi)

MP- Member of Parliament

Mp- Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi)

MÜSIAD- Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen

NAP- Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGOs- Non-governmental Organisations

NOP-National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi)
NSC- National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu)
NSP- National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi)
OECC- Organization of European Economic Cooperation
OIC- Organisation of Islamic Conference
PKK - - Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan)
RPP -Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
SAM- Center for Strategic Research
SETA-Foundation for political, Economic and Social Researches
TASAM -Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies
TEPAV-Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
TESEV -Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TGNA- Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi)
TGS- Turkish General Staff (Genelkurmay Başkanlığı)
TIKA- Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency
TOBB- The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
TPP -True Path party (Doğruiyol Partisi)
TURKSAM -Turkish Center for International Relations Strategic Analysis
TÜSIAD-Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen
TUSKON-The Confederation of Turkish Businessman and Industrialists
UK- United Kingdom
UN -United Nations
UNDP -United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO- United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
USA -United States of America
USAK-International Strategic Research Organization
VP- Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi)
WP- Welfare Party (Refah Partisi)

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1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose of Thesis

In the past decade, the question “*What is happening to Turkey?*” seems to have become a commonly raised question by the scholars in the Western world. Some analysts even observe a shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy and claim that Turkish foreign policy is turning away from the Western world towards the Middle East and Asia. Nevertheless, considering Turkey’s history, one may argue that the transformation of Turkish foreign policy is merely a new phenomenon. This study will argue that this transformation can be dated back to as early as the 1980s when Turkey started the liberalization of the Turkish economy, which opened Turkish society and the Turkish economy to the outside world. Since then, in order to adapt to the profound changes that have taken place in Turkey and in the international arena, Turkey’s identity and interests have been going through a massive transformation process, which has in return reshaped its foreign policy making culture fundamentally.

The scholars of Turkish foreign policy almost unanimously agree that the fundamental feature of Turkish foreign policy is its orientation towards the West. Consequently, after the establishment of the Republic in 1923 Turkey adopted a one dimensional foreign policy strategy which was based on the Kemalist identity’s main goals of Westernization and Europeanization of Turkey. As a result of this deliberate policy Turkey neglected its political, cultural and economic ties with its surrounding regions such as the Middle East, Caucasia, the Balkans and Central Asia, which in the eyes of the Kemalist establishment represented “backwardness and corruption”. It is no exaggeration to say that the Kemalist identity and its one dimensional pro-Western orientation had been the main driving force behind Turkish foreign policy during the

much of the Republic's history. The unchallenged role of the Kemalist identity and its foreign policy begun to change with the end of the Cold War, since the new era created profound challenges to the Kemalist identity and its isolation policy in Turkey's surrounding regions. First, under the late Turgut Özal's administration (prime minister 1983–1989; president 1989– 1993) Turkey began to be involved in the greater Middle East, Central Asia, the Balkans and Caucasia actively. Yet it is clear that this transformation process has been accelerated and become much more visible since the JDP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in late 2002. Consequently, a significant shift in Turkish foreign policy has gone largely unnoticed over the last 10 years under the Justice and Development Party rule (2002-2012).

It is a well known fact that the JDP's foreign policy has been mainly shaped by Ahmet Davutoglu's "strategic depth" doctrine. Davutoglu served until 2009 as chief foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Erdogan and was described as the mastermind behind the scenes of new proactive Turkish foreign policy. In 2009 he has been appointed as foreign minister, a position which he holds up until today. In his sentimental book, *Strategic Depth*, Davutoglu criticises the one dimensional and unbalanced foreign policy practices of Kemalist elites who mainly focused on the ties with Western Europe and USA neglecting Turkey's relations with neighboring countries and regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus.¹ Davutoglu suggests that Turkey has to improve its relations with its neighbors under the guidance of his zero problem-maximum cooperation with neighbors policy and also adopt a multidimensional foreign policy strategy, which does not rely on one actor or region but has multiple ties with various actors and regions at the same time.²

Davutoglu argues that Turkey's foreign policy needs a reorientation in the face of the new regional and global developments in the post Cold War era. With his concept of "strategic depth" Davutoglu offers a new interpretation of the geopolitical position of Turkey, which laid down the foundations of new grand strategy for Turkish foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. Davutoglu argues that geography is not altered;

¹ **Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001);** *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: Turkey's Place in the World)*, Küre, Istanbul, pp. 45-63.

² **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008);** *Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007*, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.10, No.1, 2008, p.77.

however its interpretations are subject to change in the course of history.³ In this regard the following quote, in which Davutoglu reinterprets Turkey's geopolitical position, is noteworthy: *“As a major country in the midst of the Afro-Eurasia landmass, Turkey is a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one, unified category. In terms of its sphere of influence, Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country all at the same time.”*⁴ It is clear that this new approach poses a major break with the Kemalist establishment's notion that Turkey is and must be a European country. Davutoglu concludes that Turkey should obtain a new position in its region by promoting security and stability for itself as well as for its neighbors and the region.

Furthermore, under the guidance of Davutoglu Turkey declared a zero problem policy with its neighbors, which also poses a major break with the Kemalist establishment's notion that Turkey is surrounded by enemy and rival states. Subsequently, in the last decade Davutoglu achieved a paradigm change in Turkey's foreign policy by changing Turkey's attitude to its neighbors and other countries from enmity and rivalry to friendship. As a result Turkey has improved its relations with most of its neighbors and neighboring regions significantly, which has helped Turkey to emerge as a pivotal actor that promotes stability and security in its immediate neighborhood.

The foreign policy initiatives that Turkey undertook under the JDP rule are hard to count. In the last decade during the JDP government Turkey has mediated between various groups and countries such as Israel and Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Shia and Sunni groups in Iraq, Bosnia and Serbia. Furthermore, Turkey started the accession negotiations with the EU (European Union) in 2005; was elected for a permanent seat at the UN (United Nations) Security Council for two years in 2009-2010; contributed to the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) mission in Afghanistan; improved its relations with most of its neighbors dramatically, sent troops for UN peace keeping forces in Lebanon; obtained a leading status in the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference); improved its relations with the Arab League obtaining an observer status; established closer ties with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and improved its economic, political, and diplomatic relations with most Arab and Muslim states; obtained an observer status

³ **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2001);** *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiyenin uluslararası Konumu*, pp. 115-118.

⁴ **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008);** *Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007*, p.77.

in the AU (African Union) in 2005, in the Gulf Cooperation Council, in the Association of Caribbean States and the Organization of American States. Counting these initiatives, which cover an immense area, demonstrates clearly the new multidimensionalism of Turkish Foreign policy. According to Davutoglu, Turkey's engagements from Africa to Central Asia and from EU to OIC are parts of his new foreign policy vision. In the following quote he envisages a global role for the Turkish state in the next decade: *“Domestically, Turkey needs to deepen and enrich its democracy, accommodate the differences within its society, and strengthen the coordination and balance among its institutions in 2008 and the years that follow. These initiatives will make Turkey a global actor as we approach 2023, the one hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic.”*⁵

This study aims to analyze the drastic changes that have taken place in the Turkish state's identity and interests in the last three decades, which in return have reshaped its foreign policy under the rule of the JDP governments. This transition will be put into the wider context of the transformation and liberalization of the Turkish state and society in the last three decades. Furthermore, the process of Europeanization in Turkey and its effects on Turkish foreign policy making will be also examined. Additionally special attention will be paid to the role of the Davutoglu's new foreign policy doctrine, i.e. strategic depth, in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. Finally this study will apply holistic constructivism as a theoretical framework with special emphasis on Alexander Wendt's culture of anarchies theory in order to provide a fuller picture of the JDP's foreign policy and the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and its foreign policy in the last three decades.

1.2 Literature Review and the Argumentation of the Thesis

Considering the analysis of Turkish foreign policy, one can claim that there are two significant approaches regarding the main orientation of Turkish foreign policy. While some scholars argue that Turkish foreign policy has been mainly shaped by Kemalist ideology/identity and has followed its principles throughout the Republic's history,

⁵ **Ibid.**

others claim that it has always had a pragmatic approach towards the external world and has not always implemented the Kemalist ideology in foreign affairs.

According to the first approach, Turkish foreign policy has been used to realize Kemalist aspirations to transform Turkish society into a Western one. Turkey's engagement with Western organizations, such as NATO and the EU, has been considered by the state elite as a part of Turkey's Westernization process. Calis argues that behind the continuity of Turkish foreign policy one can see the state's identification with the norms of Western civilization. Additionally, he argues that the internal and external conditions do not significantly alter the traditional course of foreign policy because of the powerful state structure. He notes that *"as long as the state structure does not change its identification with Kemalism, Turkey's western oriented foreign policy would hardly be changed by events occurring outside the country"*⁶ However he also acknowledges that some external and internal developments may have affected the style and implementation of Turkish foreign policy. Despite this, he claims that its substance, namely its Western orientation, has been preserved for more than seven decades. He concludes that there has been a strong correlation between the Westernist and Kemalist state's identity and the making of Turkish foreign policy.

The latter approach argues that Turkey's foreign policy course has been influenced by history and geopolitics. These scholars consider the Turkish foreign policy decision makers as realists, who sought to implement a policy to protect Turkish national interests in accordance with Turkey's national power. This school of thought acknowledges the continuity in Turkey's foreign policy, however they claim that in essence Kemalist foreign policy has not been ideological but pragmatist. These analysts consider Turkey's pro-Western policies and its membership to NATO as realist moves, and mainly driven by the maximization of its security interest.⁷ For instance, Danforth argues that *"Turkish leaders have seldom been influenced by the ideologies that determine their domestic politics. Understood in context, Atatürk's disengagement from*

⁶Çalış, Şaban (1996); The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham, p.8 and 19.

⁷ Ibid.; p. 9.

the Middle East and the AKP's re-engagement with the region were both practical responses to strategic realities.”⁸

However, the two approaches presented above do not provide a sufficient explanation of Turkish foreign policy in the post Cold War era. Although the cornerstone of traditional Turkish foreign policy, namely its orientation towards the West, has remained in place and provided continuity, there are some new elements in Turkish foreign policy, which cannot be explained only by short term pragmatic reasons or Kemalist principles. These new elements indicate a transformation in the Turkish state's identity and interests, which is reshaping its foreign policy foundations. It should be noted that it is unlikely that this transformation will change Turkey's orientation towards the West, however, what it is also clear that it is changing Turkey's attitude towards other regions and Turkish foreign policy is obtaining a more multidimensional approach.

Considering the events after the end of the Cold War, one may claim that Turkey was caught unprepared to the major systemic changes in the international system and their consequence in Turkey's surrounding regions. To begin with, the 90s in Turkey were marked with political instability and weak coalition governments, which were unable to cope with these massive challenges. Additionally, due to its ideological handicaps the Kemalist elite was reluctant to improve relations with those other than Western countries. The Kemalist elite's pragmatic approach as put forward by some scholars in foreign policy was mainly to turn to non-Western regions whenever they faced problems with the West⁹ such as in 1964 (the Cyprus crisis), in 1974 (the Turkish intervention in Cyprus) or in 1980 (military coup). These short breaks in Turkish foreign policy orientation did not lead the country to develop alternative policies and were meant to last for a short term until the relations with the West improved again. As a result of this, after the Cold War Turkey was unable to develop a realistic grand strategy in order to achieve its ambitious plans, as declared by former President

⁸**Danforth, Nicholas (2008);** Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign Policy: From Atatürk to the AKP, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 3, Fall 2008, p.83.

⁹ **Sönmezoğlu, Faruk;** Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin dış politikasında süreklilik ve değişim (Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy) **in: Sönmezoğlu, Faruk (Ed.) (2001);** Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), Der Yayınları, İstanbul, p.1047.

Suleyman Demirel, to spread its influence from “*the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China*”¹⁰.

The main argumentation of this study is that the Turkish state’s identity and interests have been going through a fundamental transformation process since the end of the Cold War, which began with the transition to a liberal economic system in 1980. Together with the transition to a liberal system there are also other factors which have been influential in this transformation process. Firstly, the end of the Cold War ended the strict bipolar world system, which enabled Turkey to improve its relations with various regions at the same time. Secondly, the Helsinki Summit decision in 1999 to grant Turkey candidacy status for EU membership opened a vast political reform process in Turkey, which has been accelerated under the JDP government since 2002. Thirdly, the JDP’s foreign policy advisor, Ahmet Davutoglu, provided the much needed grand strategy for Turkish foreign policy, namely the “strategic depth” doctrine. Finally, another factor for the transformation of Turkish foreign policy was provided by the ideological preparedness of the JDP, namely its Islamic background and its willingness to improve deep rooted relations and cooperation with Turkey’s surrounding regions, most of whom were Muslim countries.

All of these factors together contributed to the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and interests, which in return reshaped its foreign policy making culture fundamentally. As a result of this, Turkey obtained a self confident, multi dimensional and balanced foreign policy strategy towards various regions and countries. Thus it can be claimed that the notion that the JDP’s foreign policy practice is just driven by its Islamic orientation is not accurate. In sharp contrast, it may be claimed that the JDP’s foreign policy poses a reflection of the normalization and structural transformation of Turkish foreign policy, which started with economic liberalization in the 80s and reached its peak time in the post Helsinki era with the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy and with the implementation of new foreign policy doctrine.

¹⁰ **Aydin Mustafa**, Kafkasya ve Orta Asya`yla ilişkiler (Relations with Caucasus and Central Asia), in; **Oran, Baskin (Ed.) (2006)**; Türk Dış Politikası II, 1980-2001: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar (Turkish Foreign Policy II 1980-2001), İletişim , İstanbul, pp 388.

Considering the history of Turkish foreign policy one can clearly argue that the Turkish foreign and security policy-making culture has mainly been influenced by a Realpolitik view of international relations. The key Turkish decision makers perceived the international environment as anarchical, which required being militarily strong and ready to deploy hard power military force for win-lose outcomes.¹¹ Alexander Wendt's theory of "culture of anarchies" may be of particular interest in the Turkish context. Wendt suggests three main distinct forms of cultures of anarchy, namely Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian, whose prevailing logic are enmity, rivalry and friendship respectively. Wendt also suggests that the cultures of anarchy can be internalized in three degrees. Within this context, in this study it will be argued that Turkey's foreign policy making culture until the Helsinki Summit in 1999 can be considered to be within the Lockean culture. The history of Turkish foreign policy clearly demonstrates that Turkey has not followed a revisionist or irredentist foreign policy and has accepted the right of existence of other states, which mainly places Turkey into a Lockean culture. In the course of history Turkey has internalized the Lockean culture to the third degree and recognized other states' sovereignty and their right to exist. The dominance of a Lockean culture based on rivalry started to change after the Helsinki Summit, leading to an Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy, which in return promoted the emergence of a Kantian culture based on friendship and cooperation in the Turkish foreign policy making culture. The determinants and consequences of this transformation process will be discussed in the fourth chapter in more detail.

1.3. The Structure and Methodology of the Thesis

This study will be mainly based on secondary literature and the discourse analysis of official documents, debates, policy papers on Turkish foreign policy, as well as speeches/ interviews and articles of state personalities, who play a role in Turkish foreign policy.

¹¹ **Kirişçi, Kemal (2006):** Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, Chaillot Paper No 92 September 2006, Inst. for Security Studies European Union, Paris, pp. 100-101, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/7409/01/chai92.pdf> (accessed 19.05.08, 13:30)

In order to understand the profound changes that take place in Turkish foreign policy this study will apply constructivism, since it has broadened our analysis of world politics with its valuable contributions. It considers international relations to be socially constructed and focuses on the awareness and consciousness of the human being and its place in international relations.¹² Constructivism claims that identity plays a substantial role in the definition of states' interests, which in return shape their policies. Finally, it emphasizes the importance and role of norms, material structures and identity in the formation of political decisions. It also points out the mutual construction of agents and structures at the same time.¹³

In foreign policy studies there has been always a discussion about the level of analysis, which centered around the question of whether to focus on national or international factors in the analysis of the foreign policy of a certain country. Some scholars considered the mixing of both national and international levels as unthinkable. However, over the past two decades the cross level analysis approach, which incorporates both national and international factors, has started to become popular amongst scholars of IR (International Relations). Checkel points out the fact that *“today, an IR-FPA consensus seems to be emerging that we need synthetic, cross level approaches.”*¹⁴

Constructivism has also been affected by this new trend in FPA (Foreign Policy Analysis). Holistic constructivists questioned the approach of unit level and systemic level constructivists, who have only taken into consideration domestic or international factors respectively. Holistic constructivism advocates a cross level analysis approach, which takes into consideration the two dimensions of international politics, namely domestic and international. Reus Smith notes that in order to *“accommodate the entire range of factors conditioning the identities, interests of states, they bring the corporate*

¹² **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.160.

¹³ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; Constructivism; in: **Burchill, Scott et. al. (2009)**; Theories of International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 212.

¹⁴ **Checkel, Jeffrey T.**; Constructivism and Foreign Policy, in: **Smith, Steve/ Hadfield, Amelia/ Dunne, Tim (2008)**; Foreign Policy: Theories Actors Cases, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 78.

and the social together into a unified analytical perspective that treats the domestic and international as two faces of a single social and political order.”¹⁵

As mentioned above, holistic constructivism makes it possible to combine the two facets of international politics, which might lead to a better understanding of the complex issue of the formation of the states' identities and interests, which shape their policies. Thus this study will apply a holistic constructivist approach in order to achieve a comprehensive analysis of the domestic and international factors that led to the transformation of Turkish foreign policy in the past three decades.

This study will be mainly divided into three chapters. The second chapter of the study will focus on the evolution and roots of constructivist theory in social sciences in general, and IR theories in particular. It will analyze the main ideas of constructivist theory focusing on the assumptions of conventional constructivism rather than on critical constructivism since conventional constructivism offers various practical theories for IR. In this regard, unit level, systemic level and holistic level constructivism's contributions to IR theory will be examined thoroughly. In doing so extra attention will be paid to the Alexander Wendt's culture of anarchies theory, which will be used as the general theoretical framework to explain the transformation of Turkish of foreign policy. Furthermore, in the section of unit level constructivism the influence of the norms of international society and international organizations -with special emphasis on Europeanization -on the states' identities will be also examined, since it may shed light on the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and interests.

As discussed in the previous section, the main argumentation of this thesis is that Turkish foreign policy is going through a radical transformation process which started with the transition to a liberal economy in Turkey in 1980. Therefore the analysis of Turkish foreign policy will be divided into two periods. The first period will cover the period between 1919 and 1980, which is the period from the last days of the Ottoman Empire to the military coup in 1980. The evolution of the Turkish state's identity, i.e. the Kemalist identity, will be the main focus in the third chapter, which will be based on

¹⁵ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; Constructivism; in: **Burchill, Scott et. al. (2009)**; Theories of International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 225.

a holistic constructivist approach. Therefore both domestic and external determinants of the formation of the Turkish state's identity will be examined in the third chapter. Consequently the first part of the third chapter will analyze the domestic structural factors in the making of the Turkish state's identity, which have exerted a long term influence over the determination of Turkish foreign policy. In this regard the role of following factors in the evolution of the Turkish state's identity and interests will be examined in detail: the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, Sevres syndrome, state ideology, radical Westernization, clash of identities, the extraordinary role of the Turkish Army, geographical determinants, the lack of strategic thinking and the dominance of elites in the decision making process. The second part of this chapter will describe conjunctural factors under two categories, namely domestic and external factors, which have exerted temporary effects on Turkey's foreign policy and its daily implementation. Finally in the third part, the results of the third chapter will be discussed.

The fourth chapter will cover the period between 1980 and 2012. It will analyze the factors and the processes that facilitated the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and interests which in return led to the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy making. Following the holistic constructivist approach, the determinants of this transition will be analyzed under two categories, namely external and internal. In the first section of this chapter the following external factors, which paved the way for the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy, will be examined: globalization, the end of the Cold War, the transformation of the geopolitical and geostrategic position and Europeanization. The second section will focus on internal factors such as the transition to a liberal economic system, the rise of counter elites and identities, the rise of the JDP, the "strategic depth" doctrine and the rising role of civil society. Finally, the last part will summarize the results of the fourth chapter, in which a thorough discussion of the transition of Turkish foreign policy from a Lockean culture to a Kantian culture will take place.

The fifth chapter will constitute the conclusion of this research. In this chapter the overall results of this study with a brief summary as well as the predictions about the future of Turkish foreign policy will be presented.

2. Theoretical Framework: Constructivism

This section analyzes constructivism in international relations theory, as it may provide us with a better understanding of the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and its foreign policy in the last three decades. Furthermore, because Turkey is a candidate for EU membership, this section will also discuss the concept of Europeanization in candidate countries, which will provide a theoretical framework to analyze the impact of the EU on the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and its foreign policy.

2.1. Definition

Constructivism is first presented to international relations theory by Nicholas Onuf in 1989.¹⁶ Its main assumption about international relations theory was summarized in Wendt's oft cited phrase: "*Anarchy is what states make of it*".¹⁷ Throughout the 1990s it has become a trendy and popular approach among the scholars of international relations, as it has broadened the analysis of world politics with its valuable contributions. Constructivists consider international relations to be socially constructed, and they focus on the awareness and consciousness of the human being and its place in

¹⁶ **Fierke, K.M.**; Constructivism, in: **Dunne, Tim/ Kurki, Milja/ Smith, Steve (2010)**; *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.186.

¹⁷ **Wendt, Alexander (1992)**; *Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics*, *International Organization*, 46, 2, Spring 1999, pp. 391-425.

international relations.¹⁸ The phrase “*socially constructed*” indicates that they give greater importance to the “social” and consider the world “*as coming into being through a process of interaction*” between agents and structure.¹⁹ Shortly, constructivism highlights the significance and role of norms, material structures and identity in the formation of political decisions. It also points out the mutual construction of agents and structures at the same time.²⁰

Constructivism does not consider the international system as something which exists independent of human consciousness, like the natural world around us. It is produced through intersubjective awareness or a common understanding among people. This means that it is constructed by ideas, not by material forces. “*It is a human invention or creation not of a physical or material kind but of a purely intellectual and ideational kind. It is a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place.*”²¹ According to constructivist logic, any change in the thoughts and ideas entering into the international system will affect and alter the system as well, since the system is constituted by ideas and thoughts. This explains the logic behind Alexander Wendt’s oft-cited phrase: ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. As put forward by Jackson and Sorensen this phrase seems to be harmless, however “*the potential consequences are far-reaching: suddenly the world of IR becomes less fixated in an age-old structure of anarchy; change becomes possible in a big way because people and states can start thinking about each other in new ways and thus create new norms that may be radically different from old ones.*”²²

As mentioned above, constructivists suggest that the social world does not exist independent of human consciousness and is affected by the ideas and beliefs of the

¹⁸ **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.160.

¹⁹ **Checkel, Jeffrey T.**; Constructivism and Foreign Policy, in: **Smith, Steve/ Hadfield, Amelia/ Dunne, Tim (2008)**; Foreign Policy: Theories Actors Cases, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 73.

²⁰ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; Constructivism; in: **Burchill, Scott et. al. (2009)**; Theories of International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, p. 212.

²¹ **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; Introduction to International Relations,p.160

²² **Ibid.**; p.160

people engaged in it. Therefore constructivists reject the positivist and behaviorist stance that considers the social world as an external entity in which rules may be analyzed and explained by scientific research. Constructivists make a distinction between the socio-political and natural world. While scientific laws exist for the natural world, there are no such laws in social sciences. Similarly, constructivists do not consider history as evolving external phenomena separate from human thought and ideas. Therefore they claim that “*sociology or economics or political science or the study of history cannot be objective ‘sciences’ in the strict positivist sense of the word.*”²³

Furthermore, constructivists reject the mechanical causality of positivism because of its failure to consider the intersubjectivity of social events. For instance, constructivists question the well-known billiard balls analogy in the explanation of international relations because it does not take ideas and beliefs of the actors into consideration. Constructivists argue that the aim of their approach is to illuminate the inside of the billiard balls in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of international relations.²⁴

There is a consensus among constructivists about the employment of Marx Weber’s interpretive understanding (*verstehen*) idea in the analysis of social action. However, they are not united about “*the extent to which it is possible to emulate the scientific ideas of the natural sciences and produce scientific explanations based on hypotheses, data collection and generalization.*” According to constructivists there is no absolute objective truth across time and place in social sciences. However, constructivists still do make truth claims in their analysis of international relations, but acknowledge that “*their claims are always contingent and partial interpretations of a complex world*”²⁵

The scholars of IR distinguish between European and North American forms of constructivism. This division is a reflection of the debates within critical international theory. The North American variant is labeled as conventional or modernist

²³ **Ibid.;** p.162

²⁴ **Ibid.;**p.164

²⁵ **Ibid.;** p.165

constructivism. The European form of constructivism is often referred to as critical, post-modernist, interpretive or post-positivist²⁶. In spite of this division, these two schools of thoughts share some main assumptions about social life and world politics.

Firstly, constructivists consider the role of normative or ideational structures to be as significant as the material structures in shaping the behavior of the actors. Contradicting the neo-realist and Marxist emphasis on the influence of material structures, constructivism points out the structural characteristics of the system of shared ideas, beliefs and values, which affects the outcome of the social and political actors' decisions.²⁷ According to Wendt, constructivists do not argue that "*ideas are more important than power and interest, or that they are autonomous from power and interest. The claim is rather that power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up. Power and interest explanations presuppose ideas, and to that extent are not rivals to ideational explanations at all.*" As a result of this new approach, Wendt suggests "*a rule of thumb for idealists: when confronted by ostensibly 'material' explanations, always inquire into the discursive conditions which make them work.*" For instance, he states: "*when Neorealists offer multipolarity as an explanation for war, inquire into the discursive conditions that constitute the poles as enemies rather than friends.*"²⁸

Two factors are important in constructivism's focus on the role of normative or ideational structures.²⁹ Firstly, constructivists point out the fact that "*material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.*" Wendt puts forward this constructivist view with the following example: "*500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of*

²⁶ **Checkel, Jeffrey T.**; Constructivism and Foreign Policy, pp. 72-73.

²⁷ **Ibid.**; p. 220.

²⁸ **Wendt, Alexander (2009)**; Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.135.

²⁹ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; Constructivism, p. 220.

shared understandings.”³⁰ Secondly, they highlight the significance of normative or ideational structures because of their influence on the actors’ identities. Accordingly, the social identity of a state is determined by the norms of the international system. Reus-Smit illustrates this constructivist notion with the following example, “*in the age of Absolutism (1554-1848) the norms of European international society held that Christian monarchies were the only legitimate form of sovereign state, and these norms, backed by the coercive practices of the community of states, conspired to undermine Muslim, liberal or nationalist polities.*”³¹

The second common assumption by constructivists is that the effects of non-material structures on identities are important since interests are shaped by identities, and they in turn determine the actions. Unlike the rationalist view, which holds interests as predefined and exogenous to interstate interaction, constructivists suggest that interests are not given and are subject to change. Furthermore they argue that in order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of world politics it is vital to comprehend the process of actors’ interest formation.³² In order to analyze the formation of interests, constructivists concentrate on the actors’ social identities as “*identities are the basis of interests.*”³³ Finally, they do not reject the notion that actors are self-interested, however they suggest that this does not provide sufficient explanation until “*we understand how actors define their selves and how this informs their interests.*”³⁴

Thirdly, constructivists suggest that agents and structures are mutually constructed. On the one hand, the actors’ identities and interests are determined by the normative and ideational structures; on the other hand these structures owe their existence to the knowledgeable practices of the actors. In other words, constructivists emphasize the influence of the non-material structures on identities and interests as well as the role of practices in preserving and altering those structures. As put forward by Wendt “*it is through reciprocal interaction that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring*

³⁰ **Wendt, Alexander (1995);** Constructing International Politics, International Security, Vol.20, No. 1, Summer, 1995, p 73.

³¹ **Reus-Smit, Christian;** Constructivism, pp. 220-221.

³² **Ibid.;** p. 221.

³³ **Wendt, Alexander (1992);** Anarchy is what states make of it, p. 398.

³⁴ **Reus-Smit, Christian;** Constructivism, p. 221.

social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests."³⁵ In other words "*social structures exist, not in actors' heads nor in material capabilities, but in practices. Social structure exists only in process. The Cold War was a structure of shared knowledge that governed great power relations for forty years, but once they stopped acting on this basis, it was "over."*"³⁶

According to Reus-Smit there are three main differences between the rationalist theories of IR (such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism) and constructivism. Firstly, unlike the rationalist stance, constructivists do not consider actors as atomistic egoists but as social beings. Accordingly, actors' identities are constructed by the "*institutionalised norms, values and ideas of the social environment in which they act.*" Secondly, whereas rationalists claim that interests of the actors are defined before they enter into social relations, constructivists consider the interests as endogenous to social relations, "*as a consequence of identity acquisition, as learned through process of communication, reflection on experience and role enactment.*" Thirdly, instead of considering society as a strategic realm, in which actors attempt to maximize their interest, constructivists consider society as a constitutive realm, in which actors are generated as "*knowledgeable social and political agents.*" Reus-Smit points out the fact that constructivists are labeled as "constructivists" because of this different ontological stance, which highlights the "*social determinants of social and political agency and action*"³⁷

Apart from these common assumptions, there are significant differences between conventional and critical constructivism. Conventional constructivism analyzes the impact of social norms and identity on foreign policy decisions and world politics. This school of thought is mainly dominated by positivist North American scholars, who are "*interested in uncovering top-down/deductive mechanisms and casual relationships between actors, norms, interests and identity*". They are labeled conventional because of their positivist view of the analysis of IR. For instance, in the analysis of the impact of international organizations on the promotion of certain values or norms in the

³⁵ **Wendt, Alexander (1992);** Anarchy is what states make of it, p. 406.

³⁶ **Wendt, Alexander (1995);** Constructing International Politics, p 74.

³⁷ **Reus-Smit, Christian;** Constructivism, p. 223.

international system, conventional constructivists discuss the influence of these values on the formation of the individual's or the state's interests.³⁸ Prominent representatives of conventional constructivism include Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, Martha Finnemore, Christian Reus-Smit, John Ruggie, Emanuel Adler, Michael Barnett, and Ted Hopf.³⁹

Unlike the conventional approach, the focus of critical constructivism is the analysis of language's role in mediating and constructing social reality. Contrary to conventional constructivism, which analyzes factors that influence the change in a state's identity, critical constructivism examines the "*background conditions and linguistic constructions (social discourses)*" that contribute to any such change. In other words, critical constructivists rely on a "*deeply inductive (bottom up) research strategy that seeks to reconstruct state identity, with the methods encompassing a variety of linguistic techniques.*"⁴⁰

Critical constructivists are also unconvinced about conventional constructivists' stance about truth claims. Because of the absence of a neutral ground, where truth claims can be evaluated objectively, critical constructivists claim that "truth claims" are not achievable. Accordingly, "*truth is always connected to different, more or less dominant, ways of thinking about the world*". Therefore, there is always a connection between power and truth and these two cannot be separated. Critical constructivists consider the uncovering of the connection between truth and power, and the critique of the dominant ways of thinking to be the main task of their approach. Ann Tickner, David Campbell, James Der Derian, Jim George, Andrew Linklater and R. B. J. Walker are the prominent representatives of critical constructivism.⁴¹

The fact that critical constructivism concentrates on the critical assessment of present theories is criticized by some scholars. According to Jackson & Sorensen, in terms of new contribution to IR theory conventional constructivism can be regarded much more

³⁸ **Checkel, Jeffrey T.**; *Constructivism and Foreign Policy*, p. 72.

³⁹ **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; *Introduction to International Relations*, p. 165.

⁴⁰ **Checkel, Jeffrey T.**; *Constructivism and Foreign Policy*, p. 73.

⁴¹ **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; *Introduction to International Relations*, p.165.

productive than critical constructivism.⁴² Therefore this study will be based on the assumptions of the conventional constructivism as it offers various theories for IR.

2.2 Historical Context of the Rise of Constructivism in IR

The historical context in which constructivism rose should be understood before going into detail about the constructivist theories of IR. Like other debates which have shaped IR theory in the past (such as the debate between realism and idealism after the First World War), the constructivist approach emerged in historically and culturally specific circumstances.⁴³

Throughout the Cold War international relations theory was dominated by materialist, rationalist and positivist theories such as realism and liberalism, which mainly focused on power distribution and balance of power.⁴⁴ Realism had overcome idealism after the Second World War and became the dominant theory in IR due to its powerful theoretical explanations of war, alliances, imperialism and the obstacles for international cooperation at that time. Realism considered international relations as a power contest among self-interested states and had a pessimistic view regarding peace and cooperation among rival states.

However, the dominance of classic realism was challenged by liberals in the 1970s. Unlike the realists' image of international relations as a system of colliding billiard balls, liberals such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye considered the international system "*as a cobweb of political, economic and social relations binding sub-national, national, transnational, international and supranational actors*".⁴⁵ They highlighted the significance of non state actors, transnational relations and the interdependence between states. Subsequently, Keohane and Nye revised their views acknowledging and explaining the significance and power of sovereign states in the concept of complex interdependence. Accordingly "*states were acknowledged to be the principal actors in*

⁴² **Ibid.**; pp.165-166.

⁴³ **Fierke, K.M.**; Constructivism, p. 178.

⁴⁴ **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; Introduction to International Relations, pp. 160-161.

⁴⁵ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; Constructivism, p. 213.

world politics, but pervasive interdependence was thought to alter the nature and effectiveness of state power, with the balance of military power, so long emphasized by realists, no longer determining political outcomes, as sensitivity and vulnerability to interdependence produced new relations of power between states.”⁴⁶

As a response to this liberal challenge, Kenneth Waltz published *Theory of International Relations*⁴⁷ in 1979 modifying realist theory radically, and thereby founding neo-realism or structural realism. Neo-realism is based on two main assumptions. Firstly, it considers the international system to be anarchical because of the absence of an order imposing central authority. Secondly, as a result of this anarchical system the main aim of the states is to protect their own existence, which requires a maximization of military power. According to Waltz, the power struggle and conflict are the main endemic features of international relations. As a result of this view, he claims that international cooperation is at best risky and at worst nonexistent. Reus-Smit points out the fact that Waltz’s book gave a new identity and confidence to the neo-realists.⁴⁸

However, this did not prevent neo-realism to be challenged by a new approach of neo-liberalist insitutionalists. Realism had claimed that international cooperation would only be possible under the hegemony of a powerful state, which would establish and impose the necessary institutional rules for a sustainable cooperation between states. However, the end of 1970s witnessed a decline in American hegemony, which did not affect the international economic cooperation promoted by America in the Cold War era. As a response to this phenomenon, Keohane developed a theory to explain the cooperation between states under anarchy or in the absence of a hegemonic power. In *After Hegemony*⁴⁹, published in 1984, Keohane developed a neo-liberal theory of international cooperation embracing three main assumptions of neo-realism: the influence of international anarchy on a state’s behavior, the importance of the state as

⁴⁶ **Ibid.**; p. 213.

⁴⁷ **Waltz, K. N. (1979)**; *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw-Hill, Boston.

⁴⁸ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; *Constructivism*, p. 214.

⁴⁹ **Keohane, Robert (1984)**; *After hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton

the most significant actor in IR and the notion that states are basically self-interested. However, aside from these common assumptions neo-liberalism advocated different explanations regarding international cooperation. According to neo-liberals, in the absence of a central authority states are reluctant to cooperate due to their fear about a potential renege on agreements by other states. This makes cooperation too risky and costly. Neo-liberals argue that this phenomenon does not only clarify the failure of cooperation between states, but also makes clear in which conditions they would cooperate. According to neo-liberals, the establishment of international institutions or regimes can be seen as an attempt by states to overcome these difficulties. They argue that the results of international regimes, which make international cooperation under anarchy possible, are as follows: increased cost of breaking agreements, reduced transaction costs, and increased information about the intent of other states.⁵⁰

The core disagreement between neo-realists and neo-liberals is regarding the question of whether states are interested in relative or absolute gains. The neo-realist argument is that states are preoccupied with relative gains and therefore the prospect of absolute gains does not necessarily encourage cooperation between states. For instance, *“even if a trading agreement promises to net state A \$100 million in profit, if that same agreement will net state B \$200 million, State A may refuse to cooperate”*. However, according to neo-liberals, the calculation of relative gains does not prevent international cooperation as *“states tend to evaluate the intentions of other states as well as their relative capabilities; and when states have multiple relationships with multiple states the constant calculation of relative gains is simply impractical.”* Therefore, unlike neo-realists, who define states as defensive positionalists, neo-liberals consider them to be utility-maximizers.⁵¹

Apart from these distinctions, these two mainstream theories share a common ground because of their rationalism, which is based on the three assumptions of micro economic theory. Firstly, actors are considered atomistic, self interested and rational. Secondly, the actors enter into social relations with predefined interests and which are not influenced by social interaction. Thirdly, society is considered as *“a strategic realm,*

⁵⁰ Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism, pp. 214-215.

⁵¹ Ibid.; pp. 215-216.

a realm in which individuals or states come together to pursue their predefined interests". Neither neo-realism nor neo-liberalism is interested in the formation of state interests as they consider state interests as exogenous to interstate interaction. Furthermore, neo-realism denies the reality of an international society describing it as an international system, whereas neo-liberals accept the existence of an international society emphasizing its strategic significance. Accordingly, the main reason for cooperation between states is the establishment and protection of functional institutions. However, social interaction does not play any role in the formation of states' identities and interests.⁵²

In the midst of these discussions between two rationalist theories, the main assumptions of rationalism were challenged by critical theorists leading to the emergence of a new critical approach in IR. Contrary to rationalist theories, they claimed that "*actors are inherently social, that their identities and interests are socially constructed, the products of inter subjective social structures.*" Furthermore, they criticized the epistemology and methodology of Lakatosian neo-positivism pointing out "*the unquantifiable nature of many social phenomena and the inherent subjectivity of all observation*". They also questioned the objective truth claims of rationalist theories indicating the relationship between knowledge and interests. Thus, they argue that the main task of their theories is to uncover and dismantle the structures of hegemony and oppression.⁵³

Critical theorists were also divided into two main camps between post-modernists and modernists. Post-modernist critical theory is inspired by French social theorists such as Jacques Derrida and Michael Foucault. They advocated a radical interpretivist approach contradicting "*all attempts to assess empirical and ethical claims by any single criterion of validity, claiming that such moves always marginalize alternative viewpoints and moral positions, creating hierarchies of power and domination.*" The assumptions of modernist critical theory were mainly based on the ideas of the Frankfurt School theorists like Jürgen Habermas. They adopted a stance of critical interpretivism acknowledging knowledge-power relations and the subjectivity of all truth claims.

⁵² **Ibid.**; pp. 216-217

⁵³ **Ibid.**; p. 217.

However they maintained that “*some criteria were needed to distinguish plausible from implausible knowledge claims, and that without minimal, consensually grounded ethical principles, emancipator political action would be impossible.*”⁵⁴

Apart from these discussions, it is suggested that the first wave of critical theory was mainly focused on the critique and dismantling of rationalist theories in IR. Therefore, it is primarily an abstract theory, which criticizes the dominance of rationalist theories with regards to their position on legitimate knowledge, nature of the social world and their aim. Accordingly, they pointed out the symbiotic connection between theory and practice considering the critique of IR discourse as the core of their analysis.⁵⁵

It is a historical fact that the end of the Cold War dramatically transformed the international system, which had some inevitable consequences for international relations theory as well. It is suggested that the end of the Cold War demonstrated neo-realism’s failure to predict the end of the Cold War and to explain the balance of power in the post Cold War era, as the neo-realist logic assumed that US (United States) power would be balanced by other states leading to a multipolar world. However, it is clear that this assumption did not come true. Waltz speculated that it would occur tomorrow and Christopher Layne claimed that Japan and Germany could balance US power in fifty years. As a solution to this uncertainty, constructivists claim that the role of thoughts and ideas must be analyzed as well, in order to achieve a better understanding of the balance of power and anarchy.⁵⁶

It was this historical context and the theoretical debate among mainstream IR theories which led to the emergence of the constructivist approach in IR. It is suggested that because of the domination of mainstream theories in North America, constructivism became particularly popular and trendy among American scholars, whereas in Europe

⁵⁴ **Ibid.**; pp. 217-218

⁵⁵ **Ibid.**; p. 218.

⁵⁶ **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; Introduction to International Relations, pp.160-161.

this was not the case as the role of ideas and the social interaction between states had already been added into the international society approach analysis.⁵⁷

According to Richard Price and Reus-Smit, constructivism can be considered as a natural consequence of critical theory due to their adaption of critical theory's insights to explain some features of international relations. However, unlike the first wave of critical theory, constructivism highlighted the significance of the empirical analysis. Constructivism has used the critical theorists' ontology, which emphasized an "*alternative image of humans as socially embedded, communicatively constituted and culturally empowered*" to illuminate international relations. Furthermore, constructivists also used critical theory's methodologies, such as interpretive discursive and historical modes of analysis, for their empirical studies.⁵⁸

According to Reus-Smit there were four influential factors in the rise of constructivism in IR. Firstly, the critical theorists were challenged by the rationalists because of their focus on the theoretical critique without a substantive analysis of world politics. While leading critical theorists questioned the drives behind this challenge, constructivists took up the challenge to prove the power of their non-rationalist heuristic approach. Secondly, as mentioned before, the end of the Cold War had demonstrated the theoretical weaknesses of mainstream theories and also "*undermined the critical theorists' assumption that theory drove practice in any narrow or direct fashion, as global politics increasingly demonstrated dynamics that contradicted realist expectations and prescriptions.*" This change made it clear that other than a narrowly defined meta-theoretical critique, new alternative approaches were required in order to explain the new challenges in world politics. Thirdly, the emergence of a new generation of scholars in the 90s, who not only adopted many aspects of critical theory but also "*saw potential for innovation in conceptual elaboration and empirically informed theoretical development*", contributed to the rise of constructivism in IR. Lastly, the frustration about the analytical handicaps of rationalist theories has also

⁵⁷ **Ibid.**; p. 161.

⁵⁸ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; Constructivism, pp. 218-219

contributed to the embrace of a new approach by the mainstream scholars, which has carried constructivism “*from the margins to the mainstream of theoretical debate*”.⁵⁹

To sum up, one can say that two debates had shaped IR theories before the end of the Cold War. The first debate was between neo-realism and neo-liberalism and about the possibility of international cooperation. The second was the debate between rationalists and critical theorists. However, as discussed above, the end of the Cold War has thrown up new questions and challenges for IR theory, shifting the axes to two new debates, namely the debate between rationalists and constructivists, and between constructivists and critical theorists. Constructivism has criticized the rationalist and positivist approaches of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, and also condemned the critical theorists’ focus only on meta-theoretical critique without an empirical analysis of IR. As put forward by Reus-Smit “*The veracity of the epistemological, methodological and normative challenges that critical theorists levelled at rationalism has not diminished, but the rise of constructivism has focused debate on ontological and empirical issues, pushing the metatheoretical debate of the 1980s off centre stage*”.⁶⁰ As a result of this turn in IR, constructivism has been carried into the mainstream of IR theories and become a very popular and trendy approach among IR scholars throughout the 1990s.

2.3 The Roots of Constructivism

It should be mentioned that constructivism has been regarded both as a social theory and a theory of IR. Therefore, the developments in sociology and philosophy have also had their imprints on constructivism. For instance, Anthony Giddens analyzed the link between structures and actors in his concept of “structuration”. Accordingly, unlike the neo-realist assumption about the limitation of state actors by the structure of anarchy, there is no mechanical determination of the actors by the structures. “*The relationship between structures and actors involves intersubjective understanding and meaning. Structures do constrain actors, but actors can also transform structures by thinking about them and acting on them in new ways. The notion of structuration therefore leads to a less rigid and more dynamic view of the relationship between structure and*

⁵⁹ **Ibid.**; 219-220

⁶⁰ **Ibid.**; pp.225-226.

actors.”⁶¹ This new understanding is used by constructivists to propose a less rigid understanding of anarchy in IR theory.

Some analysts also suggested that constructivism is not a totally new approach. Jackson et al. suggest that the roots of constructivism can be found as late as in the 18th century. For instance, Giambattista Vico, an Italian philosopher in the 18th century, suggested that the natural world is created by God whereas the historical one is created by human beings. According to Vico *“history is not some kind of unfolding or evolving process that is external to human affairs. Men and women make their own history. They also make states which are historical constructs. States are artificial creations and the state system is artificial too; it is made by men and women and if they want to, they can change it and develop it in new ways.”*⁶² Furthermore, Immanuel Kant has been considered as another pioneer of social constructivism as he suggested that we could only obtain subjective knowledge about the world due to the filtration of knowledge through human consciousness.⁶³

Additionally constructivists have also referred to the Weberian concept of “*verstehen*”, which indicates that *“action always must be understood from within and thus that social meaning is a function of what is in people’s heads.”*⁶⁴ Max Weber highlighted the difference between the social world and the natural world of physical phenomena. *“Human beings rely on ‘understanding’ of each other’s actions and assigning ‘meaning’ to them. In order to comprehend human interaction, we cannot merely describe it in the way we describe physical phenomena, such as a boulder falling off a cliff; we need a different kind of interpretive understanding, or verstehen... Weber concluded that subjective understanding is the specific characteristic of sociological knowledge”*⁶⁵ The concepts outlined above were used by constructivist theory to highlight the significance of meaning and understanding in IR.

⁶¹ Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations, p. 161.

⁶² Ibid.; 161-162.

⁶³ Ibid.; p.162.

⁶⁴ Fierke, K.M.; Constructivism, p.183.

⁶⁵ Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations, pp.161-162.

2.4. Constructivist Theories of International Relations: The Formation of Identity, Norm, Interest and Culture

As mentioned above, constructivism has two aspects. To begin with, it is a general social theory, which analyzes social actions, the social world and the linkage between structures and actors. Therefore, constructivism as a social theory is applicable to all social sciences. Consequently, it has also contributed to the theory of IR with a number of substantive theories.⁶⁶ Reus-Smit distinguishes between three distinct variants of constructivist IR theories, which have been developed throughout the 90s, according to their level of analyses: systemic, unit level and holistic constructivism.⁶⁷ The next section will include an elaborate analysis of these three different approaches.

2.4.1 Systemic Level Constructivism: The Emphasis on Systemic/External Factors;

The systemic level constructivism focuses only on the relations between states in the international system ignoring the role of domestic factors. This approach does not take the domestic political developments into consideration. According to Reus-Smit the best example of systemic level constructivism is developed by Alexander Wendt with his theory of cultures of anarchy.⁶⁸ However, it should be mentioned that Wendt is not the only representative of this approach. There are other theorists, who contributed to this approach with their analysis of the effect of international organizations and international society's norms on the formation of the states' identities and interests, such as Martha Finnmore and Michael Barnett.⁶⁹

Wendt distinguishes between social and corporate identities of the state. He defines the social identity of the state as "*the status, role or personality that international system ascribes to a state*". The corporate identity is defined by Wendt as "*the internal human, material ideological or cultural factors that make a state what it is*". Consequently,

⁶⁶ **Ibid.**; p.162.

⁶⁷ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; Constructivism, p. 223.

⁶⁸ **Ibid.**; p. 223.

⁶⁹ **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; Introduction to International Relations, pp.168-173.

although Wendt acknowledges that the identities and interests of the states are “*in important part determined by domestic rather than the international system*”, he argues that “*if we are interested in the question of how the state system works, rather than in how its elements are constructed, we will have to take the existence of states as given...*”⁷⁰

This stance of systemic level constructivism is criticized by some scholars because it disregards the role of domestic factors in the formation of identities and interests. For instance, Reus-Smit criticizes Wendt’s focus on systemic theorizing with the following statement: “*Wendt brackets corporate sources of state identity, concentrating on how structural contexts, systemic process and strategic practices produce and reproduce different sorts of state identity.*” According to Reus-Smit the major trouble of this approach is the fact that it analyzes the influential factors in the international system from an unproductive narrow perspective as it focuses only on the systemic level. Therefore this approach does not provide sufficient explanation of the drastic changes in the international society and state identities. Reus-Smit concludes that by excluding domestic factors, Wendt disregards “*most of the normative and ideational forces that might prompt*” a change in the identities and interests.⁷¹

Aside from the critiques and limitations of this approach, it should be mentioned that systemic level constructivism shed important light on the systemic sources in the formation of state identity and interests. As a result, this approach might be effective in understanding one element of world politics, namely the external international environment and its effects on the identities and domestic structures of states. Therefore this section will first analyze all the contributions of systemic level constructivism in order to achieve a better theoretical framework in the analysis of the systemic sources of the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and its foreign policy.

2.4.1.1 Cultures of Anarchy

The core assumption of Wendt’s theory is that anarchy in the international system does not always lead to self-help, which contradicts the neo-realist stance. Wendt argues that whether the anarchy leads to self-help cannot be decided a priori as the process of interaction between states creates and may change the identity and interest of the

⁷⁰ **Wendt, Alexander (2009)**; *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 246

⁷¹ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; *Constructivism*, pp. 223-224.

actors.⁷² In Alexander Wendt's words *"There is no logic of Anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interest rather than another; structure has no existence or causal power apart from process. Self help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it"*⁷³

Wendt agrees with the neo-realists about the main objectives of the states, namely survival and the security. However, as mentioned above, Wendt argues that this does not always result in a self-help system. In order to achieve a comprehensive understanding of various security policies resulting from this desire for survival and security, Wendt suggests that the formation of the identities and interests in the interaction between states should be analyzed.⁷⁴ In this regard Wendt refers to a basic assumption of constructivist social theory, namely that *"People act towards object, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them."* For instance the relations between enemy states and friendly states are radically different, and the neo-realist logic of anarchy does not explain these different attitudes. Wendt illustrates this constructivist view with the following example; *"If society forgets what a university is, the powers and practices of professor and student cease to exist; if the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies, the cold war is over."* The structures are constructed accordingly by collective meanings, which in return form the actions. Wendt concludes that *"actors acquire identities- relatively stable, role specific understandings and expectations about self, by participating in such collective meanings"*.⁷⁵

Wendt agrees with the neo-realist assumption that the main characteristic of the international system is anarchy. However, as mentioned above, Wendt suggests that anarchy does not always lead to self-help systems and different sorts of anarchy cultures might develop as a result of the interaction between states throughout history. Consequently Wendt distinguishes between three main types of anarchy cultures at the macro level: *"based on what kind of roles- enemy, rival and friend- dominate the*

⁷² Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations, p.167.

⁷³ Wendt, Alexander (1992); Anarchy is what states make of it, pp. 394-395.

⁷⁴ Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations, p.168

⁷⁵ Wendt, Alexander (1992); Anarchy is what states make of it, pp. 396-397.

system". He defines these cultures as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian respectively. According to Wendt the self-help system can only be observed in a Hobbesian culture and he rejects the neo-realist notion of one single "logic of anarchy" as he argues that "*anarchic structures vary at the macro level and can therefore have multiple logics.*" Furthermore, against the rationalist claim that only the behavior of states is determined by system structure, Wendt argues that "*the structure of the international politics also has construction effects on states.*" He criticizes the neo-realist stance with the following statement: "*Anarchy as such is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; anarchies only acquire logics as a function of the structure of what we put inside them*".⁷⁶

Wendt emphasizes the fact that he considers structure not in material but in social terms. Considering structure in social terms means that "*the actors take each other into account in choosing their actions. This process is based on actors ideas about the nature and roles of Self and Other, and such social structures are distribution of ideas or stocks of knowledge.*" Wendt draws a distinction between shared and private ideas and claims "*shared ideas make up the subset of social structure known as culture*". He acknowledges that private ideas might construct structures, however he maintains that its shared ideas that generally construct structures. As a result of this, Wendt argues that it is culture which constitutes the structure of the international system, which he defines as its political culture.⁷⁷

To demonstrate how these cultures constitute states, Wendt mentions three influential factors in the adaptation of cultural norms by actors: force, price and legitimacy. Wendt considers these factors as a reflection of the "*three different degrees to which a norm can be internalized and thus as generating three different pathways by which the same structure can be produced.*" Thus Wendt claims that the three types of anarchy cultures can be internalized in three different degrees (see Figure 1). Furthermore, Wendt suggests that the absolute construction of the actors only takes place in the third degree of the internalization of cultures. In the first and second degrees "*the culture is affecting just their behaviour or beliefs about the environment, not who they are or what they*

⁷⁶ **Ibid.**; pp. 247-249

⁷⁷ **Ibid.**; p. 249

want” The next section will provide an elaborate analysis of the three cultures of anarchy developed by Wendt.⁷⁸

BOX 6.4 Cultures of anarchy and degrees of internalization			
DEGREE OF INTERNALIZATION	3rd		
	2nd		
	1st	Hobbesian	Lockean
			Kantian
		DEGREE OF COOPERATION	

Adapted from Wendt (1999: 254)

Figure 1: Cultures of Anarchy and Degrees of Internalization ⁷⁹

a. Hobbesian

Wendt acknowledges that the logic of a Hobbesian culture is war of all against all. However, unlike the conventional view, he claims that the causes of the state of war are the shared ideas, not anarchy or human nature. Therefore the concept of enmity and how states perceive each other is vital in a Hobbesian Culture. Wendt suggests that “*enemies are constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not recognise the right of the self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self.*” Wendt notes that enmity and rivalry have a common ground as “*both does not fully recognise the self and therefore may act in a revisionist fashion toward it*”. However he makes a distinction between deep revisionism of enmity, which aims to eliminate the “Other”, and shallow revisionism of rivalry, which aims to revise only the Other’s behavior or property. Consequently the intentions of enemies are unlimited and the intentions of rivals are limited in nature. Furthermore Wendt suggests that whether the enemy is real or imagined does not affect the

⁷⁸ Wendt, Alexander (2009); Social Theory of International Politics, p. 250.

⁷⁹ Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2007); Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 169.

perceptions of the states because when they consider enemies as real then they will act accordingly.⁸⁰

According to Wendt, defining each other as an enemy might have four different consequences for a state's foreign policy conduct, which in turn produce "*a particular logic of interaction*". Firstly, the principle of "*kill or be killed*" forces the states to follow deep revisionist policies towards their enemies, even if they prefer a status quo policy. Secondly, the actors will base their decisions on the worst case scenario, that is to say "*negative possibilities rather than probabilities will dominate, which reduces likelihood of reciprocating any cooperative moves made by the enemy.*" Thirdly, "*if you want peace prepare for war*" will be the main principle of the states, which will lead states to increase their military capabilities because the enemy might wage a war "*as soon as he can win.*" Lastly, in case of a war the states will not limit their violence because the enemy might take advantage from the other state's self-restraint. Wendt notes that he considers power politics as "fundamentally social in the Weberian sense." Therefore, he defines power politics as Realpolitik rather than realist. He considers Realpolitik as "*a self-fulfilling prophecy*", whose beliefs produce behaviors "that confirm those beliefs". In short, enemy images have "*homeostatic quality that sustains the logic of Hobbesian anarchies.*"⁸¹

The above outlined concept is based on the micro level interaction between actors and how they perceive each other. In the macro level, the logic of enmity will prevail in the system after reaching a "*tipping point*", namely when the majority of the states consider each other as enemies. It is at this stage that actors begin to consider enmity as a feature of the system, which forces them to "*represent all Others as enemies simply because they are parts of the system.*" As a result of this, a logic of interaction emerges, which is "*based more on what actors know about their roles than on what they know about each other, enabling them to predict each other's behaviour without knowing each other's minds.*" Wendt suggests that the logic of Hobbesian anarchy produces four macro level patterns in the international system. Firstly, war becomes endemic and unlimited, which does not necessarily mean a constant state of war because of material limitations. However, as a result of collective perceptions of the Other as an enemy "*war may quite*

⁸⁰Wendt, Alexander (2009); Social Theory of International Politics, pp. 260-262

⁸¹ Ibid.; pp. 262-263.

literally at any moment occur". Secondly, the weak and unfit actors will be eliminated by strong actors. This will reduce the number of actors involved in the system, which will lead to power concentrations such as empires. Thirdly, the strong states will attempt to balance each other's power, which however will not be sustainable because in a Hobbesian anarchy "*the tendency toward consolidation*" will prevail in the long run. Lastly, in a Hobbesian anarchy non-alignment and neutrality will be very difficult since all the actors have to follow the logic of the system: "*kill or be killed*".⁸²

As mentioned before, there are three degrees of internalization of Hobbesian anarchy. In the first degree the actors are aware of the norms; however the actors act according to the norms because they are forced to do so, not because it is their intention. Therefore an actor's "*behaviour is purely externally rather than internally driven*". Wendt notes both status quo and revisionist powers comply with Hobbesian norms because shared ideas about the system force them to do so. According to Wendt the first degree of Hobbesian culture does not match much of recent Western history. However, he mentions that the post Westphalian system based on Lockean culture witnessed "*temporary regressions to a Hobbesian condition when a powerful state had an internal revolution and rejected Lockean norms altogether*", such as the French revolution, the following Napoleonic wars and the rise of national socialism.⁸³

In the second degree of internalization the actors comply with the norms because they believe it is in their self-interest. Therefore their behavior towards norms can be considered as instrumental. At this point actors start to justify their decisions with shared expectations, such as necessity and *raison d'état*. Wendt suggests that after a short time any Hobbesian culture will be internalized at least to the second degree, because the states have to comply with the logic of the system in order to secure their existence.⁸⁴

In the third degree actors comply with the norms because they consider them as legitimate. Norms constitute actors absolutely only in this stage and before this stage their identities and interests are not shaped by the culture. It is in this degree that "*actors identify with other expectations, relating to them as a part of themselves. The*

⁸² **Ibid.**; pp. 264-265.

⁸³ **Ibid.**; pp. 268-270.

⁸⁴ **Ibid.**; pp. 270-272.

other now inside the cognitive boundary of the Self, constituting who it see itself as in relation to the Other, its "Me"." As a result of this approach Wendt rejects the neo-realist stance on anarchy, according to which the source of the anarchy is human nature. Wendt argues that *"having defined their identities and interests in terms of a shared systemic culture, enemies become a group- albeit a dysfunctional one that has suppressed any sense of itself"*. Furthermore he points out that the more actors resist change the more their identities and interests are constructed by the shared beliefs and norms.⁸⁵

b. Lockean

According to Wendt the post Westphalian world is not a Hobbesian but Lockean system. However, it should be mentioned at this point that Wendt's theory is Eurocentric and he does not consider the other parts of the world in his analysis. Apart from this limitation he suggests that after the Westphalian agreement the "live and let live" logic of Lockean anarchy prevailed over the Hobbesian logic of "kill or be killed".⁸⁶

Lockean anarchy is based on rivalry rather than enmity of Hobbesian anarchy. In a Lockean anarchy rivals recognize the other states' sovereignty and their right to exist. Therefore conquest and domination of the other states are not among the characteristics of this system. However, this self-constraint does not mean that states settle their disputes peacefully and the use of force in the disputes is still an essential part of this system. Wendt suggests that rivalry might lead to territorial revisionism as well, because *"the right to property- enough to live- is acknowledged, but which property may be disputed, sometimes by force"*.⁸⁷

Wendt considers sovereignty as an institution, which is shared by many states. The recognition of others' right to exist is the essence of this institution. Wendt points out the fact that in the Westphalian system this right is recognized in international law as well, which makes it more than an abstract right. Today the majority of states recognize this law in spite of the nonexistence of a central authority. Yet this does not make the

⁸⁵ **Ibid.**; pp. 272-278.

⁸⁶ **Ibid.**; p. 279.

⁸⁷ **Ibid.**; pp. 279-280.

Lockean system “a complete rule of law system” because the rivals can use force to resolve disputes.

This type of culture of anarchy based on rivalry might have four consequences for states’ foreign policy behavior. Firstly, states follow a status quo policy towards other states’ sovereignty. Secondly, because the right of sovereignty is a commonly accepted right, the security threats decrease, which might cause absolute gains to prevail over relative losses. The states will still be concerned about their security, however in a far less intense way since “*certain pathways on the game tree- those involving their own death- has been removed.*” Third, the states do not rely on just military power as in the Hobbesian system because the states can easily find trusty allies in case of a threat. Lastly, in case of war the use of violence is limited as manifested in “*just war theory and standards of civilisation.*”⁸⁸

The concept explained in the above analysis is the micro level interaction between actors and how they perceive each other. In the macro level the logic of rivalry will prevail in the system after reaching a “tipping point”, namely when the majority of the states consider each other as rivals rather than enemies. It is at this stage “*states will make attributions about each other’s minds based more on what they know about the structure than what they know about each other, and the system will acquire a logic of its own*”. According to Wendt this structure produces four types of behavior at macro level. First is the limitation and acceptance of warfare at the same time. War is considered legitimate in terms of protecting interests, however it is also limited, “*not in the sense of killing a lot of people, but of not killing states.*” Moreover, wars of conquest are a rare phenomenon, and are opposed by the majority of the states for the sake of the status quo. Secondly, the death rate is lower than in Hobbesian culture and the Lockean anarchy has more stability in terms of membership. Wendt emphasizes that membership is the core of the logic of Lockean anarchy; since the states considered to be non members do not enjoy the right to sovereignty. Wendt illustrates his view with the survival of micro states such as Monaco and Singapore, who survived just because “*potential predators let them live.*” This means that weak states are protected because of the restraint of the strong, not because their power. Thirdly, the balance of power turns into “*a basis for order*” since it is not needed for the survival. Finally, the

⁸⁸ **Ibid.**; p. 282.

neutrality or non-alignment of a state is recognized by other states. According to Wendt his concept places Waltz's anarchy in a Lockean system.⁸⁹

As mentioned above, the norms of each culture can be internalized in three distinct degrees. The institution of sovereignty is the basis of the Lockean system. In the first degree states comply with the Lockean norms just because of the coercive power of other states or material limitations. Wendt points out the fact that if the majority of the states do not comply and recognize the norms of Lockean culture then there is always a danger that Hobbesian culture can take over the system. However, the relative stability of the Westphalian system demonstrates that Lockean culture has been more deeply internalized.⁹⁰

In the second degree, the actors adopt the norms because they believe it is in their self-interest, which makes their behavior towards the norms instrumental. The institution of sovereignty reduces security risks and enables cooperation between states for mutual benefits. Wendt notes that it is "*in this way the institution of sovereignty exert causal or regulative effect on states.*" Furthermore, it also has constitutive effects on states' behavior since "*the shared beliefs about what counts as violation of sovereignty*" facilitates the institution to work. Wendt suggests that in the second degree culture plays a much more important role than in the first degree, "*but still as an intervening variable between power and interest and outcomes.*"⁹¹

In the third degree case, the states adopt the norms of Lockean culture just because they consider them legitimate and identify themselves with the norms. Wendt makes a distinction between interest and self-interest, and explains interest as follows: "*our behaviour is still interested in the sense that we are motivated to obey the law, but we do not treat the law as merely an object to be used for our own benefit.*" Therefore, in the third degree states follow status quo policies both at the level of behavior and interests. As an example for this Wendt mentions that the USA let the Bahamas live although no power would have prevented a USA invasion of the Bahamas. Wendt's argument is that the USA has internalized the norms of sovereignty so deeply its

⁸⁹ **Ibid.**; pp. 283-285.

⁹⁰ **Ibid.**; pp. 286-287.

⁹¹ **Ibid.**; pp. 287-288.

interests and behavior are determined according to these norms, which has prevented a USA invasion of Bahamas.⁹²

c. Kantian

According to Wendt, the Westphalian system is mainly dominated by Lockean culture. There were some returns to Hobbesian culture in the past three centuries, however, each time the revisionist states were confronted and prevented by the status quo powers. Despite this domination of Lockean culture in the modern times, Wendt observes the emergence of Kantian culture - derived from Immanuel Kant's "perpetual peace" - in the post Cold War era, since the behavior of consolidated liberal democracies "*seems to go well beyond a Lockean culture.*" For instance, contrary to Lockean culture the north Atlantic states and many others have settled their disputes peacefully, and they have acted as a team in terms of their security.⁹³

According to Wendt the basis of Kantian culture is friendship as a role structure. There are two distinct features of this culture: first the non-violent method of dispute settlement; second the mutual assistance in case of a security threat towards any members of the security team. Wendt calls these characteristics the two rules of the Kantian culture, namely "*the rule of non-violence*" and "*mutual aid*". He notes three points about these rules. Firstly, "*the rules are independent and equally necessary*" Secondly, "*the friendship concerns national security only, and need not spill over into other issue areas*". Lastly, in contrast to alliances found in Lockean culture, "*the friendship is temporally open-ended*".⁹⁴

Pluralistic security communities and collective security are the outcomes of these two rules of friendship in Kantian culture. In a pluralistic security community the members of the community do not consider war as a legitimate way of resolving disputes and therefore do not wage war each other, and settle their disputes peacefully through negotiation, arbitration or courts. There is a distinction between a pluralistic security community and collective security system. A pluralistic security community is

⁹² **Ibid.**; pp. 288-289.

⁹³ **Ibid.**; p. 297.

⁹⁴ **Ibid.**; pp. 298-299.

established to settle the disputes among its member states, whereas a collective security system is mainly established to resolve the disputes between the community and non-member states. That is to say, the basis of collective security is mutual aid or “*all for one, one for all*” in case of security threats from outside. In other words, in a collective security system the self-help system is replaced by the Other-help system. Wendt notes that self-help systems may produce alliances between states; however there is a fundamental distinction between collective security and alliances. While in an alliance cooperation is self-interested and will be dependent on the continuum of the security risk: “*the collective security is neither threat nor time specific.*” The members of a collective security system consider themselves as “*a single unit for security purposes a priori*”. Furthermore, the military capabilities of member states require a different meaning in a collective security system. In alliances, the military capabilities of members may pose a threat to each other when the cooperation is over, whereas in a collective security system the military capabilities of members are “*an asset to all, since each knows they will only be used on behalf of the collective.*”⁹⁵

Wendt notes that universal collective security is compulsory for a Kantian culture at the macro level. However, he rejects the notion that a collective security system must be a universal system indicating two alternative options. Firstly, the states may establish collective security systems “*within relatively autonomous regional subsystems or security complexes*”. Secondly, in a balance of power system at macro level, the reason for cooperation between states within a bloc might be their commitment to “all one for, one for all” principle rather than their fears about the other blocs’ intentions. Wendt illustrates his view with the following statement: “*The fact that the members of a bloc can be either rivals or friends also helps us explain change over time, as in the case of NATO, which may have formed initially as an alliance with the expectation that it would be temporary, but seems to have become a collective security system with an expectation of performance*”⁹⁶

As the other cultures, the Kantian one can be internalized in three degrees. In the first degree the states comply with the Kantian culture norms because they are forced to do

⁹⁵ **Ibid.**; pp. 299-301.

⁹⁶ **Ibid.**; pp. 301-302.

so. Wendt rejects the notion that material coercion can only be explained by realist assumptions and suggests that it is also applicable to idealist theories. As mentioned before, one element of Kantian culture is the pluralistic security community, which according to Wendt can easily be rationalized by material coercion. In this security system the revisionist states are stopped from attacking other states by the sanctions of the status quo powers and the high costs of war. In the other part of Kantian culture, viz. collective security, there are two factors explaining cooperation in coercive terms, which pose a non-temporary security threat to all members. Environmental issues and the threat of a nuclear war can be seen as an example of this kind of threat, which might force the states to collaborate against their will.⁹⁷

In the second degree case states comply with the Kantian norms because of self-interest based on instrumental calculation about the advantage of Kantian norms. In the case of a pluralistic security community *“the costs of violating the norms still figure in states calculations, but rather thwarting an interest in aggression they are now viewed indifferently as simply part of the incentive structure for different behaviours.”* In the case of collective security the states perceive friendship as a strategy used to acquire advantages for themselves. According to Wendt, at this stage of internalization although states have a weak commitment to friendship, they act *“as if they were friends”*, helping each other in case of a security threat, which will continue permanently because of shared beliefs. Wendt acknowledges that it is a low possibility that a Kantian culture in the second degree might prevail at macro level because of the *“demanding obligations of friendship”*. However, he maintains that the states might achieve the second degree, since *“there is a lot more collective action in domestic life than the pure self interest model leads us to expect”*⁹⁸

Finally, in the third degree case states adopt the norms of Kantian culture because they consider them as legitimate. *“This means that states identify with each other, seeing each other’s security not just as instrumentally related to their own, but as literally being their own.”* Wendt concludes that in this degree the states must really consider each other as friends rather than behaving as if they were. Therefore the states must

⁹⁷ **Ibid.**; pp. 302-303.

⁹⁸ **Ibid.**; pp. 304-305.

*“make sacrifices for the Other for his own sake, because he has legitimate claims on the Self.”*⁹⁹

Wendt suggest that the Kantian culture would establish a “*decentralized authority*” or an “*internationalization of political authority*”, which looks neither like an anarchy nor a state. Wendt concludes that a “*Kantian Culture based on the rule of law*” would imply that “*two dimensions are relevant to the constitution of anarchy/non-anarchy rather than the traditional one, namely the degree of centralisation of power and the degree of authority enjoyed by the system’s norms.*”¹⁰⁰

To sum up, Wendt concludes that his model does not suggest that a change in structures is easy, however it may occur. Wendt questions “*whether the international politics evolve in a linear direction or progress over time*” and indicates that it has two dimensions, viz. vertical and horizontal. The first dimension raises the question of whether there is a linear progress in the internalization of cultures from the first to the third degree. Wendt notes that his answer to this question is a “qualified yes” because “*the longer a practice has been in existence the deeper it will be embedded in the individual and collective consciousness.*” The horizontal dimension arises another question of whether there is a linear progress in history from a Hobbesian culture to a Kantian one. Wendt answers this with the following statement: “*even there is no guarantee that the future of the international system will be better than its past, at least there is reason to think it will not be worse.*”¹⁰¹

d. The Process of Cultural/Structural Change

As mentioned previously Wendt suggests that cultural/structural change in the international system is possible but not easy because the existing culture of anarchy reproduces itself through practices and resists such a change. However, Wendt points out that “*agents and structures are themselves processes, in other words, on-going*

⁹⁹ **Ibid.**; pp. 305-306.

¹⁰⁰ **Ibid.**; pp. 307-308.

¹⁰¹ **Ibid.**; pp. 310-312.

accomplishments of practice".¹⁰² It is these practices and the interaction between agents that produce, reproduce and transform agents and cultures. Furthermore "*the process of interaction adds an irreducible and potentially transformative element*",¹⁰³ which might change the structure of the international system. Therefore Wendt rejects realism's single logic of anarchy and suggests that different cultures of anarchies such as Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian emerged in the international system throughout history. Consequently he suggests that a change in the culture of anarchy is quite difficult but possible.

In order to explain the process of change in the culture of anarchy, Wendt points out that there are two models of "*what is going on*" in the social process. On the one hand the rationalist model claims that the states' interests and identities are given and are not influenced by the interaction between states. The only change occurs in the behaviors of the states, which they modify according to their interests and incentives. On the other hand the constructivist model suggests that identities and interests of the states are constructed in the process of interaction. This model accepts the realist notion that the agents determine their behaviors according to incentives, however "*the assumption is made that more is actually going on in those choices than just the squaring of means to ends: actors are also instantiating and reproducing identities, narratives of who they are, which in turn constitute the interests on the basis of which they make behavioral choices*"¹⁰⁴

From the analytical point of view, Wendt says, there is no disagreement between these two models since they focus on different dimension of process. He suggests that "*it would be useful know the scope conditions for when each models assumptions hold.*" The rationalist model may offer a good explanation when we expect that the identities and interests of states will not alter in an interaction, whereas the constructivist model may provide a better analytical tool when we expect that they will vary. Finally he argues that "*rationalism for today and tomorrow, constructivism for the longue duree*", since change is more likely to occur in the long term. However, from the ontological

¹⁰² **Ibid.**; p. 313.

¹⁰³ **Ibid.**; p. 366.

¹⁰⁴ **Ibid.**

point of view, there is a stark disagreement between these models on the question of whether the agents are indigenous or exogenous to the interaction.¹⁰⁵

Wendt rejects the realist stance that self-interest is an “*external dues ex machine driving the international system*” and argues that it is a constant product of the system, whose existence depends on the practices. If the practice does not reproduce self-interest it will perish in the system. “*The possibility of structural change is born out of that fact.*”¹⁰⁶

d.1 The Two Mechanisms of Identity Formation

Based on what Wendt calls “interactionist social theory” he first proposes a general model of identity formation analyzing the production and reproduction of identities in social interaction. Wendt notes that there are two approaches to the mechanisms of identity formation, namely the natural and cultural selection approaches. Natural selection is dominant in nature and both natural and cultural selections are winnowing mechanisms in society. It should be noted that these approaches represent the materialist and idealist stances respectively, and not the rationalist and constructivist.¹⁰⁷

The first mechanism (natural selection) “*occurs when organisms that are relatively poorly adapted to the competition for scarce resources in an environment fail to reproduce and are replaced by the better adapted... Natural selection is not about a war of all against all, but about different reproductive success. This can be used to explain the evolution of species (states vs. city-states) or of traits (identities and interests) within a species, but mechanisms is the same, reproductive success of organisms.*”¹⁰⁸ Wendt notes that this approach is successful in explaining the emergence and dominance of the Hobbesian culture in the most part of human history, however it fails to explain the states’ identities after the Westphalian agreement since

¹⁰⁵ **Ibid.**; 366-367.

¹⁰⁶ **Ibid.**; p.369.

¹⁰⁷ **Ibid.**; pp.317-321.

¹⁰⁸ **Ibid.**; p. 321

the small states have been able to survive despite the inequalities of power and constant warfare.¹⁰⁹

Cultural selection (second mechanism) “*is an evolutionary mechanism involving the transmission of the determinants of behaviors from individual to individual, and thus from generation to generation, by social learning, imitation or some other similar process.*”¹¹⁰ The first mechanism of cultural selection is imitation. It shapes the identities and interests of states, “*when actors adopt the self-understandings of those whom they perceive as successful.*” both in material and status means. Wendt notes that imitation may change a population’s characteristics within a single generation, whereas natural selection requires many generations for such a change.¹¹¹ The second mechanism of cultural selection is social learning. “*The basic idea is that identities and their corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others... actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how they think Others see or appraise them, in mirror of Others` representations of the Self*”¹¹²

Wendt notes that despite the materialists’ focus on natural selection as the main determinant of identity formation, he prefers cultural selection. Natural selection may be more dominant at some stage, however “*cultural selection may still explain most of the variance in the cultural forms, and create the parameters within which natural selection operates.*” Thus both cultural and natural selection mechanisms might have been influential in the evolution of the egoistic states’ identities and interests.¹¹³

d.2 Collective Identity and Cultural Change

As mentioned previously, on the one hand rationalism argues that the states’ identities and interests are exogenous to the interaction between states and the structural change

¹⁰⁹ **Ibid.;** p.323

¹¹⁰ **Ibid.;** p.324.

¹¹¹ **Ibid.;** pp.325-326.

¹¹² **Ibid.;** p.327.

¹¹³ **Ibid.;** p.336.

only emerges “when the relative expected utility of normative vs. deviant behavior changes.” On the other hand constructivism suggests that the state’s identities and interests are endogenous to the interaction between states and the structural change emerges “when actors redefine who they are and what they want.” Wendt notes that structural change at the level of international politics requires collective identity formation. He explains collective identity with the following statement:

*“The mark of a fully internalized culture is that actors identify with it, have made it, the generalized Other, part of their understanding of Self. This identification, this sense of being part of a group or “we”, is a social or collective identity that gives actors an interest in the preservation of their culture. Collective interests mean that actors make the welfare of the group an end in itself, which will in turn help them to overcome the collective action problems that beset egoists.”*¹¹⁴

There are some limits to the formation of collective identity.

- It is relationship specific: Franco-German collective security does not include Brazil
- It is issue and threat specific: In a Lockean culture states are committed to others’ survival rather than their general security, since self-help still dominates the culture.
- It will be in constant conflict with egoistic identities: a sacrifice for Others is exceptional

Wendt summarizes his main point with following statement: “because the structure of any internalized culture is associated with a collective identity, a change in that structure will involve a change in collective identity, involving the breakdown of an old identity and the emergence of a new one.” Wendt distinguishes between identity change and structural change, because identity formation occurs at the micro stage and structural change occurs at the macro stage. In his analyses Wendt take the Lockean culture as his starting point because it is more relevant in today’s international system and attempts to demonstrate the process of the transformation of this culture into a Kantian one. According to Wendt, natural selection does not play an important role in a Lockean culture because the culture is not based on the principle of “kill or be killed”. As mentioned before, structural change is not easy because internal and external sources show resistance towards such a change. Thus even redefinition of some states’ identity

¹¹⁴ **Ibid.**; pp.336-340.

and interests is not enough for a structural change. Structural change only occurs after “enough important actors change their behaviour that a tipping point is crossed.”¹¹⁵

Wendt notes that imitation plays a significant role in “the tendency of many Third worlds and former communist states to adopt the institutional and ideological attributes of Western states”. However this tendency requires “the prior existence of a collective identity to which states are trying to gain membership, in this case West or Modernity”.¹¹⁶ Therefore Wendt focuses on the role of social learning in the formation of collective identity, which was explained in the previous section. Wendt proposes “four master variables “that could explain why states in a Lockean world would engage in prosocial security policies and thereby spur collective identity formation.”¹¹⁷

d.3 Master Variables of Cultural/Structural Change

Wendt’s four master variables include interdependence, common fate, homogeneity and self-restraint. Unlike the mainstream IR theories that consider the egoism of states as given and focus on the how these variables produce cooperation among egoist states, Wendt suggests that the main importance of these variables is to weaken egoistic identities contributing to the formation of collective identities. Furthermore, the variables are divided into two groups, namely the active (the first three variables) and permissive (self-restraint) causes. At least one efficient cause combined with self-restraint is necessary for the collective identity formation. Therefore self-restraint has a key role in this process, which has “deeper effects, enabling states to solve the fundamental problem of collective identity formation: overcoming the fear of being engulfed by the Other.”¹¹⁸

The first master variable is interdependence. “Actors are interdependent when the outcome of an interaction for each depends on the choices of other.” Interdependence does not only include cooperative but also enmity relations. Wendt notes that in order to

¹¹⁵ **Ibid.**; p. 338.

¹¹⁶ **Ibid.**; p. 341.

¹¹⁷ **Ibid.**; p. 342.

¹¹⁸ **Ibid.**; pp. 343-344

create collective identity, interdependence should be objective rather than subjective because in case of a collective identity actors consider each other's interests as their own and are interdependent by nature. There is a constitutive rather than casual correlation between subjective interdependence and collective identity. The main point here is the transformation of objective interdependence into a subjective one. Wendt analyzes the reasons and process of this transformation and suggests that interdependence will not just alter the behaviors of the states but also their very identities.¹¹⁹

The second master variable is common fate, which indicates a situation where actors' life or well-being depends on the fate of the group as a whole. Like the case in interdependence, common fate may only produce collective identity "*if it is an objective condition, since subjective awareness of being in the same boat is constitutive of collective identity, not a cause.*" There is a clear distinction between interdependence and common fate. The first one results from the interaction of two actors, the latter one produced by an outsider who considers and treats the first two as a group. Wendt notes that in the early stages of common fate actors may persuade their egoist interests, however in later stages their identities will be influenced by the cooperation and a collective identity will be formed.¹²⁰

The third and final efficient master variable is homogeneity or likeness. Likeness has two aspects in terms of organizational actors' corporate and type identities. "*The first refers to the extent to which they are isomorphic with respect to basic institutional form, function and casual powers.*" For instance states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are alike units in today's international politics. The second refers to the type variation within a given corporate identity, such as regime type. For collective identity formation both forms of homogeneity are relevant. Wendt summarizes his hypothesis with the following statement: "*increases in objective homogeneity cause actors to recategorize others as being like themselves. Categorizing others as being similar to oneself is not the same thing as identifying with them, but it fosters the latter in two ways.*" The first indirect influence is a decrease in the quantity and quality of conflicts,

¹¹⁹ **Ibid.**; pp. 344-349

¹²⁰ **Ibid.**; pp. 349-353.

which might stem from the dissimilarities of both identities. The second direct influence contributes to the phenomenon that actors consider each other *“as like themselves along the dimensions that constitute them as a group.”* This notion produces a pro-social behavior which is based on the following logic: *“if they are just like us then we should treat them accordingly”* However Wendt notes that homogeneity merely produces a collective identity and its contribution should be understood in context of other master variables.¹²¹

The fourth permissive master variable is self-restraint, which is vital in the creation of a collective identity promoted by the other three efficient variables. The increasing effects of the three efficient variables produce more incentive for actors to adopt a pro-social behavior, which weakens the egoism of the actors and persuades them to treat others as themselves. This whole process depends on whether the actors overcome *“their fear being engulfed, physically or psychically, by those with whom they would identify.”*¹²² Wendt concludes that *“self-restraint is not an active cause of collective identity because it says nothing about the willingness to help others... However, by helping to constitute a security community self restraint also reduces states anxieties about being engulfed if they give the Other some responsibility for the care of the Self, enabling the positive incentives provided by the other master variables to work... Self-restraint generates collective identity only in conjunction with the other factors in the model, but its role in that combination is essential.”*¹²³

2.4.1.2 Norms of International Society and the Influence of International Organizations

Another variant of systemic constructivism was developed by Martha Finnemore and Michael Barnett. Like the other constructivists Finnemore’s focus is on the formation of states’ interests and identities. However, unlike the Wendt’s approach, which analyzes the effect of the interaction between states on the identities and interests of the states, Finnemore draws attention to the norms of the international society and their influence on the identities and interests of states. Finnemore argues that identities and interests of

¹²¹ **Ibid.**; pp. 353-357

¹²² **Ibid.**; p.357.

¹²³ **Ibid.**; p.363.

the states are influenced by international forces, namely by the dominant norms of conduct in the international society.¹²⁴ In Finnemore's words:

*"States are socialised to accept certain preferences and expectations by the international society in which they and the people who compose them live... The fact that we live in an international society means that what we want and, in some ways, who we are, are shaped by the social norms, rules, understandings, and relationships we have with others. These social realities are as influential as material realities in determining behaviour. Indeed, they are what endow material realities with meaning and purpose. In political terms, it is these social realities that provide us with ends to which power and wealth can be used."*¹²⁵

Finnemore illuminates the impact of international society norms on national policies with three case studies: the role of United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) on the states' adaptation of bureaucracy of science policy after 1955; the role of the International Red Cross on the acceptance of the norms of limitations in warfare by the states; and the role of the World Bank on the states' recognition of the limitation of economic sovereignty *"by allowing redistribution to take priority over production values."*¹²⁶ In the first case study she suggests that the states learned how to establish science bureaucracies through UNESCO because this did not exist in the majority of the states until UNESCO promoted the establishment of these bureaucracies after 1955. As a result of this promotion the number of states where these bureaucracies exist increased from fourteen in 1955 to ninety in 1975. Therefore, Finnemore claims that UNESCO's propaganda, namely that a civilized and modern state should have a science bureaucracy, was influential in the spread of this bureaucratic form over the globe.¹²⁷

The states adopt the international society's norms mainly through international organizations, which exert influence on policies of states by setting the norms and constructing their interests and identities. Finnemore and Barnett consider international organizations as autonomous bureaucracies and as key actors at the international level. They argue that *"they are not simply passive collections of rules or structure through which others act. Rather, they are active agents of global change. They develop new*

¹²⁴ Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations, p.169.

¹²⁵ Finnemore, Martha (1996); National interests in international society, Cornell University Press, New York, p. 128.

¹²⁶ Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations: p.169.

¹²⁷ Finnemore, Martha (1996); National interests in international society, pp. 34-68.

policy ideas and programs, manage crisis and set priorities for shared activities that would not exist otherwise."¹²⁸ International organizations have authority and power "both because of their form as rational legal bureaucracies and because of their liberal goals." This enables them to influence states' behavior in direct and indirect ways.¹²⁹

According to Barnett and Duvall, international organizations might have four distinct forms of power in world politics, namely compulsory, institutional, structural and productive. Compulsory power is in effect when one actor can unilaterally force another actor to accept certain policies. The control of material resources by IOs (International Organizations), such as the World Bank, enables them to influence the national policies of states.¹³⁰ The IOs might also have compulsory power because of their normative values. For instance the EU forces its members and candidate countries to adopt certain policies and to reform their domestic institutions so that they will reach European standards.¹³¹ The other three forms of power are defined by Barnett and Duvall as follows:

*"Institutional power is in effect when actors exercise indirect control over others, such as when states design international institutions in ways that work to their long- term advantage and to the disadvantage of others. Structural power concerns the constitution of social capacities and interests of actors in direct relation to one another. One expression of this form of power is the workings of the capitalist world- economy in producing social positions of capital and labour with their respective differential abilities to alter their circumstances and fortunes. Productive power is the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification. A particular meaning of development, for instance, orients social activity in particular directions, defines what constitutes legitimate knowledge, and shapes whose knowledge matters"*¹³²

All in all, the IOs are powerful actors, rather than just instruments of states, because they are bureaucracies that persuade and promote liberal policies at the international level. However this does not necessarily mean that they just act for the sake of humanity, since like other bureaucracies they protect their own interests and may clash

¹²⁸ **Finnemore, Martha/ Barnett, Michael (2004);** Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, Cornell University Press, New York, p. 156.

¹²⁹ **Ibid.;** p. 162

¹³⁰ **Barnett, Michael/ Duvall, Raymond (2005);** Power in global governance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 3-4.

¹³¹ **Finnemore, Martha/ Barnett, Michael (2005);** Rules for the World, p. 176.

¹³² **Barnett, Michael/ Duvall, Raymond (2005);** Power in global governance, pp. 3-4.

with the interests of the states and citizens, whom they are meant to represent.¹³³ Thus Finnemore argues that the term international society does not indicate “*that we live in a Wilson or Ideal World. To say that social norms are at work internationally is not to pass judgment on the ethics or morality of those norms*” because “*sociability and community can operate for good or ill*”. For instance “*social norms can promote slavery, racism, and ethnic cleansing as well as acts of charity and kindness*”.¹³⁴

a. Constructivist Analysis of European Integration

The theories of European integration have been dominated by two rival approaches, namely, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, which share a common ground in considering integration as a process. Other theories like federalism are focused on the result of the integration process. All these theories are a reflection of the developments in European integration and IR theories.¹³⁵ Diez and Wiener observe three distinct periods in European integration history and theory. In the first phase between 1960 and 1980 the main focus of the theories was to analyze and explain the reasons for the integration and its possible results. In the second period between 1980 and 1990 integration theories were concerned with the analysis of governance. The classification of the emerging EU as a political system and the explanation of the political process in European integration were among the main areas of research interest in those years. In the final phase after the Cold War the EU transformed into an institutionalized body. Social and political outcomes of integration theory and conceptualization of European integration and governance were among the main research questions of integration theories.¹³⁶ It was in this phase that the rationalist and positivist approaches of the mainstream theories were challenged by critical theories. Subsequently, constructivism

¹³³ **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; Introduction to International Relations: p.171.

¹³⁴ **Finnemore, Martha (1996)**; National interests in international society, p. 128.

¹³⁵ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, Ashgate, Aldershot, p. 19.

¹³⁶ **Wiener, Antje,/ Diez, Thomas (2004)**; European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, cited in **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, Ashgate, Aldershot, p. 19.

offered “*nuances and insights to the analysis of European cooperation that are played down or overlooked in conventional analyses of that complex process*”.¹³⁷

Constructivists contributed to European integration studies by analyzing the different aspects of the integration process. As mentioned before, constructivism highlighted the importance of the norms, material structures and identities in the formation of political decisions. In the case of European integration they drew attention to the intersubjectivity and social context of the ongoing integration process. Christiansen et. al. argue that “*finding the tools to analyse the impact of intersubjectivity and social context enhances our capacity to answer why and how European arrived its current stage*”.¹³⁸ Constructivists reject the mainstream integration theories’ assumption that the process of integration is a strategic interaction between states with given interests. They draw attention to the impact of social learning, socialization and norms on the formation of the identities and interests of the actors in European integration. According to Checkel, social learning is “*a process whereby actors, through interaction with broader institutional context, acquire new interests and preferences.*”¹³⁹

Constructivism also rejects the realist claim that due to different national interests CFSP (common foreign and security policy) in the EU is not achievable, “*and the occasional progress in the field is merely tactical manoeuvring.*”¹⁴⁰ In this regard Glarbo considers cooperation in the CFSP a result of social interaction rather than as a consequence of national interests. He argues that “*the results of national diplomacies intentionally and unintentionally communicating to themselves and to each other their intents and perceptions of political co-operation*” therefore social interactions constitute

¹³⁷ Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations: p.173.

¹³⁸ Christiansen, Thomas/Jorgensen, Knud Erik/ Wiener, Antje (1999); the social construction of Europe, Journal of European Public Policy 6, no. 4, p. 529, cited in Özcan, Mesut (2008); Harmonizing foreign policy , p. 17.

¹³⁹ Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999); Social Construction and Integration, Journal of European Public Policy 6, no 4, pp. 545 and 548 cited in Özcan, Mesut (2008); Harmonizing foreign policy , p. 17.

¹⁴⁰ Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010); Introduction to International Relations: p.172.

intersubjective structures facilitating further cooperation.¹⁴¹ As put forward by Jackson and Sorensen the states in the EU might have different foreign policy interests and preferences, yet “*day- to- day practices of political cooperation significantly promotes a shaping of common perspectives and mutual coordination.*”¹⁴²

Constructivists also criticize the mainstream approaches on federalism and the EU, which represent the traditional dichotomy between “*the transformation of the EU into a federal state, or anticipated a roll- back towards more conventional intergovernmental cooperation.*”¹⁴³ Koslowski argues that constructivism offers a better understanding of European integration, rejecting the dichotomy between federalism and intergovernmentalism. He argues that “*Constructivism helps to retool federal theories for more persuasive analysis of the EU by refocusing attention on political practices, intersubjective meanings and informal norms. ... The challenge of analysis, of course, is to resist teleological explanations, accept the ‘in betweenness’ of the European polity and settle for understanding the European policy for what it currently is, rather than try to explain European integration toward some hypothetical ‘end state’ that it may never reach.*”¹⁴⁴

b. Europeanization in Member and Candidate States

The impact of the European Union on its member and candidate states’ domestic political structures is referred to as Europeanization. It is argued that EU membership or even prospects of it leads to significant domestic changes in the subject states. The foreign policies of the member and candidate states are no exception in this process. In

¹⁴¹ **Glarbo, Kenneth** (1999); *Wide-awake Diplomacy: Reconstructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6:4, Special Issue, p. 635., cited in **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; *Introduction to International Relations*: p.172.

¹⁴² **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; *Introduction to International Relations*, p.172.

¹⁴³ **Ibid.**; p.173

¹⁴⁴ **Koslowski, Rey (1999)**; *A constructivist approach to understanding the European Union as a federal polity*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(4), pp. 576-7 cited in **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; *Introduction to International Relations*: p.173.

the broader sense Europeanization is defined as the “*process of construction, diffusion and institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub national) discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.*”¹⁴⁵ Despite this broad definition, Europeanization often refers to the internalization of EU norms due to direct or indirect pressures from the EU both in member and candidate countries.

Apart from this conventional approach, constructivists draw attention to society rather than nation states and emphasize “*the multiple ways social reality is continuously created in processes that cannot be reduced to either agency or structures.*” Constructivism argues that in order to understand Europeanization, globalization and the history of modernity in which it occurs must be included in the analysis. Consequently constructivism considers Europeanization as a process of social construction, in which cultural dynamics play a significant role.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, constructivism suggests that it is the normative arguments rather than rational arguments, which play a substantial role in the critical decisions regarding the future of the EU such as eastern enlargement. Finally, this approach also highlights the role of identity in the decision making process within the EU, indicating the different responses of Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) to the adoption of a single European currency.¹⁴⁷ In brief, this approach highlights the influence of globalization in which Europeanization takes place, draws attention to the different logics of the construction of Europe and highlights the significance of norms and identities in the decision making.

In general the scholars of IR make a distinction between the effects of Europeanization and globalization. However the interaction between these two phenomena makes it difficult to identify their influence on the domestic political structures. It is argued that

¹⁴⁵ **Heather, Grabbe** ; Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process, in; **Featherstone, Kevin/ Radaelli, Claudio M. (Ed.) (2003)**; The Politics of Europeanization, Oxdord University Press, Oxford, p. 309.

¹⁴⁶ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, pp. 21-22.

¹⁴⁷ **Grigoriadis, Ionannis, N. (2009)**; Trials of Europeanization: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p.9.

on the one hand Europeanization may reinforce the effects of the globalization and on the other hand it may provide a protection against the unwelcomed effects of globalization for the EU states. Grigoriadis argues that “*careful process tracing and attention to the time sequences between EU policies and domestic changes allow us to distinguish between Europeanization and Globalisation effects.*”¹⁴⁸

According to Featherstone and Kazamias¹⁴⁹ the concept of Europeanization can be understood in three distinct dimensions:

- The increasing and expanding institutionalization at the EU level
- The incorporation of norms, rules identities and interests of actors at the level of member states
- The adoption of EU norms by non-member states. It should be mentioned that the third dimension might include the candidate states, such as Turkey, Croatia etc.

This section will first focus on the effects of Europeanization on the member states and then attempt to apply this framework on candidate countries, as Turkey is still a candidate country for the EU.

To begin with, the logic of interaction between the EU and the member states should be analyzed. This interaction is often referred to as a two level process consisting of bottom-up and top-down dimensions. While the bottom-up dimension focuses on the emergence of European institutions as a result of common norms, rules and practices, the top-down dimension emphasizes the effects of these institutions on the domestic political structures of the member states. Thus it is clear that the member states are both object and subject to Europeanization. It is argued that the member states may adopt three distinct strategies in order to protect their own interests towards the effects of Europeanization, which varies based on the economic power of the member states:

- Pace setting, i.e., Trying to impose certain policies at EU level, which represent the interests of the member state

¹⁴⁸ **Ibid.**; p.6.

¹⁴⁹ **Featherstone, Kevin/ Kazamias, George (Ed.) (2001);** Europeanization and Southern Periphery, Frank Cass, London, pp. 5-6.

- Foot dragging, i.e., Opposing or delaying of policies, which are against the interest of the member state
- Fence sitting, i.e., adopting a passive policy

In the adaptation to the EU norms the member states demonstrate different behaviors, in which the traditions and interests of the countries are influential variables. This process is referred to as the domestic adaptation with national colors. In the adaptation process “*EU member states change under the exertion adaptational pressures, whose strength is inversely proportional to the compatibility of pre-existing domestic conditions “goodness of fit”*” The transformation in the member states occurs smoothly if the domestic structures are compatible, whereas in case of an incompatible and enduring domestic structure, Europeanization leads to a radical domestic transformation, which faces a serious resistance and therefore its success remains uncertain. Furthermore “*the process of adaptation is further affected by the presence or absence and activity of mediating factors. Multiple veto points in the domestic structure, facilitating formal institutions, the organizational and policymaking cultures of a country, the differential empowerment of domestic actors, and learning are cited as examples of mediating factors.*” ¹⁵⁰

The foreign policies of the member states are less affected by Europeanization in contrast to other areas because the integration into the CSFP in the EU is still relatively weak and has not replaced the national foreign policies. Manners and Whitman¹⁵¹ developed a new framework in order to analyze the effect of Europeanization on member states’ foreign policies. In this framework there are three parts, each of which poses two questions, namely:

- **Foreign policy change:** the first question analyzes adaptations through membership, which attempts to assess the way in which the member states modify their policies towards the EU and other member states as a result of EU membership. The second question draws attention to the socialization of foreign policy makers, which “*analyses the role of social interaction in shaping the practices, perceptions and interests of policy makers and tries to*

¹⁵⁰ Grigoriadis, Ionnis, N. (2009); Trials of Europeanization, pp.5-6.

¹⁵¹ Manners, Ian/ Whitman, Richard (Ed.) (2000); The foreign policies of European Union Member States, Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp.6-11.

answer whether the sharing of information and common practices among decision makers leads to socialisation and the transformation of the common perceptions of policy makers.”¹⁵²

- **Foreign policy process:** this section analyzes the domestic and bureaucratic aspects of the foreign policy process in the member states. The first question in this section tries to understand the interaction between internal and external political forces and the influence of the domestic structures. The second part analyzes the legal status of the foreign policy bureaucracies in the decision making process and the interaction between bureaucrats and ministries.
- **Foreign policy actions:** the third section focuses on the foreign policies of the member states towards the EU members and non-member states. The first question analyzes the positive and negative impacts of the CSFP on the member states’ foreign policies. The second question deals with the EU member states’ special relations with other countries.¹⁵³

Grigoriadis¹⁵⁴ and Özcan¹⁵⁵ suggest that the concept of Europeanization may be implemented on the candidate countries as well, because the candidate countries are more vulnerable to the dictates of the EU and have limited force to influence the EU institutions. However there are some differences in Europeanization in candidate countries, namely power asymmetry and conditionality. Firstly, as mentioned before the IOs may exert compulsory power on the states to adopt certain policies and norms. The asymmetric relationship between the EU and candidate countries allows the EU to exert compulsory or coercive power on the candidate countries to adapt their domestic structures to EU norms. Secondly, the candidate countries are forced to comply with the conditions of the EU as a result of the uncertain outcome of the accession process.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵² **Özcan, Mesut (2008);** Harmonizing foreign policy, p. 25

¹⁵³ **Manners, Ian/ Whitman, Richard (Ed.) (2000);** The foreign policies of European Union Member States, pp.6-11.

¹⁵⁴ **Grigoriadis, Ionnis, N. (2009);** Trials of Europeanization, p.6.

¹⁵⁵ **Özcan, Mesut (2008);** Harmonizing foreign policy, p. 29-30.

¹⁵⁶ **Heather, Grabbe ;** Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process, in; **Featherstone, Kevin/ Radaelli, Claudio M. (Ed.) (2003);** The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 303.

Consequently it can be argued that this asymmetrical relationship allows the EU to determine the rules of the game in the accession negotiations and therefore there is no bottom-up process of Europeanization in candidate countries.

There are several mechanisms used by the EU to foster and force the required transformation in the candidate countries. Grabbe defines five mechanisms of Europeanization i.e., models: provision of legislative and institutional templates; money: aid and technical assistance; benchmarking and monitoring; advice and twinning; gate-keeping: access to negotiations and further stages in the accession process.¹⁵⁷

In case of the CSFP there are limited required legal changes for candidate countries. The candidate countries are expected to adopt the *acquis politique*, “*which means they will ensure that their national foreign policies comply with the positions of the member states within the framework of the CFSP. Contrary to the adaptation to the European standards by *acquis communautaire* during the accession process, there are limited things that the candidate countries should do, like promising not to do unexpected things like attacking their neighbours*”, the peaceful settlement of border problems and to have good relations with the neighboring countries. As a result of the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, Europeanization in this area in candidate countries is much more voluntary and non hierarchical.¹⁵⁸

To sum up, the concept of Europeanization can be applied to candidate countries such as Turkey since the candidate countries are subject to immense pressure from the EU to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. As witnessed in the last decade, “*Turkey’s desire to join to European Union have resulted in increasing adaptational pressures on Turkey’s domestic political structures, depending in their goodness of fit.*”¹⁵⁹ However, in the transformation of domestic political structures one must distinguish between the effects of Europeanization, globalization and domestic factors. This study will take these different factors into consideration and aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the factors contributing to the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and its foreign policy in the last three decade.

¹⁵⁷ **Ibid.**; 312.

¹⁵⁸ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, p. 31.

¹⁵⁹ **Grigoriadis, Ionnis, N. (2009)**; Trials of Europeanization, p.6

2.4.2 Unit-level Constructivism: The Emphasis on Domestic Factors

Unit-level constructivism is the opposite of systemic constructivism. Contrary to systemic constructivism's focus on the role of the international environment and norms in constructing state identities and interests, unit level constructivists highlight the significance of domestic factors in this process.¹⁶⁰

In order to demonstrate the influence of domestic factors on states' identities and interests, some constructivists focused on the different influences of international norms in various states indicating the role of domestic factors in this differentiation. For instance, Thomas Risse et. al. focus on the different levels of internalization of international human right norms in various countries. According to their study, the type of regime, the civil war experience and the existence of internal human rights organizations all influence a country's internalization of international human right norms.¹⁶¹

In a book edited by Peter Katzenstein, other constructivists focus on the area of national security suggesting that it is constructed mainly by domestic factors, namely the culture and identity of states.¹⁶² For instance Johnston finds “*a specific hard Realpolitik strategic culture in the Chinese tradition that informs and shapes Chinese security policies. The argument is that Chinese decision makers have internalized this strategic culture and that it has persisted across vastly different interstate systems, regime types, level of technology and types of threat.*” Therefore the neo-realist explanation of Chinese policies is inadequate since it does not take this Chinese strategic culture into consideration.¹⁶³

¹⁶⁰ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; Constructivism, p. 220.

¹⁶¹ **Risse, Thomas/ Ropp, Stephen C./ Sikkink, Kathryn (1999)**; The power of human rights: international norms and domestic change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

¹⁶² **Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed) (1996)**, The Culture of National Security: Norms and identity in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York.

¹⁶³ **Johnston, Alastair Iain (1999)** Cultural realism and Strategy in Maoist china, in: **Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed) (1996)**, The Culture of National Security, p.217, cited in **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; Introduction to International Relations, p 174.

Another scholar, Peter Katzenstein, has studied Japanese national security in order to develop a constructivist approach on the role of domestic factors in this area. Katzenstein drew attention to the point that the systemic theorizing fails to include the role of domestic structures on states' policies.¹⁶⁴ In order to explain his argument Katzenstein compares Japanese and German national security policies in the post World War II era. Katzenstein highlights the fact that both countries have developed very different domestic and external security policies despite their similar history of military defeat, foreign military occupation, economic development, their transformation from authoritarianism to democracy and nascent great power status.¹⁶⁵

As an answer to this phenomenon Katzenstein points out the role of different norms in both countries. Katzenstein suggests that *"in Germany the strengthening of state power through changes in legal norms betrays a deep-seated fear that terrorism challenges the core of the state. In effect, eradicating terrorism and minimizing violent protest overcome the specter of a Hobbesian state of nature."* He points out the turmoil of German politics in times of national crisis in the 1950s and 1960s resulting from the issue of the emergency powers debate, which lasted until a grand coalition of the two major parties took over power. Conversely, in Japan *"the close interaction of social and legal norms reveals a state living symbiotically within its society and not easily shaken to its foundation. Eliminating terrorism and containing violent protest were the tasks of a Grotian community."* At this point he notes that in Japan *"the pressure was much lower than in Germany to address the issue of national emergency in legal terms. Conversely, Germany's active involvement in the evolution of international legal norms conveys a conception of belonging to international Grotian community. Japans lack of concern for the consequences of pushing terrorists abroad and its generally passive international stance is based on a Hobbesian view of the society of the states."*¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ **Jackson, Robert/Sorensen, Georg (2010)**; Introduction to International Relations, p 174.

¹⁶⁵ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; Constructivism, p. 224.

¹⁶⁶ **Katzenstein, Peter J. (Ed) (1996)**; Cultural Norms & National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, Cornell University Press, New York, pp. 153-154.

Another contribution to unit level constructivism came from Ted Hopf who has studied the domestic formation of identity and interest in Soviet and Russian foreign policy in 1955 and 1999. Hopf notes that his study attempts to give “*an account of how states own domestic identities constitute a social cognitive structure that makes threats and opportunities, enemies and allies, intelligible, thinkable and possible.*”¹⁶⁷

To sum up, it can be suggested that on the one hand, unit–level constructivism makes it possible to explain the differentiation of identity, interests and action in various states, and on the other hand it fails to explain the similarities between states.¹⁶⁸ Therefore an approach considering both domestic and external factors is needed to achieve a comprehensive analysis of the formation of states’ identities and policies, which will be discussed in the coming chapter.

2.4.3. Holistic Constructivism: Cross Level Analysis of Influential Factors

The level of analysis has been always an issue in foreign policy studies. In the past decades the combination of both national and international levels of analysis – i.e. the mixing of levels - was perceived as unthinkable. Yet over the past two decades a considerable amount of IR scholars have rejected this limitation and adopted a cross level analysis approach. Checkel notes that “*today, an IR-FPA consensus seems to be emerging that we need synthetic, cross level approaches.*”¹⁶⁹

Constructivism is no exception to this new trend in FPA. Unlike systemic and unit level constructivists, who represent the conventional dichotomy between the national and international levels of analysis, holistic constructivists have adopted a cross level analysis approach, which aims to incorporate the two dimensions of international politics, namely domestic and international. “*To accommodate the entire range of factors conditioning the identities, interests of states, they bring the corporate and the*

¹⁶⁷ **Hopf, Ted (2002);** *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities & Foreign Policies*, Moscow, 1955 and 1999, Cornell University Press, p.16.

¹⁶⁸ **Reus-Smit, Christian;** *Constructivism*, pp. 224-225.

¹⁶⁹ **Checkel, Jeffrey T.;** *Constructivism and Foreign Policy*, p. 78.

social together into a unified analytical perspective that treats the domestic and international as two faces of a single social and political order."¹⁷⁰

Ted Hopf also prefers a holistic approach and points out the need for cross level analysis in foreign policy studies. On the issue of the significance of domestic and systemic factors in the shaping of states' identities, interests and policies Hopf summarizes his views in the following statement:

*"Although any understanding of world politics requires a theorization of the domestic and the systemic, there would be no systemic theory of world politics because world politics has no predominant system; it has subcultures, each of which can be understood only by examining how states constitute themselves in their societies. The answer to the question of who are enemies and friends begins at home. Finding out precisely how a state's identity affects the construction of its interests vis-à-vis another state demands that the social context in which that state's collection of identities is being discursively constructed be investigated as deeply and broadly as possible. This means exploring not only how that state's identities are produced in interactions with other states, but also how its identities are being produced in interaction with its own society and the many identities and discourses that constitute that society."*¹⁷¹

Like any other approach holistic constructivism has both contributions to and limitations in FPA. The predominant focus of holistic constructivists is the forces behind the global change such as the rise and decline of the states' sovereignty. In order to achieve a better understanding of this process they focus on the mutual constructive relationship between the global order and the state. In this regard Reus-Smit notes that *"holistic scholarship has the merit of being able to explain the development of the normative and ideational structures of the present international system, as well as the social identities they have engendered."* Yet the focus on the global changes might result in a more structuralist approach which neglects the role of human agencies in this process.¹⁷²

Apart from the limitation resulting from this predominant approach within holistic constructivism, in general it enables us to combine the two facets of international politics, which might lead to a better understanding of the formation of the states'

¹⁷⁰ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; Constructivism, p. 225.

¹⁷¹ **Hopf, Ted (2002)**; Social Construction of International Politics, p. 294.

¹⁷² **Reus-Smit, Christian**; Constructivism, p. 225.

identities and interests, which in turn shape their policies. Therefore this study will adopt a holistic approach in order to achieve a comprehensive analysis of the domestic and external factors that led to the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and interests in the past three decades.

3. A Holistic Constructivist Analysis of the Formation of the Turkish State's Identity, Interests and Foreign Policy (1919-1980)

Although foreign policy of a country is affected by the international system to some extent, it is obvious that it is also influenced by its specific system of government, political culture and its special circumstances. Therefore, instead of looking at general forms of behavior in international relations to explain all the interactions between states, each case has to be analyzed in its specific conditionality within the international system. *“In this context, Turkey is one of the unique players in the international system, encountering a complex set of interrelations with other players. Although one part or another of her interrelations could be fitted into, or explained by, one of the various different international relations and foreign policy analysis approaches, almost all of them, however, fail after a certain point to explain Turkish foreign policy as a coherent whole.”*¹⁷³

Specifying a certain number of variables which affect the identity, interests and foreign policy in all countries in same way is hardly possible. Furthermore, analysis of a specific case may need highlighting of different factors. Therefore in order to analyze the foreign policy of a specific country in a specific time period, some thought should be given beforehand to the variables that affect foreign policy.

There are several factors which affect a country's identity and interests, which in return informs its foreign policy making. Aydin notes that in the Turkish case these factors

¹⁷³ **Aydin, Mustafa (2004)**; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) Papers, December 2004, Ankara, p 4.

may be analyzed in two main categories. One category, which may be defined as domestic structural factors, is continuous, static and subject to change in the long run. The other, which may be defined as conjunctural factors, is dynamic and subject to change under the influence of internal and external developments in the short run.¹⁷⁴

The domestic structural factors are not affected directly by international politics and the daily happenings of foreign politics. *“They can exert a long term influence over the determination of foreign policy goals. Geographical position, historical experiences and cultural background, together with national stereotypes and images of other nations, and long term economic necessities would fall into the category of structural variables.”*¹⁷⁵

The second category of factors is conjunctural variables, which are affected by developments in domestic politics and international relations. Contrary to domestic structural factors, these dynamic factors do exert temporary influence on a country’s state identity and especially on its foreign policy’s daily implementation. Systemic changes in the international system, shifts in the balance of power, domestic political changes, economic factors and characters of decision makers can be considered within this category.

As mentioned in the second chapter, this study will adopt a holistic constructivist approach, which enables us to combine the two faces of international politics, namely internal and external. Combining both internal and external factors might be useful in order to achieve a better understanding of the formation of the Turkish state’s identity and interests, which have shaped its foreign policy. Therefore this chapter will first analyze the factors which shaped the Turkish state’s identity and its foreign policy until 1980, when Turkey underwent a fundamental economic transformation, namely the transition to the liberal economic model, which resulted in a substantial transformation of the Turkish state’s identity and society. The era after 1980 and the external and internal determinants of this transformation will be analyzed in the next chapter in order to achieve a comprehensive analysis of the transformation of the Turkish state’s identity, which in return reshaped its foreign policy in the past three decades.

¹⁷⁴ **Ibid.**; p.5.

¹⁷⁵ **Ibid.**; p.5.

Bearing in mind this theoretical framework, the first part of this chapter will analyze the domestic structural factors in the evolution of Turkish states identity and interests, which have exerted a long term influence over the determination of Turkish foreign policy. The second part of this chapter aims to describe conjunctural factors under two categories, namely domestic and external factors, which have exerted temporary effects on Turkey's state identity, interests and foreign policy. Finally in the third part the results of this chapter will be summarized.

3.1 Domestic Structural Determinants in the Making of Turkish Foreign Policy: Identity, Ideology, History and Political Culture

3.1.1 Legacy of the Ottoman Empire

The experiences and traumas of a society during the course of history are likely to exert an influence on a country's identity and its foreign policy in the long run. In this context, to some extent the Ottoman legacy has exerted a certain influence on the Turkish state's identity and its foreign policy culture. This chapter aims to describe the particular features in Turkish foreign policy which were inherited from the Ottoman Empire.

Although the founders of modern Turkey radically refused their Ottoman past and sought to break with its legacy, which symbolized to them “*ignorance, Corruption, backwardness and dogmas*”¹⁷⁶, the country has inherited some of its fundamental features from the Ottoman Empire. In order to understand the genesis of Turkish foreign policy these inherited features should be analyzed in more detail. In this regard Aydin argues that:

“Today, the Turkish nation carries the deep impressions of the historical experiences of being reduced from a vast empire to extinction, and then having to struggle back to save the national homeland and its independence. The struggle for survival and the play of realpolitik in the international arena, together with an imperial past and a huge cultural heritage left strong imprints on the national philosophy of Turkey and the character of her people. Furthermore, historical experiences cannot be separated from the present day life of a nation. Like individuals, nations react to both internal and

¹⁷⁶ **Ibid.**; p.8

external forces within the international political arena, based on their historical impressions, prejudices and national image of themselves and other nations. Good or bad, right or wrong, historical experiences colour a nation's reaction to events and forces in the political system. They limit the foreign policy options of the political leadership and are filters for viewing international reality”¹⁷⁷

First of all, it is important to realize that one of the concrete legacies of the Ottoman Empire in Turkey is its bureaucratic elite, which established the modern Turkish state. In its last two decades the bureaucratic elite of the Ottoman Empire was mostly dominated by Turks. These well-experienced elites played a crucial role in establishing the new Turkish state and nation.¹⁷⁸ Ironically it was these elites, which attempted to establish a new republic, a totally new nation and sought to break with the Ottoman legacy, who were the very source of the material connection between the Ottoman Empire and the modern Turkish state. As a result these elites transferred their experiences and policy making culture to the coming generations in modern Turkey. Not only the elites but also the majority of the Ottoman institutions and political culture were inherited by the modern Turkish state as well.

Secondly, the main foreign policy strategy of the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century, which was playing one great power against another for survival and the preservation of the status quo, was also inherited by the new Turkish state.¹⁷⁹ The Ottoman Empire's foreign policy during its early centuries was mostly motivated by its military offensive character. However, after losing its military superiority to European powers, which became obvious after the unsuccessful Vienna siege in 1683, the main foreign policy goal was the protection of the status quo by military and diplomatic means. After the siege of Vienna in 1683 the Ottoman Empire was steadily forced to withdraw from its Balkan regions. The attempts to modernize the army were never fully successful and sufficient. Thus the Ottoman Empire was forced to pursue its foreign policy by playing one great power against another for survival. This policy became one of the main features of Ottoman diplomacy in the 19th century, and due to the international system of the balance of powers it was successful to an extent in protecting the integrity of Ottoman Empire. The modern Turkish state inherited this policy and

¹⁷⁷ **Ibid.**; p.6

¹⁷⁸ **Ibid.**; p.9

¹⁷⁹ **Oran, Baskın (Ed.) (2006);** Türk Dış Politikası I, 1919-1980: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar (Turkish Foreign Policy I 1919-1980), İletişim , İstanbul, pp 46-49.

implemented it after the First World War using the differences between Britain, France and Italy to obtain independence.¹⁸⁰ *“One can also see that after the Second World War, Turkey’s well played role as a continuously threatened nation, gained resulting American aid which, at its highest point amounted to \$738.9 million for the year 1986, only third after Israel and Egypt.”*¹⁸¹

Thirdly, preservation of the status quo is one of the main fundamentals of the Turkish foreign policy making culture, which was also inherited from the Ottoman experience. Considering the history of Turkish foreign policy one can claim that its main objective has always been to preserve the existing status quo. The main features of a status quo policy are being conservative and defensive. There are just few examples of revisionism in modern Turkish history, such as the issues of Hatay, Mosul and Straits. In all these cases Turkey avoided taking unilateral measures and attempted to resolve these issues according to international law.¹⁸² According to Davutoglu, during the period of decline Ottoman elites were much too concerned with preserving the status quo under the heavy pressure of colonial powers, and their foreign policy towards its lost territories was mainly based on the notion of *“either absolute hegemony or absolute retreat”*. He argues that this notion prevented the Ottoman Empire and its successor, the modern Turkish state, from developing strategies in order to create spheres of influence in lost territories (except during the reign of the Abdulhamid II and the post Cold War era). Davutoglu notes that Turkey inherited this notion from the Ottomans, and its policies towards the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East are mainly shaped by this notion of *“either absolute hegemony or absolute retreat”*.¹⁸³

Fourthly, the nature of hostilities against the Ottoman Empire in its last two decades made it impossible for it to trust any state. One should also consider the impact of European financial control on the Ottoman Empire, exercised through the Public Debt Service after the Empire declared bankruptcy in 1881. In addition to this, since the Christian minorities had been used as a means of interfering in Ottoman authority

¹⁸⁰ **Hale, William M. (2000)**; Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, Frank Cass, London, pp.44-45.

¹⁸¹ **Aydin, Mustafa (2004)**; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, p.5

¹⁸² **Oran, Baskın (Ed.) (2006)**; Türk Dış Politikası I, 1919-1980 (Turkish Foreign Policy I, 1919-1980), pp. 46-49.

¹⁸³ **Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001)**; Stratejik Derinlik, pp. 52-54.

throughout the last decade of empire and the nature of playing great powers each other required extreme cautiousness and skepticism, these features became one of the fundamental features of Ottoman diplomacy.¹⁸⁴ This notion manifested itself in the modern common Turkish saying that *Turkey is a country which is surrounded by enemy states*, which are extremely efficient and can act in unison against Turkish interests. This brings us to another main feature of Turkish political culture, which is constant skepticism and cautiousness towards other states and the conviction that the external world is conspiring to weaken and divide Turkey. This phenomenon is often called Sevres Phobia or Syndrome¹⁸⁵, which will be analyzed in the coming section (s.2.1.2) in more detail. As a result of this legacy, Turkish policy makers and the public have always been skeptical about the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) financial aid programs and the intentions of the EU regarding the rights of Kurds in Turkey.

Fifthly, the Ottoman domination in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East has also had an effect on Turkey's relations with its neighbors. In particular, the inefficient and unpopular Ottoman domination in these countries in the 19th century left bitter memories of Ottoman rule. Therefore, Turkish foreign policy makers had to take these concerns into consideration when they dealt with former Ottoman regions. The negative effect of Ottoman domination in neighboring countries manifested itself obviously in Turkey's everlasting conflict with Greece and Armenia.¹⁸⁶ Another issue regarding the former Ottoman domination in Turkey's neighboring regions and countries is the religious and ethnic minority groups in those countries, which have close cultural connections with Turkey, as the majority of Muslims and Turks in Caucasus and Balkans fled to Ottoman Empire and Turkey in the 19th and 20th centuries whenever they had political problems in their countries. According to McCarthy, between 1827 and 1922 around 5 million Muslims were killed in the Caucasus and the Balkans as a result of Russian and Balkan Chauvinism. Therefore, within that time 5.4 million Muslims (Bosnians, Albanians, Georgians, Chechens, Abkhazs, Circassians and Turks) fled to Anatolia, as they considered the Ottoman Empire as a Muslim kin state.¹⁸⁷ In

¹⁸⁴ **Aydin, Mustafa (2004)**; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, pp.10-11

¹⁸⁵ **Kirişçi, Kemal (2006)**: Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, p. 32,

¹⁸⁶ **Aydin, Mustafa (2004)**; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, p. 11

¹⁸⁷ **McCarthy, Justin (1995)**; Death and Exile: The ethnic cleansing of ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922, Darvin Press, Princeton, pp. 1-5, 333-340.

1920 around 1/3 of Turkey's population consisted of these refugees.¹⁸⁸ With the increasing role of public opinion in Turkish foreign policy after the Cold War, the coming generations of these refugees played the role of a quasi-Diaspora and affected Turkish public opinion regarding the conditions and problems of these minorities. Therefore these concerns have been reflected increasingly in Turkish foreign policy towards these regions after the Cold War¹⁸⁹, which can be clearly observed in Turkey's policies toward Bosnia and Chechnya during the 1990s.

Sixthly, the notion that Russia represents a major threat to Turkey's security is another main feature of Turkish foreign policy. The roots of this notion can also be found in the long-standing conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire which has caused thirteen Russo-Turkish wars. This history of distrust, hostility and continuous conflict made the Turkish policy makers extraordinarily cautious about Russia and its intentions. When the Soviet Union demanded territorial cessions and special privileges on the straits after the Second World War the old memories about Russian expansionism became alive and this forced Turkey to become a part of NATO.¹⁹⁰

Finally, belonging to a nation which had found empires and been master of a world empire caused a sense of greatness and self-confidence in the common Turkish mind. The fact that majority of Turks do not consider the Ottoman Empire as a classical colonial power is also important to understand the modern Turkish state's policies. *"It is frustrating for them to be in the position of, and regarded as, a second-rate power. This frustration, perhaps in large part, explains Turkish sensitivity to insult and criticism, related to her dependence upon the great powers, and to exclusion from important international conferences"*¹⁹¹

3.1.2 Sevres Syndrome/ Phobia/ Complex

¹⁸⁸ **Hale, William M. (2000)**; Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000; p.17.

¹⁸⁹ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the middle east, Ashgate, Aldershot, pp.81-82.

¹⁹⁰ **Aydin, Mustafa (2004)**; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, p. 12

¹⁹¹ **Ibid.**; p. 12.

As mentioned above, one of the aspects of Turkish political culture is Sevres Syndrome. It is “an expression used in international relations to describe the paranoia of the Turkish secular bureaucracy and its politicians. This takes the form of an irrational fear that Western powers are bent on dismantling Turkey visà- vis the abortive Treaty of Sèvres in 1920.”¹⁹² This phenomenon has been investigated increasingly in recent studies and referred to as the “Sevres- Phobia, Syndrome or complex”.

The treaty of Sevres was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the allied forces at the end of World War I. It was drawn up by the allied forces and imposed the division of Anatolia into small states and occupation zones (See Figure 2). However this treaty was never ratified by the Ottoman Parliament. Moreover, following the Turkish War of Independence the treaty was replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.




Figure 2: Partitioning of Anatolia and Thrace According to the Treaty of Sèvres ¹⁹³

¹⁹² Guida, Michelangelo (2008); The Sevres Syndrome and “Komplo” Theories in the islamist and secular press, Turkish Studies, Volume 9, Issue 1, March 2008, p. 38.

¹⁹³ Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_S%C3%A8vres (accessed on 13.03.2010, 15:13)

The fact that the Treaty of Sevres is a matter of history does not necessarily mean that it has no influence on the Turkish state's identity and its political culture today. In order to achieve a full comprehension of Turkish politics, this paranoia should be analyzed in more detail. Guida claims that this experience affected Turkish opinion of the West for years to come. According to a Survey conducted in 2006, 72 percent of Turks were convinced that some countries would like to divide Turkey. Guida suggests that this opinion is shared by the majority of Turkish intellectuals as well. ¹⁹⁴

This phenomenon is driven by several factors. To begin with, the long tradition within Turkish policy making of viewing the world from a Realpolitik perspective can be associated with the Sevres Phobia. Furthermore, it is also a reflection of the long lasting territorial loses of the Ottoman Empire to the European powers.¹⁹⁵ The other factors are described by Guida as follows: *“this “insecurity complex” has been reinforced by other threats and dangers to Turkey’s national security in the intervening years, ranging from Stalin’s expansionist statements in the mid-1940s, to Armenian and Syrian irredentism, to the bilateral military cooperation of Greece and Syria, to the invasion of Iraq, and finally, to Turkey’s ostracism from the European Union.”*¹⁹⁶

The Sevres Phobia promoted the notion that foreign and security policy must be exempted from daily politics in order to preserve Turkey's territorial integrity. This type of understanding of foreign policy making facilitated the idea that in order to not to jeopardize national security, democracy should be limited. In return this notion leads Turkish politicians like former “social democrat” Prime Minister Ecevit to articulate such statements as: *“The vulnerability of Turkey demands a special type of democracy”*.¹⁹⁷ On the other hand, “the military plays a critical role in perpetuating the Sevres Phobia” as well, because Turkish security culture is mainly shaped by the Turkish military. This culture is *“characterised by a deep sense of suspicion and a tendency to shy away from cooperation.”*¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁴ Guida, Michelangelo (2008); The Sevres Syndrome and “Komplo” Theories in the islamist and secular press, p. 38.

¹⁹⁵ Kirişçi, Kemal (2006); Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, p.33

¹⁹⁶ Guida, Michelangelo (2008); The Sevres Syndrome and “Komplo” Theories in the islamist and secular press, p.38

¹⁹⁷ Kirişçi, Kemal (2006); Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, p. 35

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.; p. 33

The Sevres Syndrome is crucial to understanding Turkish politics. It casts light on Turkish foreign relations, policies, and various Turkish positions towards international issues. Guida points out that this syndrome has been also the source of irrational overreactions and behaviors from Turkish politicians and the public,¹⁹⁹ as has been witnessed with the Cyprus issue and in relations with the EU. In such cases it is mostly manipulated by elites and politicians to influence the public opinion towards the external world.

It has been suggested that in recent years the definition of national security is changing and the influence of Sevres phobia is weakening. The excessively securitized traditional foreign and security policy making culture is dissolving. It is an ongoing process, in which Turkey's relations with the EU will be critical.²⁰⁰ At the same time the architect of JDP's foreign policy, Ahmet Davutoglu, also criticises Sevres Phobia harshly and suggests that Turkey has to free itself from this paranoia and follow a more active foreign policy in order to improve its international status.²⁰¹

3.1.3 State Ideology: Radical Westernization, Kemalism

In the wake of European military superiority the Ottoman Empire started to modernize its army in the 18th century. The main question at that time was “how to save the state”. In the beginning the reforms included just the military. The Ottomans were convinced that the modernization of the army would be sufficient to preserve the state's integrity. However the quasi-successful modernization of the army could not prevent the Ottoman territorial losses. Moreover, European imperialism and nationalism undermined the foundation of the “Ottoman millet system”. The response of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite was to extend the reforms (Tanzimat) to all areas.²⁰² These reforms resulted in

¹⁹⁹ **Guida, Michelangelo (2008)**; The Sevres Syndrome and “Komplo” Theories in the islamist and secular press, p.37

²⁰⁰ **Kirişçi, Kemal (2006)**; Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, p. 33

²⁰¹ **Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001)**; Stratejik Derinlik, p. 60-61

²⁰² **Ahmad, Feroz (2004)**; The making of modern Turkey, Routledge, London. pp. 3-4.

identity crises among the Ottoman intelligentsia. The last quarter of the 19th century witnessed a long debate among the Ottoman intellectuals to find a new identity. These intellectuals gathered around four political movements, namely Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism and Westernism.²⁰³

Ottomanists suggested creating a new sense of Ottoman citizenship among all the millets. Their main suggestion was that equal rights for all citizens and creation of more liberal institutions would preserve the country's integrity. At the same time Islamists sought to unite all Muslims under one authority, by offering them a sense of Islamic political identity. On the other hand the Turkists dreamed of creating a Turkish empire consisting of all Turkish people in the world. However, the increase of nationalism among different Muslim subjects such as Arabs, Albanians and the Christian population made the Ottomanist and Islamist ideas irrelevant. Given the geopolitical and historical realities, the majority of Turkish intelligentsia realized the utopian character of Turkism as well. Although all these political movements were in favor of modernization of the country, none of them pledged a total break with the values of Islamic civilization. Therefore these movements cannot be regarded as the foundation of the modern Turkish state.²⁰⁴

Contrary to the above mentioned three movements, Westernism suggested adopting all Western values and an absolute integration to Western civilization. The founder of the modern Turkish State, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was a convinced Westernist and strongly believed that the future of Turkey was within the Western culture and civilization. Thus Westernism can be considered as the basis of the new Turkish Republic. Cooper highlights the fact that Atatürk himself is the most important institution in modern Turkey.²⁰⁵ Thus the most important factor, which affects Turkish foreign policy making culture, is Atatürk's practice of foreign policy and his commitment to the Westernization of Turkey. Atatürk's principles of foreign policy include:

²⁰³ **Çalış, Şaban (1996)**; The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, p. 39

²⁰⁴ **Ibid.**; pp. 40-42.

²⁰⁵ **Cooper, Malcolm (2002)**; The legacy of Atatürk: Turkish political structures and policy-making, *International Affairs* 78, 1 (2002), p.118.

- Orientation towards the West
- International peace, derived from the “peace at home, peace abroad” axiom
- Preservation of the status quo, rejection of revisionism and irredentism
- Realism: realization of the country’s power limits and rejection of so called “Ottoman Adventurism”
- Legality, solving international issues by legal means, such as issues of the Straits and Mosul
- Foreign policy as a natural corollary of Turkey’s Westernization and modernization²⁰⁶
- Refusal of participation in any alliances or conferences on the basis of religion (Islam), which is considered against the secular identity of the Turkish state.²⁰⁷

Ataturk’s *“foreign policy objectives reflected a departure from the expansionist ideology of the Ottoman Empire. He was mainly concerned with independence and sovereignty, thus with his motto of peace at home, peace in the world, he, while aiming to preserve the status quo, sought a deliberate break with the Ottoman past in every aspect of life.”*²⁰⁸ After the independence war, Ataturk carried out the following radical reforms in order to establish a new secular-modern nation and state:

- Abolition of the sultanate (1 November 1922) and the Caliphate (3 March 1924)
- Proclaiming of the Turkish Republic (29 October 1923)
- Replacement of the traditional religious education system with a secular system
- Prohibition of the use of “fez” and “turban” and legal enforcement of the wearing of the European hat (25 November 1925)
- Abolition of Islamic courts and Islamic law (8 April 1924) and their replacement with a new legal system based on a Swiss civil code (17 February 1926)
- Prohibition of the dervish order activities and visits to tombs of sultans (30 November 1925)

²⁰⁶ **Stone, Leonard A. (2004);** Turkish Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity, Insight Turkey, Volume 6, Number 4/2004, p. 71.

²⁰⁷ **Çalış, Şaban (1996);** The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, p. 90.

²⁰⁸ **Aydin, Mustafa (2004);** Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, p.6

- Replacement of the traditional calendar with the Gregorian calendar
- Language reform; creation of a new modern Turkish language
- Disestablishment of Islam as state religion (10 April 1928)
- Replacement of Arabic letters with the Roman alphabet (1 November 1928)
- Placement of secularism in the Constitution (5 January 1937) ²⁰⁹

The rejection of the Ottoman Empire and old social system manifested itself in the six principles of Kemalism: Nationalism, Populism, Secularism, Republicanism, Statism and Reformism. Aydın mentions that many of these principles have foreign policy implications. *“Though the original Kemalist goals of national foreign policy underwent various mutations, practically all Turkish governments, regardless of their standpoints, put his “indisputable dogma” into their programmes and have not, and could not implement policies that ran counter to Kemalist principles.”*²¹⁰ In an interview, a veteran Turkish diplomat and politician Ümit Haluk Bayülken stated that *“We were raised in the spirit of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and were implementing his guiding principles with firm adherence.... His ideas have been whole heartedly accepted and implemented by generations of Turkish diplomats and politicians. These ideas became the guidelines of Turkish foreign policy...”*²¹¹

There is almost a unanimous consensus among the scholars that the fundamental feature of Turkish foreign policy is its orientation towards West.²¹² However, there are two

²⁰⁹ **Aksin, Sina (2007)**; Turkey from empire to revolutionary republic; the emergence of the Turkish nation from 1789 to present, Hurst & Company, London, pp. 191-216.

²¹⁰ **Aydın, Mustafa (2004)**; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, p.17

²¹¹ **An interview with Ambassador Ümit Halûk Bayülken**: Turkish foreign policy: past, present and future, Insight Turkey, Volume 4, Number 4/2002, p. 17.

²¹² **For example See: Bacik, Gökhan/ Aras Bülent (2004)**; Turkey’s Inescapable Dilemma: America or Europe?, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.3, No.1, Spring 2004, pp. 57-58; **Oran, Baskın (Ed.) (2006)**; Türk Dış Politikası I, 1919-1980: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar (Turkish Foreign Policy I 1919-1980), İletişim, İstanbul, pp. 49-52; **Sander, Oral (2006)**; Türkiyenin Dış Politikası (Turkey’s Foreign Policy), İmge, İstanbul, pp. 71-73; **Çalış, Şaban (1996)**; The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham, pp.7-8; **Aydın, Mustafa (2004)**; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, SAM (Center for Strategic Research) Papers,

main approaches regarding the nature of Turkish foreign policy. While some scholars argue that Turkish foreign policy is mainly shaped by Kemalist ideology and has followed its principles, others claim that it has had always a pragmatic approach towards external world. It is clear that these two approaches do not provide sufficient explanation of today's Turkish foreign policy. Although the traditional Turkish foreign policy cornerstones remain in place and provide continuity, there are some new elements in Turkish foreign policy after the post Cold War era, which cannot be explained only by pragmatic or ideological reasons. These new elements indicate a transformation in Turkish foreign policy's foundations, which will be discussed in the coming sections in more detail. It is unlikely that this transformation will change Turkey's orientation towards West; however it is changing Turkey's attitude towards other regions and Turkish foreign policy is obtaining a more multidimensional approach.

3.1.4 Clash of Identities: “Torn Country” and “Divided Self”

The founding fathers of Turkey attempted to establish a nation according to the standards of Western civilization. Their nation was an “*imagined community*” as described by Benedict Anderson. The modern Turkish state was not an outcome of an already developed national identity. Instead it was the Turkish nation which was established by the power of the Turkish state and a revolution from above. There were different races among the population and the majority of the people were Muslim-conservative, who did not share the ideas of the Kemalist elite at that time.²¹³ Therefore Calis argues that it is possible to distinguish between national identity and state identity in Turkey. By the phrase Turkish state identity he means “*a particular body of*

December 2004, Ankara, p 9; **Sönmezoğlu, Faruk**; Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin dış politikasında süreklilik ve değişim (Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy) in: **Sönmezoğlu, Faruk (Ed.) (2001)**; Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), Der Yayınları, İstanbul, p.1047.

²¹³ **Fuller, Graham E. (2004)**; Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004, p. 53.

principles and ideas which the Turkish state identifies itself".²¹⁴ He emphasizes that there are different definitions of the Turkish national identity besides the Kemalists' definition, which vary according to assumptions of different groups such as Turkists, Ottomanists and Islamists. Considering Turkish history one could argue that that none of these different identities were reflected in Turkey's foreign policy²¹⁵ until the end of the Cold War.

After the establishment of the Republic in Turkey, the Kemalist elite implemented a very radical Westernization/modernization, secularization, and Turkification process in order to create a Western society and a Turkish nation state. These elites were able to create a minority among the Turkish population, which were mainly living in the cities and supported the ideas of Kemalism and Westernization.²¹⁶ However until the late 40s the majority of the population (in 1940 81%) were living in the rural areas²¹⁷ and had not been affected by the ideas of the Kemalist elite. The 50s and 60s witnessed a rapid urbanization and industrialization, which brought these conservative masses into the cities.²¹⁸ Thanks to the transition to a multi party system in 1945 they became more involved in political life. Although these conservative masses were in favor of modernization, they did not support the Kemalist radical secularization and Westernization. As a result of these factors Turkish society was divided into two main camps, namely the Westernized secular culture of the tiny but influential bureaucratic elite and the Islamic culture of the indigenous population.²¹⁹ As put forward by Baran, this division still affects Turkish politics today. In the context of the 2007 presidential election discussions, Baran clearly demonstrates that Turkish society is divided into two main camps between secular republicans and Islamists (supported by liberal

²¹⁴ **Çalış, Şaban (1996)**; The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, p.26.

²¹⁵ **Ibid.**; p.24

²¹⁶ **Ahmad, Feroz (2004)**; The making of modern Turkey, p.92

²¹⁷ **Aksin, Sina (2007)**; Turkey from empire to revolutionary republic, p. 240.

²¹⁸ **Zürcher, Erik Jan (2004)**; Turkey: A Modern History, Tauris, London, p.226.

²¹⁹ **Ahmad, Feroz (2004)**; The making of modern Turkey, p.92.

democrats).²²⁰ Thus it can be argued that this division has been influential in Turkish political life until today.

According to Calis, Turkish foreign policy is determined by the Turkish state's identity, not the Turkish nation's identity.²²¹ Yet the struggle between these two identities has caused many problems in Turkish political life. The movements against Kemalist principles and radical secularization/Westernization have been marked by the state elite as an "*internal threat*". Davutoglu argues that the concept of an internal enemy resulted in a focus on internal problems, which in return undermined the strategic thinking of Turkish foreign policy and prevented it from developing strategies to increase its influence in surrounding regions.²²² Davutoglu argues that the imposition of radical Westernization and secularization by the Kemalist elite on Turkish society is responsible for the social phenomenon of the "divided self".

According to Davutoglu, Laing's study of "the divided self"²²³ could present a theoretical framework in order to understand the division of Turkish society. According to Laing's study, the conflict between the "*Inner self*" and "*embodied self*" produces a crisis between "*self*" and its surroundings. The "*self*", which is alienated from its "*body*", identify itself with a "*false self*". Davutoglu emphasizes that one can implement this theoretical framework into societies as well and identifies the consequences of such an identity crisis in Turkish society. He claims that the body of a society is its history and geography. Subsequently, he associates a society's alienation from its history and geographical realities with the "*self's*" alienation from its body, which causes identification with a "*false self*". Davutoglu claims that in order overcome this problem Turkey needs to make peace with its history and culture.²²⁴ In this regard Aydin also detects an identity crisis in Turkey, due to the fact that the self-image of

²²⁰ **Baran, Zeyno (2008)**; Turkey Divided, Journal of Democracy, Volume 19, Number 1 January 2008, p. 55.

²²¹ **Çalış, Şaban (1996)**; The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, p. 25.

²²² **Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001)**; Stratejik Derinlik, p. 63.

²²³ **See Laing, R.D (1999)**; The divided self: an existential study in sanity and madness, Penguin, Harmondsworth.

²²⁴ **Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001)**; Stratejik Derinlik, p. 59.

Kemalist elites, who identified themselves with Western secular values, is not shared by the larger part of public opinion.²²⁵

Another scholar, who has paid extra attention to the division in Turkish society, is Samuel Huntington, who describes Turkey as a “*classic torn country*”. He defines a torn country as follows: “*A torn country has a single predominant culture, which places it in one civilisation but its leaders want to shift it to another civilisation.*”²²⁶ He also indicates two features of torn countries; the first being referred to by their leaders as a bridge between two cultures, and the second being described by scholars as Janus-faced. This definition almost perfectly matches the situation of Turkish society. According to Huntington, a successful redefinition of civilizational identity requires three conditions, although he also mentions that “*it also to date has failed*”:

- The overall support of the political and economic elite
- The willingness and acceptance of the public
- The acceptance by the dominant elements in the host civilization²²⁷

Although Huntington overestimates the support of the Turkish public he claims that for many years Turkey met two of the three conditions for a civilizational shift, namely the support of the overwhelming majority of elites and public. Yet the unwillingness of the elites of Western civilization to accept Turkey prevented this transformation. Meanwhile the rise of political Islam activated anti-Western ideas among the public, which in return undermined the secularist pro-western orientation of the Kemalist elites. Therefore Turkey would remain a torn country. Huntington also highlights the fact that a growing number of Turkish politicians in the 90s described Turkey as a “bridge between cultures”, which confirms that Turkey is a torn country, because “*a bridge is an artificial creation connecting two solid entities but is part of neither*”.²²⁸

²²⁵ **Aydin, Mustafa (2004)**; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, p 24.

²²⁶ **Huntington, Samuel P. (1998)**; The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, Touchstone Books, London, p. 138.

²²⁷ **ibid.**; p. 139

²²⁸ **ibid.**; pp. 148-149.

The above mentioned split in Turkish society has been affecting Turkish political life since the establishment of the Republic. At the same time it has had some inevitable consequences for Turkish foreign policy making, one of which is a focus on internal problems causing a lack of strategic thinking and planning towards surrounding regions. The categorical rejection of the Islamic and Ottoman heritage and the desire to become a part of Western culture resulted in an alienation from the Middle East and the Third World. This has caused an imbalance in Turkish foreign policy with an overemphasis on ties with the West to the neglect of Turkey's interests with other regions. During the Cold War Turkey had been regarded an agent of America in the Middle East. Turkey was denounced by non-western and non-aligned countries at the 1955 Bandung Conference and was attacked as blasphemous by Islamic countries. It was not until the crisis of Cyprus that Turkey understood the consequences of such isolation from the Muslim world and the Third World. Furthermore, the 90s witnessed an increase in the role of NGOs and public opinion in Turkish foreign policy making, which put pressure on the Kemalist elite to take into consideration the public's views regarding issues such as Bosnia, Chechnya and Azerbaijan²²⁹.

In conclusion, considering all of these facts, one might claim that the split in Turkish society has been and will be affecting the country's political life until some consensus can be reached in Turkish society about the country's identity. Until that time it will remain a considerable obstacle to Turkey focusing its energy on foreign policy objectives effectively.

3.1.5 The Extraordinary Role of the Turkish Army: "Ruling but not Governing"²³⁰

There is almost a consensus among scholars that the military in Turkey has been playing a substantial role in its political life since the establishment of the Republic, and that there seems to be a regular pattern of military intervention in political life. Furthermore, compared to other institutions, the Turkish army has enjoyed a great deal

²²⁹ **For example see: Bulut, Esra (2004);** The Role of Religion in Turkish Reactions to Balkan Conflicts, Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2004, pp.1-13.

²³⁰ **Cook, Steven A. (2007);** Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey, The Johns Hopkins University Press.

of legitimacy in the eyes of the Turkish public throughout history as a result of its role in the Independence War.²³¹ However, the roots of the Army's involvement in Turkish political life has to be understood in the context of Turkish history, since throughout history the military has always been regarded one of the main features of Turkish culture. In the earliest historical records regarding the Turks, they were mentioned as riding nomads and mercenaries in Central Asia.²³² They had no formal organs of a government, and their livelihood mainly came from raising flocks. From the early second century, because of the changing climatic, military and political conditions these nomadic Turkic tribes (Oguz Turks) were forced to migrate to the West, where they met settled civilizations. From the 8th century onwards the Turks came into contact with Islamic civilization for three centuries. As a result of this contact the majority of Oguz Turks converted to Islam. Many of them served as members of the Abbasid caliphate armies, in which they rose to powerful positions. Some of them established their own states such as the Karahandis and Gaznevids. However, the most powerful of them was the Great Seldjuq Empire, which assumed the role of protectors of the Abbasid caliphs and orthodox Islam. After the Mongol invasion in the 13th century Seldjuq Empire was weakened and was replaced by various Turcoman principalities in Anatolia.²³³

One of these principalities was the Ottomans, who inherited the spirit of "*ghaza*" (holy war) from the former Turkic Seljuq Empire. Beside its complex political organization, the Ottoman Empire was a vast military establishment, which was created and sustained by territorial expansion. During the battle Ottoman soldiers shouted: "*If I return I'll be a ghazi, if I die, a martyr.*"²³⁴ Inalcik notes that for six centuries the Ottoman state's existence had been shaped by the "*ghaza*" character.²³⁵ Therefore, martial values and virtues were always praised by Ottoman society and the Ottoman military played a

²³¹ **Baran, Zeyno (2008)**; Turkey Divided, p. 63.

²³² **Jenkins, Gareth (2007)**; Continuity and change: prospects for civil–military relations in Turkey, International Affairs 83: 2 (2007), pp. 340.

²³³ **Shaw, Stanford (1976)**; History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume I Empire of the gazis: the rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.1-3.

²³⁴ **Ahmad, Feroz (2004)**; The making of modern Turkey, p.16.

²³⁵ **Inalcik, Halil Ed. (1994)**; An economic and social history of the ottoman empire 1304-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 11.

central role in Ottoman political life.²³⁶ The terms “gazi” and “shid” (martyr) have been inherited by the modern Turkish state as well. The founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Pasa, was granted this title during the Independence War by the Turkish National Assembly. Ironically, despite his commitment to secularism, Atatürk used this term during his life. The terms “ghazi” and “shid” are used in Turkey even today for soldiers killed in action and diplomats who have been assassinated.²³⁷

During the Ottoman Empire’s decline the Ottoman Army, once the source of its power, was constantly involved in plots against sultans and in palace politics. When the Ottomans attempted to create a modern army, Janissaries and the “ulema” opposed the idea. After an unsuccessful attempt by Sultan Selim III (reigned 1789-1808), who was killed after a Janissary revolt, Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) succeeded in destroying the Janissaries and established a modern army in 1826. Subsequently new military schools and academies based on the Western model were established, out of which a new generation of reformist officers emerged. These officers also had been politicized by the end of the 19th century in their struggle to impose a constitution on Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909). They established the secret Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889 and revolted against Sultan Abdulhamid in 1908 forcing him to restore the constitution. However, there were two main groups in the Ottoman Army at the time, the radical reformers (Unionists) and the moderate liberals, therefore the CUP did not have united support.²³⁸

Because of their lack of experience in terms of ruling a country the CUP was reluctant in seizing power entirely. The first five years of the constitutional period (1908-1913) witnessed two unsuccessful rebellions in favor of the old regime (1908 and 1909) and one successful military rebellion led by anti-Unionist officers, who placed the liberals in power. However, the defeats of the Ottoman Army in the first Balkan War and the liberal government’s willingness to accept the enemy’s conditions ruined the image of the liberals. Thus the CUP successfully seized complete power through a military coup

²³⁶ **Jenkins, Gareth (2007);** Continuity and change: prospects for civil–military relations in Turkey, p. 340.

²³⁷ **Ahmad, Feroz (2004);** The making of modern Turkey, p.16.

²³⁸ **Ibid.;**, pp.2-4

in 1913. The Unionists converted the Army into an instrument of their policies. Ahmad notes that for the first time the government and the Army was under Unionist control and supported the same reform program, which has affected almost every aspect of society between 1913 and 1918.²³⁹

The modernization of the Army created alienation between society and the military. While Turkish society was mainly shaped by traditional religious beliefs, the Army adopted modern ideas such as positivism, nationalism and secularism. With the establishment of the modern Turkish state the military became the guardian of Kemalist state principles.²⁴⁰ It also considered itself the guarantor of political stability and "the *embodiment of the soul of the Turkish nation*".²⁴¹ In order to protect these principles the Turkish army increasingly intervened in political life in favor of Kemalist principles after the transition to a multi party system, which needs to be analyzed in more detail.

It is obvious that the Army played a crucial role in the last decade of the Ottoman Empire. Yet the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War had not influenced the Army's role, because even in defeat it was the only organized force able to resist the invasion of the country. Therefore it is not surprising to see that the founding fathers of Turkey were overwhelmingly commanders of the former Ottoman Army. However there was no consensus among them regarding the nature of the new regime. After the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Pasa was elected as the first president in 1923. He had a clear vision about Turkey's future and wanted to create a secular state. Yet he had rivals and opponents in the parliament and especially in the Army, which could cause a serious threat. In order to solve this problem, Ataturk insisted that the officers who wished to enter politics should resign from the Army. Many of Ataturk's opponents such as Kazim Karabekir, Ali Fuad Cebesoy and Refet Bele choose to retire and were disqualified from politics by Ataturk during his time. As a result of this, throughout the single party period (1923-1945) the

²³⁹ **Ibid;**, p.6.

²⁴⁰ **Çalış, Şaban (1996);** The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, pp. 264-265.

²⁴¹ **Jenkins, Gareth (2007);** Continuity and change: prospects for civil-military relations in Turkey, p. 339.

military was removed from political life and became the instrument of the one party state.²⁴² However one should also bear in mind the fact that it was still the military who ruled Turkey in this period because both Ataturk and Inonu were retired soldiers, who established an authoritarian regime with the assistance of the Army.²⁴³

Ahmad claims that during this time the military tradition declined and individualistic civil society thrived.²⁴⁴ However Jenkins notes that Ataturk was influenced by the Von der Goltz concept of a “nation in arms”, who was appointed to reform the Ottoman Army corps in the 19th century. His book “The Nation in Arms” was translated into Turkish in 1884 and read by Ottoman officer corps, and “*called on the military to play an active role in reshaping society and regarded the armed forces as representing almost distilled essence of the nation.*”²⁴⁵ The new Turkish Republic started to impose from early the 1930s this concept of a military nation through the education system. The propaganda claimed that the Turks had been always an organized army’s soldiers. Interestingly, even today the Turkish Army considers its roots back in the 209 BC, when the first organized army was formed by Mete Hun in Central Asia. The Turkish Army claims that the “*Turks have proven to be an army nation by dedicating themselves to the military profession throughout the history*”. Jenkins also notes that the introduction of obligatory military service in 1927 contributed to the propaganda of an army nation, as military service played an educational and civilizing role in order to reshape the views of the male population. This propaganda also found a ready agreement in Turkish society, which was to a considerable amount hierarchical, patriarchal and authoritarian.²⁴⁶

After being out of political life in the single party period, the Cold War brought the Turkish army into political life once again. The Truman Doctrine (1947) and Turkey’s membership in NATO (1952) increased the role of the Turkish army in political life.

²⁴² **Ahmad, Feroz (2004)**; The making of modern Turkey, p.9

²⁴³ **Çalış, Şaban (1996)**; The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, p. 265

²⁴⁴ **Ahmad, Feroz (2004)**; The making of modern Turkey, p.9

²⁴⁵ **Jenkins, Gareth (2007)**; Continuity and change: prospects for civil–military relations in Turkey, p. 340.

²⁴⁶ **Ibid.**

While the junior officers were trained by American instructors on modern warfare, the old generals were unable to adopt new technologies, which divided the Turkish army into two main camps. Thanks to the transition to the multi party system in 1945 the DP (Democrat Party) won the elections in 1950. The Democrats attempted to exploit the division in the Army by supporting the generals, who were seen politically important, and neglecting junior officers. Furthermore, the 50s witnessed a deterioration in the working and economic conditions of junior officers. Additionally, the bitter political dispute between the RPP (Republican People's Party) and the governing DP contributed to the unrest among junior officers, who considered the DP anti-Kemalist and supported the oppositional RPP. All these resulted in Turkey's first military intervention in 27th May 1960, in which junior officers performed a coup against their high command. Ahmad notes that the coup followed the tradition of the Young Turk revolution in 1908, whose aim was to change the society's fundamental structures radically. The new constitution made the Turkish General Staff (TGS) directly responsible to the prime minister and created a National Security Council (NSC) to serve as an advisory corps to the ministry council. All these measures increased the prestige and autonomy of the Turkish armed forces. Thus the political parties lost their influence on the Army and the generals were recognized as the guardians of the Kemalist regime and as a stabilizing factor, which started to shape the economic and political life of Turkey. For instance in 1961 the Army mutual assistance associations were created, which brought the Turkish Army into business and industry. As a result of these developments, the generals enjoyed a privileged status in Turkish society, which they were determined to maintain.²⁴⁷

After a political dispute between political parties represented in the parliament blocked the state apparatus in 1971, the Turkish military made another coup on the 12th March 1971. This time TGS did not seize power directly, instead forcing the government to resign and replacing them with a government of technocrats. This intervention did not improve the political situation in Turkey. In sharp contrast Turkey found itself on the brink of a civil war as the fight between rightist and leftist groups constantly increased during the 70s, which resulted in another military coup on 12th September 1980. However, within this time the Army seized power entirely and remained in power for

²⁴⁷ Ahmad, Feroz (2004); The making of modern Turkey, pp.9-12.

three years. Before reintroducing civilian rule in 1983 the military imposed a new constitution in 1982, which is still in force despite major changes voted by a referendum in September 2011. After the military coup, the TGS was reluctant to give complete freedom to civil governments, which resulted in an army controlled system through a number of institutional and informal mechanisms.²⁴⁸

The rise of political Islam in the 80s and 90s resulted in the Islamist WP's (Welfare Party) victory in the general election on 25 December 1995. The WP formed a coalition government with the conservative TPP (True Path party) and WP's leader Erbakan became Turkey's first Islamist prime minister. The Turkish General Staff was concerned with the Islamist nature of the WP, which led them to articulate their belief that the secular state was under threat. However this time they did not to seize power directly. On the contrary, TGS coordinated and provoked public opposition to the government in order to remove the WP from power. Furthermore in the National Security Council the generals presented the government with a list of anti-Islamist measures, which the government was reluctant to implement. They also launched a number of briefings to inform the media, judiciary and business community about the so called Islamist threat, which led to an application of a public persecutor to the constitutional court for the closure of the Welfare Party. At the same time, the generals discreetly lobbied the TPP party members to persuade them to resign from their parties. Following the resignation of some TPP MPs, the coalition government lost its majority in the parliament and had to resign from the government. As a result of the specific methods used in this intervention, it is defined as a "post modern coup".

The last military intervention into Turkish political life occurred in 2007, when the tensions between the secularist Kemalist elite and the governing Justice and Development Party due to the nomination of the Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as president led to mass street protests and political turmoil, as Gül's wife's headscarf was considered by Kemalists to be against secularism. On the midnight of 27th April 2007

²⁴⁸ **Jenkins, Gareth (2007);** Continuity and change: prospects for civil–military relations in Turkey, pp.341-342.

the Turkish Armed Forces published an e-memorandum²⁴⁹ on its website warning the government not to select a person as president who could jeopardize the foundation of the Kemalist regime. This indirect intervention affected the constitution court's decision about the election procedure of the president in the parliament, which blockaded the election process. The response of the JDP government was the early general elections in 22th July 2007, in which JDP achieved a sensational victory.

As clearly seen from the historical context there is an obvious tradition of military intervention into Turkish political life, which resulted in two coup d'états (1960 and 1980) and three indirect military interventions (1970, 1997 and 2007). Interestingly, these interventions have a legal ground explained in the Turkish Armed Forces internal service law No. 211 (January 1961), which states that *"the duty of the armed forces is to protect and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish republic as defined in the constitution"*. Subsequently, the Army used this article to justify its intervention in 1980 and it is in force even today. Regarding the Turkish Army's role in the country's political life one should also consider the legitimacy of the Army in public opinion because of its crucial role in the founding of the Republic. Thus a considerable proportion of the Turkish population (especially Kemalists) has regarded the Army as the savior in case of external and internal political or economic crisis. In this regard Baran notes that *"Instead of shouldering the duty to make sure that their secular system is preserved through normal democratic process, a significant number of Turks assume that they can remain passive and count on the soldiers to put all right if things threaten to go off track"*²⁵⁰ Subsequently, throughout the Turkish Republic's history this notion

²⁴⁹ *"...The problem that emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish Armed Forces are concerned about the recent situation. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in those arguments, and absolute defender of secularism. Also, the Turkish Armed Forces is definitely opposed to those arguments and negative comments. It will display its attitude and action openly and clearly whenever it is necessary... The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute"* Available at; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6602775.stm> (accessed 20.02.2009,13:20)

²⁵⁰ **Baran, Zeyno (2008);** Turkey Divided, p. 63.

led to many invitations from the so called Kemalist civil society to the Army to intervene into political life in favor of secularism.

Apart from this, the Army's most important mechanism of controlling political life was the National Security Council, which was created according to the military imposed 1961 Constitution as an advisory body to the Council of Ministers. The 1982 Constitution upgraded the status of the NSC, so its views would be given priority by the Council of Ministers. The NSC meetings were held once a month and chaired by the Turkish president, and consisted of five generals and 4 government members. In theory that meant a power equilibrium. However the generals were able to dictate their agenda, as the secretary general of the NSC was always a general and its under-secretariat was mainly dominated by retired army personnel. Furthermore, the NSC general secretary had unlimited access to any civilian authority to observe the implementation of the advice imposed by the NSC. Additionally, the military had various informal mechanisms to control political life, such as private meetings with bureaucrats and public pronouncements.²⁵¹

The Army has also always maintained close ties with the foreign ministry bureaucracy, because the Kemalist elites have considered foreign policy a natural corollary of Turkey's Westernization and modernization process. The Army participated in the foreign policy process during the one party period to some extent.²⁵² However it was due to Turkey's membership to the NATO that the Army officers started to enjoy a considerable role in the making of security policies. Furthermore, the creation of the NSC in 1960 increased the Army's role in foreign policy making, as it granted a legal and institutional framework for the involvement of the military in this process. During the 50s and 60s the Army officers in their meetings with foreign colleagues regarding security and NATO issues were mainly supported by experienced Turkish diplomats, as the majority of officers were not able to speak foreign languages fluently. However, the increasing experience of army officers in international institutions in the 80s increased

²⁵¹ **Jenkins, Gareth (2007);** Continuity and change: prospects for civil–military relations in Turkey, pp. 343-344.

²⁵² **Çalış, Şaban (1996);** The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, p. 265

the independence of army officers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).²⁵³ The 90s witnessed an increasing role of the TGS in foreign policy making, because of the security issues surrounding Turkey after the end of the Cold War. During this time the TGS developed its own policies regarding the issues of Cyprus, the Aegean Sea and security, and was able to dictate its policies to weak governments at that time. Furthermore the TGS was in charge of the preparation of two vital strategic concepts regarding security issues, namely the “National Military Strategic Concept” and the “National Security Policy Concept”. The influence of the Army in relations with Israel, in particular, was of considerable importance at the time.²⁵⁴

Ahmad notes that, as in the past, the Turkish military’s role will be decided by Turkey’s place in the new world order.²⁵⁵ In this context, Turkey’s European Union membership process was crucial. European Council Helsinki Summit in 1999 granted Turkey the candidacy status for EU membership, which Turkey had been waiting for desperately, for over two decades. The Helsinki decision opened the way for an intensive reform process in Turkey to reach the Copenhagen criteria, in which the removal of military supremacy over civilian rule was the one of the main issues. In order to reduce the institutional influence of the TGS the following reforms were launched by the coalition government in 1999 and the JDP in 2003;

- The removal of military judges from the state security courts (June 1999)
- The increase of the number of civilian members in the NSC (October 2001)
- The requirement for Council of Ministers to give priority consideration to the recommendations of NSC, replaced by just a notification of Council.
- The abolishment of the obligation that the secretary of the NSC be a member of Army (July 2003)

²⁵³ **İskit, Temel (2007);** *Diplomasi: Tarihi, Teorisi, Kurumları ve Uygulaması (Diplomacy: History, Theory, Institutions and Implementation)* İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, pp.445-446.

²⁵⁴ **Bacik, Gökhan/ Aras Bülent (2004);** *Turkey’s Inescapable Dilemma: America or Europe?, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol.3, No.1, Spring 2004, p. 57.*

²⁵⁵ **Ahmad, Feroz (2004);** *The making of modern Turkey, p.14.*

- The abolishment of the general secretary's unlimited access to civilian institutions and the power to oversee the realization of NSC decisions (July 2003)
- Submission of the Turkish Armed Forces under the judicial control of the Court of Accounts
- Reduction of NSC meetings to once every two months, in order to reduce the pressure of the NSC on governments (July 2003)²⁵⁶

The TGS accepted these reforms and its loss of power, because the military, which considers Turkey's integration with the EU one of the main objectives of Turkish modernization and Westernization, was rhetorically entrapped. The military's intervention into civilian politics became contrary to the ideals of Kemalist ideology, namely being a part of European civilization and culture. Thus the military accepted the reforms in order to not to damage its credibility and legitimacy.²⁵⁷ According to some scholars one of the reasons for the military's acceptance of its loss of power was the Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök's personality, who had spent most of his career in NATO postings, where he became familiar with the ideals of liberal democracies.²⁵⁸ This notion has been proven to be accurate by the military intervention into the presidential elections in 2007 under the command of Yasar Büyükanit and his successor Ilker Basbug's involvement in political life.

To sum up, despite its loss of power in political life due the European Union reforms, which will be discussed in the coming chapter under Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy in more detail, the Turkish Army still plays a crucial role in Turkish political life behind the scenes, and is likely continue to exert its influence in the immediate future. The most obvious proof for this claim is the fact that there have been six different

²⁵⁶ **Heper, Metin (2005);** The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey, Turkish Studies, Volume 6, Issue 2, June 2005, p. 220.

²⁵⁷ **Sarigil, Zeki (2007);** Europeanization as Institutional Change: The Case of the Turkish Military, Mediterranean Politics, Volume 12, Issue 1, March 2007, pp. 39–57.

²⁵⁸ **Jenkins, Gareth (2007);** Continuity and change: prospects for civil–military relations in Turkey, pp. 343-344.

unsuccessful military coup plots²⁵⁹ since the JDP took the power in December 2002, which explains the Army's deeply rooted role in Turkish political life.

3.1.6 Geographical Determinants

One important factor that affects a country's political power and its relations with other states is its geography. Geography influences choices and alternatives of a state's policies and imposes limitations to its actions. The geographic location of the Anatolian peninsula has affected policies of all states that were established in this strategic territory. Therefore the peculiarities of Turkey's geographical position have been influencing Turkish foreign policy since the Republic's establishment. This geostrategic location enables Turkey to play a role in world politics far greater than its real power. At the same time it brings some disadvantages regarding security issues as well.²⁶⁰



Figure 3: Turkey's Geostrategic Location in the Midst of Three Continents²⁶¹

Turkey occupies one of the most strategic territories, being situated between Europe, Asia and Middle East. Turkey's geographic location allows it to oversee the historic

²⁵⁹ The failed coup plots planned by high ranking generals include; Sarikiz, Ayisigi, Yakamoz, Eldiven, Balyoz, Kafes; <http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sar%C4%B1k%C4%B1z>

²⁶⁰ **Oran, Baskın (Ed.) (2006);** Türk Dış Politikası I, 1919-1980, pp 24-25.

²⁶¹ Available at <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world.html> (accessed 23.02.2010, 17:55)

migration and invasion routes from the Balkans and Caucasus Mountains onto the high Anatolian plateau. Turkey borders the oil rich Fertile Crescent in the Mesopotamia, Caspian Sea in the Caucasus, and the strategic Persian Gulf and the Red Sea are in Turkey's proximity. Moreover it is also located at the crossroads of major air, sea and land transport routes of the modern world, which connect the industrially advanced countries of Europe with the natural resources (gas and oil) rich regions such as Asia, the Middle East and the Caucasus.²⁶² (See Figure 3)

As mentioned above, the peculiarities of the Anatolian peninsula determine Turkish foreign policy. The high mountains in the east and west of the Anatolian Peninsula allow only small entryway between the mountains. In the north, west and south, the sea surrounds the Anatolian peninsula, while parallel mountain ranges with forests and rivers along the north and the south coast make it hard to penetrate. (See Figure 4)




Figure 4: Turkey's Topographical Features²⁶³

²⁶² Aydin, Mustafa (2004); Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, p. 14.

²⁶³ Available at: <http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/T%C3%BCrkei> (accessed 22.02.2010, 15:21)

These geographic features contribute to the defense of the Anatolian Peninsula making it hard to penetrate from the outside. On the other hand, in the European Turkey there are no natural barriers such as mountains, which make it open to attacks. Furthermore, the Straits offer political and military advantages to Turkey. The fact that Turkey controls the only seaway connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean has always been an issue in Turkish foreign policy, as it brought the Ottoman Empire as well as Turkey into continuous conflict with Russia. Thus the attractions of the Straits for potential aggressors are one of the main security concerns of Turkey. The deployment of Turkey's most powerful First Army for the protection of the Straits explains the perception of this threat by Turkey. The dispute about the territorial waters around the Aegean Island with Greece has been always another main security concern for Turkish foreign policy. These concerns resulted in Turkey's declaration of *casus belli* against any Greek attempt to extend its Aegean islands' territorial waters up to twelve miles, which would include all open sea exits from the Aegean within Greece territorial waters. In 1996 these concerns almost brought Turkey and Greece onto the brink of war over the dispute of sovereignty of two uninhabited islets in Aegean Sea. (See Figure 5)

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


Figure 5: Greek and Turkish Claims in Aegean Sea²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ Sander, Oral (2006); *Türkiyenin Dış Politikası* (Turkey's Foreign Policy), İmge, İstanbul, pp.79-87.

²⁶⁵ Available at: <http://mondediplo.com/maps/aegeanmdv1997> (accessed 12.04.2010, 13:21)

Another important factor that has affected Turkish foreign policy is the number of its neighbors and the character of their regimes. It is a fact that a country that is surrounded by a large number of other countries may have to cope with an especially high risk of being threatened or attacked by at least some of its neighbors, which in return may force this country to confront its neighbors in order to protect itself. Turkey borders 8 countries on land, 6 of whom are in the politically unstable Caucasus and the Middle East. There are a number of states around the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea, which can be considered Turkey's neighbors as well, in a broader sense, as they have an open access to Turkey via the sea. This unique geographic location increases the numbers of threat and opportunities Turkey faces concurrently and explains the deeply rooted sense of insecurity in Turkish foreign policy, which has been also escalated by Turkey's Ottoman legacy and the Sevres Phobia. In order to maintain its security Turkey has always been a part of regional alliances and sought alliance with great powers outside the region such as the USA.²⁶⁶

In sum, Turkey connects three continents to each other, which makes it a Eurasian country. It is in the proximity of the oil rich Middle East, the Caspian Basin and Central Asia, and links the important trade route from the Mediterranean Basin to the Black Sea Basin via the Turkish Straits and connects all these strategically important regions to each other. Davutoglu argues that Turkey is a central country in the midst of the Afro-Eurasia landmass with multiple regional identities which cannot be minimized to one, unified category. As a result of this geographical position Turkey can be considered a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country all at the same time.²⁶⁷ This unique geostrategic location makes Turkey extremely sensitive to developments in its neighboring regions and cautious towards international and regional changes in the balance of power. This has influenced Turkish foreign policy since the establishment of Republic. It is a fact that everything changes but geography does not. However, the perceptions about a country's geopolitical position are subject to change as a result of the developments in transportation technologies and other areas. Therefore, the geostrategic position of

²⁶⁶ **Aydin, Mustafa (2004);** Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, p. 14.

²⁶⁷ **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008);** Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, p. 77.

Turkey has always been an important factor in Turkish foreign policy, and will continue to exert its influence to some extent in the coming future as well.

3.1.7 The Lack of Strategic Thinking and the Dominance of Elites in the Decision Making Process

There are various agents who contribute to the Turkish foreign policy decision making process, such as the president, the government, the NSC, the MFA, the military and public opinion. However, until the end of the Cold War Turkish foreign policy had mainly been shaped by the Kemalist elite in the MFA and the military. These elites considered themselves as the guardians of the Kemalist regime and its principles. The Army and the foreign ministry bureaucracy always maintained close ties, as the Kemalist elite considered foreign policy a natural corollary of Turkey's Westernization and modernization process. These elites always emphasized the difference between "state policy", which was represented and implemented by them, and "government policy", in Turkish political life. Military-civilian bureaucracy always attempted to implement the Kemalist state policy regardless of different governments and their policies. Therefore they demonstrated a constant resistance against any shift in Turkey's orientation towards the West and Kemalist foreign policy principles,²⁶⁸ which can be observed in the opposition of these elites towards Özal's aspirations in the Middle East during the first Gulf War and also Erbakan's Islamist oriented foreign policy between 1996 and 1997. Furthermore, due to the weakness of Turkish governments and civil society, foreign policy making remained a privilege of the small Kemalist elite.

This dominance of Kemalist elites in Turkish foreign policy may have resulted in one of the main structural weaknesses of Turkish foreign policy making culture, which is its lack of strategic thinking and theory. Considering Turkey's foreign policy history, one can argue that besides Turkey's constant orientation towards West, which was derived from the Kemalist state identity; there has been no consistent alternative grand strategy for Turkey's foreign policy until the end of the Cold War. As a result of this phenomenon, Turkish decision makers have adopted a reaction oriented defensive and conservative policy, which almost constantly avoided taking any initiative. This policy

²⁶⁸ İskit, Temel (2007); *Diplomasi: Tarihi, Teorisi, Kurumları ve Uygulaması*, pp.439-444.

manifested itself in Turkish diplomats' and decision makers' main feature, which is the preference of caution to daring action. The reasons for this phenomenon may be analyzed under four categories, namely, ideological, historical, psychological, and institutional-structural determinants.²⁶⁹

To begin with it can be said that the characteristics of Kemalist ideology are influential in the lack of strategic thinking in Turkish foreign policy. As put forward by *Oran* “*the intellectuals of Turkey who have Western educations are admirers of the West and do not oppose the West. This admiration and application of Western model in Turkey has led Turkish intellectuals not to think about any alternative to the West in foreign policy.*”²⁷⁰ The former social democrat foreign minister Ismail Cem also criticizes this one sided orientation of Kemalist elites. He suggests that the break with the Ottoman past resulted in an approach which does not take Turkish history and culture into consideration. Furthermore, this one sided orientation of Kemalist elites alienated Turkey from its neighbors and surrounding regions since they believed that showing interest towards the Middle East, Central Asia or Africa represents “backwardness”.²⁷¹

As mentioned in the previous chapter, preserving the status quo is one of the main fundamentals of Turkish foreign policy culture, which was inherited from the Ottoman experience. This policy is based on the notion of “either absolute hegemony or absolute retreat”, which prevented the Ottoman Empire and Turkey from developing strategies in order to create spheres of influence outside of their borders. One can observe the influence of this notion on Turkey’s policies towards the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans from the establishment of the Republic until the end of the Cold War, where it resulted in absolute isolation and alienation from these regions. Furthermore, the bitter memories of CUP’s adventurism in the last decade of the Ottoman Empire also prevented the young Turkish state from developing a reasonable foreign policy strategy towards these regions. This attitude of the new Turkish Republic towards

²⁶⁹ **Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001)**; *Stratejik Derinlik*, pp. 47-48.

²⁷⁰ **Oran, Baskın (Ed.) (2006)**; *Türk Dış Politikası*, p. 46, cited in **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; *Harmonizing foreign policy*, p.85.

²⁷¹ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; *Harmonizing foreign policy*, p.86.

former Ottoman regions in its early years became one of the fundamental principles of Turkish foreign policy until the end of the Cold War.²⁷²

At the same time there is a psychological dimension in this phenomenon as well, which is the fact that the nature of the new regime in Turkey caused a deep-rooted division in Turkish society as discussed in the previous chapter. This split in Turkish society has caused many problems in Turkish political life and has some inevitable consequences in Turkish foreign policy making, one of which is the focus on internal problems causing a lack of strategic thinking and planning towards surrounding regions. Furthermore, one should also bear in mind the effect of “Sevres Phobia” in the psychological dimension of the lack of the strategic thinking, which prevented Turkey from seeking improved relations with its neighboring regions.²⁷³

The last factor in the lack of strategic theory is institutional-structural determinants. The institutions that can contribute to developing strategic and alternative theories in Turkey are the MFA, the Turkish parliament, the political parties, the National Security Council, the Turkish General Staff, universities and think tanks. However, until recently the universities and think tanks were not included in this process because the foreign policy process was considered an official procedure. In addition, there has been insufficient coordination between the different bureaucratic institutions, which were influential in the decision making process.²⁷⁴

The main institution responsible for developing foreign policy strategies is the MFA. Interestingly, the MFA does not have the basic instrument for such a task: a well-organized archive. The archive of the MFA is stored in different locations and therefore, cannot be used efficiently. Thus, a former Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil suggested that the MFA does not have a memory. Moreover, the MFA has mainly been overwhelmed with the bureaucratic process and financial handicaps. Being aware of this problem, the MFA has established a strategic research institute in the 90s, which does not have sufficient personal and financial funding. Furthermore, because of the nature of

²⁷² **Ibid.**; pp. 52-59.

²⁷³ **Ibid.**; pp. 59-63.

²⁷⁴ **Ibid.**; pp. 48-52.

the MFA it is hardly possible for the diplomats to develop alternative and objective strategies, which clash with their official policies.²⁷⁵

As mentioned above, there has been always an emphasis on the difference between state policy and government policy in Turkish political life. Turkish foreign policy is mainly shaped by the military-civilian bureaucracy regardless of different governments, who have their own opinions and priorities about Turkish foreign policy. Like the Turkish Army the MFA considers itself as the guardian of Kemalist foreign policy principles. Therefore, the foreign policy bureaucracy showed a constant resistance against any government in Turkey that attempted to implement a foreign policy that clashed with state policy.²⁷⁶ As a result of this phenomenon, majority of Turkish political parties did not attempt to establish research institutions in order to produce alternative foreign policy strategies according to their own perceptions. This phenomenon also applies to the universities, which are normally supposed to supply the government with policy alternatives. Furthermore, the increasing demand of Turkey's young population for higher education and the financial difficulties turned the Turkish universities into formal education institutions, where only teaching takes place. The think tanks, which are the vital institutions for any country to develop strategies and provide expert advice on international issues, are a new phenomenon in Turkey starting in the 90s.²⁷⁷ However the influence of the think tanks in the foreign policy process is still very modest in comparison to other Western countries, because of the authoritarian character of Turkish politicians and bureaucrats.

Considering all of this, it is possible to see that from the establishment of the Republic Turkish decision makers neglected the significance of developing alternative grand strategies for Turkish foreign policy. Furthermore, there was a clear dominance of Kemalist elites in the Turkish foreign policy decision making process until the end of the Cold War. These issues are also subject to change in the post Cold War period. For instance, the increasing number of think tanks provides alternative strategies and theories for Turkish foreign policy decision makers. At the same time the

²⁷⁵ **Oran, Baskın (Ed.) (2006);** Türk Dış Politikası I, 1919-1980, pp 68-70.

²⁷⁶ **İskit, Temel (2007);** Diplomasi: Tarihi, Teorisi, Kurumları ve Uygulaması, pp.439-444.

²⁷⁷ **Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001);** Stratejik Derinlik, pp. 48-52.

Europeanization and democratization process is also decreasing the dominance of the Kemalist elites in Turkish foreign policy as well.

3.2 External and Internal Conjunctural Determinants in the Making of Turkish Foreign Policy (1919- 1980)

This section analyses the conjunctural factors that have affected the evolution of the Turkish state's identity, interests and its foreign policy under two main categories, namely external and internal determinants. As mentioned in the previous chapter, conjunctural factors do exert temporary influence on a country's foreign policy and its daily implementation. These factors include the systemic changes in the international system, shifts in the balance of power, domestic political changes, economic factors and characters of decision makers. These various factors will be taken into account during the analysis of Turkish foreign policy history. However this analysis will not cover a detailed history of Turkish foreign policy but instead will analyze the major influential factors for the evolution of the Turkish state's identity, interests and its foreign policy. The determinants of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy will be discussed in the coming chapter (4) in detail.

In order to achieve a detailed analysis, Turkish foreign policy history will be periodized according to major influential factors. In this regard it has to be mentioned that some scholars have only focused on domestic factors and analyzed Turkish foreign policy according to influential domestic factors in the decision making process. For example Uzgel has periodized Turkish foreign policy history as follows:

- The period of leader decisiveness 1919-1950
- The era of MFA's increasing influence 1950-1960
- The phase of increasing influence of public opinion 1960-1980
- The September 12 military coup period 1980-1983
- The increasing role of the business community in foreign policy 1983-1991
- The increase of the Army's role 1990s²⁷⁸

²⁷⁸ **Ilhan, Uzgel;** TDP'nin olusturulmasi (The Making of Turkish Foreign Policy), in: **Oran, Baskin (Ed.) (2006);** p.74.

On the other hand, others have mainly focused on systemic changes in the world system and its consequences on Turkish foreign policy, such as the end of the Cold War. For example Sönmezoglu has periodized the history of Turkish foreign policy as follows:

- 1923-1945 Interwar period
- 1946-1964 Rigid bipolar world system and Cold War period
- 1965-1980 Detente in the Cold War
- 1981-1991 The return to rigid bipolar world system
- 1991- The end of the Cold War ²⁷⁹

To begin with, it may be interesting to highlight the fact that the most of the systemic changes in the international system coincided with the major domestic changes in Turkey²⁸⁰ such as the beginning of the detente in the bipolar world system in the 1960s and Turkey's first military coup in 1960, which absolutely changed Turkish political life. Yet at the same time one can also argue that some of the domestic changes in Turkey were a direct result of systemic changes in the international system, such as the beginning of the Cold War and Turkey's transition to the multiparty system in 1945. This interaction between domestic and internal factors requires a holistic approach to Turkish foreign policy history. Therefore this study will deploy a combination of the two approaches mentioned above in order to highlight the significance of various factors in different times.

3.2.1 Interwar Period 1919-1945

3.2.1.1 Internal Factors: The leader's Decisiveness and Kemalist Ideology

²⁷⁹Sönmezoğlu, Faruk; Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin dış politikasında süreklilik ve değişim (Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy) in: Sönmezoğlu, Faruk (Ed.) (2001); Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi (The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy), Der Yayınları, İstanbul, p.1048.

²⁸⁰ **Ibid.**

Although the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) may be considered an anti-imperialist war in nature²⁸¹, its leaders did not follow an anti-Western policy. Even during the war, Mustafa Kemal sought to establish relations with Western powers. Thus Turkey signed a treaty of friendship with France in 1921 despite the dispute over the status of Hatay. During the Independence War Mustafa Kemal deployed the old Ottoman policy using the differences between England, France and Italy to obtain independence. After the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, in which Turkey's independence was recognized, Turkey immediately started to develop friendly relations with Western countries. Despite some unsettled territorial problems with Western powers, such as Hatay and Mosul, the young Turkish Republic rejected any revisionist policy and preserving the status quo became the main subject of its policies. The famous dictum of Atatürk, "*peace at home, peace in the world*", was a clear representation of this notion. As a result of this, the main subject of Turkish foreign policy became preserving its territorial integrity and freedom.²⁸²

As mentioned before, there was no consensus among the national movement about the nature of the new regime as the national movement consisted of a loose political coalition between the military-civilian bureaucracy, the newly emerging bourgeoisie, the notables and landlords of Turkey. Thus the secular Kemalists were in minority in the first Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in 1923. However, Mustafa Kemal employed a step-by-step approach to transform the country into a secular system. The religiously motivated Kurdish uprising in eastern Anatolia in 1925 gave Mustafa Kemal the pretext to oppress his political opponents. The law for the maintenance of order passed by TGNA provided the government with absolute power until 4 March 1929. Armed with this law the government established the special courts (Independence Tribunals), in which more than 500 regime opponents were sentenced to death. During these four years the Kemalists carried out radical reforms and after a long and painful reform process Mustafa Kemal was successful in eliminating or silencing almost all of

²⁸¹ For a critical approach see: **Başkaya, Fikret (2002)**; Paradigmanın İflası: Resmi İdeolojinin Eleştirisine Giriş (The end of the Paradigm: Introduction to the critic of State Ideology), Özgür Üniversite, Ankara.

²⁸² **Çalı, Şaban (1996)**; The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, pp. 64-68.

his opponents in 1929.²⁸³ Thus Mustafa Kemal emerged as the undisputable leader of Turkey, and later took the surname Ataturk, meaning father of the Turks.

The undisputable status of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk inevitably influenced Turkish foreign policy. Therefore the period after the Independence War was marked with the decisive role of Ataturk in the foreign policy making process. His understanding of foreign policy was decisive in the formulation of foreign policy goals and the foreign minister's role was to implement his policies. The Kemalist state identity and its interests were defined by Ataturk, and as discussed in the previous chapter, it has been shaping Turkish foreign policy up until today. Additionally, as mentioned before, the young Turkish MFA mainly consisted of former Ottoman diplomats, who carried experiences of Ottoman diplomacy into the new state. As result of bitter memories of the past two decades of the Ottoman Empire, these diplomats followed a cautious diplomacy in World War II.²⁸⁴

As can be seen clearly from this brief account of Turkish political history after the Independence War, the young Republic focused on internal problems and reforms. Therefore in the period between 1923 and 1930 foreign policy issues were not considered priority issues. Turkey received financial and military aid from the Soviet Union during the Independence War. After independence Turkey maintained close ties with the Soviet Union resulting in "The Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship" between Turkey and the Soviets in 1925. Furthermore, the dispute over the status of Mosul with Britain was solved in 1926 through negotiations. However, the 30s witnessed an increasing conflict between revisionist and status quo powers in Europe, which inevitably forced Turkey to take measures in order to preserve its security and territorial integrity against revisionist powers.²⁸⁵ Therefore the 30s witnessed a development in Turkey's relations with Western liberal countries and deterioration in its relations with the Soviets.

²⁸³ **Ahmad, Feroz (2004);** The making of modern Turkey, p.58.

²⁸⁴ **Özcan, Mesut (2008);** Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the middle east, p.93.

²⁸⁵ **Hale, William M. (2000);** pp. 44-79.

As mentioned before, Turkey witnessed fundamental reforms after the Independence War (1919-1923), which sought to create a Westernized and secular Turkey. This process of secularization and the abolition of the caliphate caused deterioration in Turkey's relations with Islamic countries. Additionally, the impact of Ottoman domination in the Middle East contributed to this mutual alienation between Turkey and Muslim countries. Furthermore, Turkish and Arabic secular intellectuals, who wanted to build nation states, considered the Ottoman and Islamic past as an obstacle for their ambitions. Thus they exaggerated the differences and problems between Arabs and Turks. Additionally, conservative Arabs considered the Kemalist reforms in Turkey a break away from Islam. All these factors contributed to Turkey's political, cultural and economic alienation from Islamic countries during this period.²⁸⁶

3.2.1.2 External Factors: Facing the Italian Threat and World War II

During the 30s the most influential external factor that affected Turkish foreign policy was the Italian threat as Mussolini claimed that Italy's historic mission lay in Asia and Africa. At the time the Dodecanese Islands in the proximity of Turkey were still occupied by Italy, and the memory of the Italian invasion of southern Turkey was still fresh.²⁸⁷ Calis notes that from three aspects the Italian threat to Turkish integrity played the same role in Turkish foreign policy as the Soviet's threat did during the Cold War. Firstly, facing the Italian threat, Turkey was forced to follow a more active foreign policy in its surrounding region in order to establish a security belt along its borders. Consequently, Turkey and Greece anticipated a leading role in the establishment of the Balkan Entente in 1934, which brought Turkey, Greece Rumania and Yugoslavia together. Furthermore, in order to establish its security in the Middle East, Turkey entered the Sadabat Pact in 1937, consisting of Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. Secondly, the fascist Italian threat brought Turkey and liberal Western countries closer. Thirdly, as a result of these two, Turkey assumed the role of protecting Western interests in the region. Furthermore, due to this threat Turkey became a member of the League of Nations in 1932. Finally, the change of the Straits' status in the Montreux Agreement in

²⁸⁶ **Çalış, Şaban (1996);** The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, p.69.

²⁸⁷ **Ahmad, Feroz (2004);** The making of modern Turkey, p. 67.

1936, which restored Turkey's sovereignty over the Straits, was also a direct response to the Italian threat.²⁸⁸

When Atatürk died in 1938, İsmet İnönü became the President of both Turkey and the Republican People's Party, as Turkey was ruled under a mono party system. The new president İnönü was a committed Kemalist and did not change the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy. However, the approaching World War II pushed Turkey to make an alliance with France and Great Britain in 1939 in order to strengthen Turkey's security. Despite this alliance, Turkey preserved its neutrality through well-calculated diplomacy until the very end of the war, which has been praised as one of the significant achievements of Turkish diplomacy in the interwar period.²⁸⁹

3.2.2 The Impact of the Beginning of the Cold War and the Transition to a Multi Party System (1945-1960)

Turkish foreign policy during the interwar period is marked with Turkey's cautious diplomacy. Although Turkey became a member of regional security pacts, this did not result in economic, political or military Western dependency of Turkey. Thus until 1939 Turkey attempted to avoid any formal attachment with Western powers and followed a balanced, neutral foreign policy towards these countries. Even during the war, Turkey sought to maintain its balanced policy and did not enter the war. However after World War II, a number of external and internal factors forced Turkey to alter its balanced foreign policy, which resulted Turkey's absolute dependency on the Western bloc. During this period Turkey witnessed significant changes both to foreign and domestic policy. These changes occurred almost simultaneously, as there was an interaction between them. As mentioned before, Turkey's transition to the multiparty system in 1945 can be interpreted as a direct result of the systemic changes in the international system, namely the beginning of the Cold War. Furthermore, the major systemic changes in world politics had inevitable consequences for Turkish foreign policy in the post World War period as well.

²⁸⁸ Çalıř, Şaban (1996); The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, p.73.

²⁸⁹ Aydın, Mustafa (2004); Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, p 26.

3.2.2.1 External Factors: The Systemic Changes and the Soviet Threat

Two major interrelated external factors were decisive in Turkish foreign policy after the Cold War. Firstly the world system was transformed from a balance of power to a bipolar world system. In a bipolar world system, it was not a realistic and possible policy for Turkey to maintain its neutral policy due to its strategic geopolitical situation. Due to the nature of the bipolar world system, Turkey could not exploit the balance of power between rival European powers anymore. Furthermore, Turkey did not have the military and economic strength to follow a neutral foreign policy after World War II. Besides these conjunctural factors, in order to fully understand Turkey's decision to become a political and economic ally of the Western bloc, one should also consider the influence of Kemalist Turkey's orientation towards the West, which was discussed among the structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy.²⁹⁰ (See Chapter 3.1.3)

Secondly, apart from these factors, there was a real security threat to Turkey's territorial integrity from the emergence of the Soviets as a superpower. The Soviets had already pursued an expansionist policy during the war, which was aimed at gaining territorial concessions from Turkey. In the secret German-Soviet talks in 1940 Turkish soil was discussed as a bargaining chip. After the war, the Soviets repeated their territorial demands in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences in 1945. Regarding the status of the Turkish Straits, Stalin stated in the Yalta conference that "*it is impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey has a hand on Russia's throat*".²⁹¹ Furthermore, on 19 March 1945 the Soviets denounced the Treaty of Friendship and Non-aggression of 1925 between Turkey and the Soviet Union. To make matters worse, on 7 June 1945 the Soviet Union demanded Soviet bases on the Turkish Straits and territorial concessions in the eastern Soviet-Turkish border. As a result of these Soviet pressures, Turkey was pushed into an alliance with the Western bloc.²⁹²

²⁹⁰ **Çalış, Şaban (1996)**; The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, p.164.

²⁹¹ **Aydın, Mustafa (2004)**; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, p. 27

²⁹² **Ibid.**; pp. 26.30.

Facing these serious Soviet threats towards its territorial integrity, Turkey first attempted to involve the United States and the United Kingdom in this issue. However, the USA and the UK left Turkey alone due to their misinterpretation of Stalin's post war aspirations and Turkey's neutrality during the war. In the meantime, the Western powers realized that the Soviets sought to take advantage of the power gap in the post war era. Thus, the UK declared on March 1946 that its treaty of alliance (1939) with Turkey was still in force and would help Turkey against any aggression. At the same time the USA president Truman started to consider the Soviet demands as a part of an expansionist grand strategy. These changes in the Western perception of the Soviet threat ended Turkey's isolation in the post war period. Subsequently the USA included Turkey in the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and in the Marshall Plan in 1948, which provided Turkey with financial and military aid. Thus between 1947 and 1961 the USA supported Turkey with 1,862 million US dollars military aid and 1,394 million US dollars economic aid.²⁹³

As a result of the above mentioned immediate Soviet threat and Kemalist orientation towards the West, Turkey gradually became part of the Western alliance and its institutions. Firstly, Turkey entered the United Nations (UN) as a founding member in 1945. Then Turkey became one of the founding members of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OECC later known as OECD) in 1948 and the Council of Europe in 1949. At the same time, Turkey also applied for membership status in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was declined in 1950 as it was initially perceived to be for Northern Atlantic countries only. However the Korean War altered the US strategy towards Soviet expansionism. Thus with the Eisenhower Doctrine the USA changed its perceptions about Turkey's strategic position. According to this doctrine, Turkey had a crucial geostrategic position in the southern flank of Europe in order to prevent Soviet aggression towards NATO countries. This new geostrategic role granted Turkey NATO membership status in 1952 and therefore its place in the Western alliance was confirmed.²⁹⁴

²⁹³ **Ibid.**; pp. 26-32.

²⁹⁴ **Dicle, Betül (2008)**; Factors driving Turkish Foreign Policy, Master Thesis, Louisiana State University, pp. 13-16.

All these developments resulted in Turkey's financial, political and military dependency on the Western alliance, particularly the USA. During this period Turkey also became an agent of Western interests and policies in its surrounding regions. For example, Turkey played an active role in the establishment of the Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Balkan Pact (1954), which were established to prevent the Soviet expansionism in these regions. Furthermore, Turkey strongly opposed the military coup in Iraq (1958) and threatened to invade Syria in case a communist regime took over; hence Turkey considered these regime changes in its neighboring states a part of the Soviet grand strategy.

3.2.2.1 Internal Factors: The Transition to a Multi Party System and the Increasing Role of the MFA

As mentioned previously, Turkey witnessed major domestic political and economic changes in the post World War II period. In 1945 Turkey witnessed a transition to the multi party system. Although Hale underestimates the impact of the systemic change in the international system on Turkey's democratization process,²⁹⁵ it is obvious that Turkey's decision was in line with its engagement with democratic Western countries. Apart from Kemalist Turkey's orientation towards the West, the President İnönü also realized that the future lay on the side of Western democracies, as they were victorious in World War II.²⁹⁶ Furthermore, it must be also mentioned that Turkey's need for financial aid required an orientation in foreign policy towards Western countries. Although the ruling Democrat Party were in favor of the liberal economic system and supported the notion that the Turkey's economy should be based on free enterprises and foreign direct investment, because of the lack of indigenous capital and low foreign direct investment they continued to establish state enterprises, for which they needed foreign financial aid.²⁹⁷ As a result of these factors it can be argued that a number of internal and external developments influenced Turkey's transformation from a single party rule to a more democratic multi party system, which in return influenced Turkey's foreign policy in post World War II period.

²⁹⁵ Hale, William M. (2000); pp. 110-111.

²⁹⁶ Çalıř, Şaban (1996); The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, p.164.

²⁹⁷ Ahmad, Feroz (2004); The making of modern Turkey, p. 120.

After the transition to the multi party system in 1945, the DP won the elections in 1950 ending the long rule of the Republican People's Party between 1923 and 1950. The DP remained in power until the military coup in 1960. During this period the DP's leader and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had the same dominance in foreign policy as in the single party period's leaders, Ataturk and İnönü. However, this period also witnessed an increasing role of foreign ministers and the MFA in the shaping of Turkish foreign policy, as Menderes was inexperienced in foreign policy matters.²⁹⁸ During this period, the DP's foreign policy was based on the maintenance of Western financial, military and political aid. Although the Soviet Union denounced its territorial demands from Turkey after Stalin's death in 1953 and there was a limited détente in the Cold War, the DP sought to exaggerate the size of the Soviet threat to Turkey's integrity and NATO in order to obtain more financial aid. Thus Turkey also became a spokesperson for Western interests in the Third World and the Middle East. For instance, Turkey supported the Western powers during the Suez crisis in 1956 and defended Western countries fiercely in the Bandung Conference against non-allied countries, which resulted in an absolute isolation and alienation of Turkey from non-Western regions.²⁹⁹ Turkey also did not realize the major political changes in its surrounding region, where decolonization resulted in the creation of new independent states. These states were strongly anti-Western and Turkey's engagement with the West and its interventionist policies towards the Middle East reminded them of their colonial past. However, it was not until the Cyprus issue that Turkey realized the consequences of this isolation, which led to a reevaluation of Turkey's Western dependency.

3.2.3 Détente in the International System and a Military Coup (1960-1980)

In 1960 Turkey witnessed its first military coup, which radically changed Turkish political life. At the same time, a détente in the Cold War based on the concept of peaceful coexistence began to emerge out of the recognition of a possible mutual

²⁹⁸ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the middle east, p. 92.

²⁹⁹ **Çalış, Şaban (1996)**; The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, pp.139-149.

nuclear destruction. All of these external and internal developments had their imprints on Turkish foreign policy during the period between 1960 and 1980, which will be discussed in this chapter in more detail.

3.2.3.1 Internal Factors: Military Coups and the Increasing Influence of Public Opinion

Turkey's first military coup in 1960, as discussed in the previous section (see 3.1.5), did not directly alter Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy orientation. However the 1961 Constitution, created under a military regime, led to a liberal political atmosphere opening the discussion of foreign policy issues to the public and press opinion. Before that time, foreign policy involvement was the privilege of a narrow, bureaucratic elite and foreign policy issues were not discussed publicly. Yet the liberal Constitution of 1961 guaranteed fundamental civil rights such as freedom of thought, expression, association, publication and other civil liberties.³⁰⁰ As a result of this, foreign policy issues became a part of inter-party debates and attracted public and press attention. Therefore the public opinion about foreign policy issues became increasingly influential and had to be taken into consideration, which was obvious in case of the Cyprus issue.

At the same time Turkish political life witnessed the emergence of socialist, nationalist and Islamist movements. The liberal Constitution's electoral law enabled various small parties to enter the parliament. The ideological differences between these parties made it very hard to reach a consensus on foreign policy issues. The weak coalition governments and the lack of consensus caused an ineffectiveness and inactivity in Turkish foreign policy during the 1970s. The increasing public pressure about foreign policy issues also prevented governments from following an active foreign policy, which could create strong opposition from various political movements. Furthermore, the discussion between the ideological camps led to a radicalization of Turkish youth in the 70s with armed clashes, which in return gave the Army the pretext to intervene into Turkish political life in 1970 and 1980.³⁰¹

³⁰⁰ **Ahmad, Feroz (2004)**; *The making of modern Turkey*, p. 129.

³⁰¹ **Aydin, Mustafa (2004)**; *Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis*, p 4

3.2.3.2 External Factors: Détente and the Cyprus Issue

During the period between 1960 and 1980 two major external factors were influential in Turkish foreign policy. Firstly, the world witnessed a détente in the bipolar balance of power, which resulted in the growth of economic interdependence between the two blocs and an increase in the role of medium powers. This change also affected Turkish foreign policy causing increasing economic relations with the Warsaw Pact and Third World countries. For example, in 1963 a Turkish parliament member's delegation paid a visit to the Soviet Union for the first time since 1932. Furthermore this détente in international politics also caused a deterioration of Turkish-American relations as the differentiation of interests came to the surface.

The deterioration started after the Cuban Missile crisis between the Soviet Union and the USA in 1963. In 1959, the USA installed the Jupiter Missiles in Turkey with nuclear warheads. The Soviet response was to install Missiles in Cuba in 1962 causing a crisis between the USA and the Soviet Union. During the Soviet-American negotiations, the Jupiter missiles in Turkey became a bargaining chip in order to achieve a settlement. Without consulting Turkey, the USA removed the Jupiter Missiles from Turkey in 1963, which gave Turkish leaders the impression that in case of a crisis the USA would act according to its own interests only, jeopardizing Turkey's security. Furthermore, in response to the development of thermonuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, NATO abandoned the massive retaliation concept according to which a Soviet attack on any NATO country would be responded to with an automatic nuclear strike. Instead, NATO developed a flexible response strategy that did not require an automatic nuclear retaliation. This new strategy also caused great concerns among Turkish leaders about Turkish security. The outcome of all these development was a reevaluation of Turkey's dependency on the West, particularly the USA.³⁰²

During this period the second influential external factor was the Cyprus Issue, which has been affecting Turkish foreign policy until today. In order to protect Turkish Cypriots' rights, Turkey became involved in the Cyprus issue in the early 1950s when the Greek Cypriots sought independence from Britain. After long and difficult

³⁰² ***Ibid.***; p 4

negotiations both sides agreed to create the independent Republic of Cyprus in 1959. A treaty of guarantee was signed between Turkey, Greece and Britain in 1960, which gave the guarantor powers the right to unilaterally intervene in Cyprus after seeking cooperation between guarantor countries. However, three years after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus the president Makarios declared the constitution as ineffective and he had intentions to alter it, which led to Turkish protests and communal conflict in Cyprus. After unsuccessful attempts to involve NATO and the USA, under heavy public pressure Turkey decided to intervene unilaterally. The response of the US was the infamous letter of President Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü, warning Turkey not to intervene. In this letter Johnson informed Turkey that the USA weapons could not be used without American permission and the USA would not help Turkey in case of a Soviet involvement in this conflict.³⁰³

The impact and consequences of this letter on Turkish foreign policy and public opinion towards America were of significant importance. Firstly, there was an increase in anti-Americanism in Turkish public opinion, and more importantly, the Turkish decision makers realized that they cannot always rely on American aid. As a result of this shock, and Turkey's isolation in international community, Turkey changed its pro-Western policy to a multifaceted foreign policy that sought to improve relations with non-Western countries. This change had three consequences in Turkey's foreign affairs. Firstly, Turkey altered its policies towards the Soviet Union, improving the relations. Secondly, Turkey changed its security policies to be able to carry out independent military operations without American or NATO assistance. Thirdly, Turkey realized the importance of improving relations with non-Western countries. Thus Turkey followed a neutral policy during the Arab-Israeli Wars in 1967 and 1973³⁰⁴ and became a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference in 1967. However, despite Turkey's attempts to improve its relations with non-Western countries, the memories of Turkey's past policies towards these regions prevented a successful rapprochement. Turkey realized this fact after its intervention in Cyprus in 1974, when the overwhelming majority of UN member countries condemned Turkey's actions.

³⁰³ **Ahmad, Feroz (2004)**; *The making of modern Turkey*, pp. 140-141.

³⁰⁴ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; *Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the middle east*, p. 94.

To sum up, one can claim that during the period between 1960 and 1980 there were significant changes in the Turkish foreign policy structure. During this period, Turkish decision makers started to highlight the importance of Turkish national interests and Turkey's independence in decision-making. However, the foundation of Turkish foreign policy, namely its orientation towards the West, as determined by Ataturk, remained unchanged. As discussed above, this change in Turkish foreign policy was affected by a number of major domestic and external factors. Among these factors one should also mention the impact of the oil crisis in the 70s and the American arms embargo to Turkey after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, which severely deteriorated the Turkish economy. All these factors forced Turkey to reconsider its Western dependency and Turkey seemed to enter a period of alienation from the West during the period between 1960 and 1980.

3.3 Conclusion: Dominance of a Lockean Culture and Realpolitik Thinking

As discussed in the theoretical framework Wendt suggests three main distinct forms of cultures of anarchy, namely Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian. The logic of Hobbesian culture is “war of all against all” resulting states considering each other as enemies and not accepting the right of existence of others. The violent method of survival makes war endemic. Wendt points out that the state system was mainly dominated by Hobbesian anarchy until the seventeenth century. The second type of anarchy culture is Lockean culture, in which states see each other rivals with restraint. However, in contrast to Hobbesian culture, the states accept the other states' existential right and elimination of other states is not the main object. Wendt suggests that after the peace of Westphalia in 1648 Lockean culture has become the main feature of the modern state system.³⁰⁵ According to Wendt there are three influential factors in the adaptation of cultural norms by actors: force, price and legitimacy which are a reflection of the “*three different degrees to which a norm can be internalized and thus as generating three different pathways by which the same structure can be produced.*”³⁰⁶ Consequently Wendt concludes that a culture can be internalized in three different degrees.

³⁰⁵Wendt, Alexander (2009); Social Theory of International Politics, pp-246-313.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.; p. 250.

Considered in this context, one may clearly argue that the foreign relations of the Ottoman Empire, which is the predecessor to modern the Turkish state, had been mainly shaped by a Hobbesian culture of anarchy during early centuries of its history. In a Hobbesian culture “kill or be killed” is the prevailing logic, states do not accept the other states’ existential rights and elimination of other states is the main object. As discussed above, the Ottomans inherited the spirit of “*ghaza*” (holy war) from the former Turkic Seljuk Empire. Apart from its complex political organization, the Ottoman Empire can be considered as a vast military organization that relied on territorial expansion by the expense of other states. One of the prominent historians of Ottomans, Halil Inalcik, points out the fact that for six centuries the Ottoman state’s existence had been shaped by the “*ghaza*” character³⁰⁷, which was demonstrated by Ottoman soldiers’ motto during the battle; “*If I return I’ll be a ghazi, if I die a martyr.*”³⁰⁸ Starting from its foundation back in the beginning of the 14th century, the Ottoman Empire steadily expanded its territories at the expense of other states. As mentioned before in its early centuries, the Ottoman Empire’s foreign policy was mostly motivated by its military offensive character. Thus it can be argued that during its first four centuries the Ottoman Empire had internalized the Hobbesian culture to the third degree. As mentioned before, in the third degree actors comply with the norms because they consider them as legitimate. It is only in third degree that the state’s identity and interests are absolutely constituted by this culture of anarchy. The process of internalization of Hobbesian culture from the first degree to the third degree in the Ottoman Empire will not be discussed here, hence it is the beyond the scope of this study. Yet it should be noted that the early history of the Ottoman Empire clearly demonstrates that it had internalized the Hobbesian culture to the third degree.

Yet, the Ottoman Empire gradually lost its military superiority to the European powers, for which the second unsuccessful siege of Vienna in 1683 can be seen as a turning point. Thus starting with this date, the Ottoman Empire had to adopt a defensive foreign and military strategy vis-à-vis the European powers. After a long 18th century,

³⁰⁷ **Inalcik, Halil Ed. (1994);** An economic and social history of the ottoman empire 1304-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 11.

³⁰⁸ **Ahmad, Feroz (2004);** The making of modern Turkey, p.16.

in which the Ottomans fought and lost many wars against the European powers resulting in the loss of its European territories in the Balkan Peninsula, the Ottoman state realized that its only chance was to deploy a status quo policy in order to preserve its territorial integrity. For this reason, the Ottoman Empire had built its foreign policy strategy around the tactic of playing one great power against another for survival. Gradually this strategy became one of the pillars of Ottoman diplomacy in the 19th century. Consequently, the Ottoman Empire was accepted into the European state system in the 19th century and its territorial integrity and independence was been guaranteed by the European powers in the Paris Treaty of 1851.

As described by Wendt, in the first degree of internalization of the cultures of anarchies “force” plays a substantial role and states comply with the Lockean norms just because of the coercive power of other states or material limitations. In the Ottoman context it can be argued that starting from the 18th century, due to European military superiority, the Ottoman Empire had to embrace the Lockean values of the European state system and had to accept the existential rights of other states. The force factor has been the main reason for the Ottoman internalization of Lockean values to its first degree. The Ottoman Empire did not internalize the Lockean culture to further degrees. Therefore, whenever an opportunity arose, such as the First World War and the Balkan wars between 1912 and 1913, it did not hesitate to return to the revisionist policies of Hobbesian culture. In this regard Wendt also observes returns to Hobbesian culture in the last three centuries of the post Westphalian era, however, he argues that each time the revisionist states were confronted and prevented by the status quo powers. To sum up, one can argue that it was not until the establishment of the Turkish Republic that Turkey totally abandoned the Hobbesian culture of the Ottoman state.

As discussed above, the modern Turkish State, the successor to the Ottoman Empire, had rejected the Ottoman Empire’s culture and history. The modern Turkish state attempted to create a totally new nation based on the principals of European civilization. Consequently with the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkey has abandoned the conquest oriented policy of Ottomans and accepted the existential rights of other states. The founder of modern Turkey, Ataturk, who determined the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy, confirmed in a speech that Turkey will not follow a conquest oriented policy as the Ottoman Empire: *“For us, there can be no question of the lust of*

*conquest... The political system which we regard as clear and fully realisable is national policy... I meant it in this sense: To work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and the welfare of the nation and the country by, above all, relying on our own strength in order to retain our existence. But not to lead the people to follow fictitious aims, of whatever nature, which could only bring them misfortune, and except from the civilised world civilised human treatment...*³⁰⁹

This speech and the history of Turkish foreign policy as discussed above clearly demonstrate that Turkey has not followed a revisionist or irredentist foreign policy and accepted the right of existence of other states, which mainly places Turkey into Lockean culture. A prominent Turkish scholar also points out that Alexander Wendt's theory of "culture of anarchies" may be of particular interest in the Turkish context, although he erroneously places Turkey in a Hobbesian culture.³¹⁰

As described by Wendt in the first degree of the internalization of the cultures of anarchies "force" plays a substantial role and states comply with the Lockean norms just because of the coercive power of other states or material limitations. In the Turkish context it can be argued that the new Turkish Republic had rejected the Hobbesian culture of the Ottoman Empire and embraced the Lockean values because the post First World War power relations forced Turkey to do so. There are many factors in the acceptance of Lockean values by the newly founded Turkish state. First of all, the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a realist politician, was well aware of the fact that it was no longer possible for a country like Turkey that was ruined in the First World War to continue with the conquest oriented policies of the Ottoman Empire. Consequently he denounced what he calls the adventurist nature of Ottoman policies and proclaimed his famous motto for Turkish foreign policy: "peace at home peace abroad". Secondly, Atatürk also realized that no non-western country was able to stop the advance of Western civilization. Thus in his project of Westernization of Turkey it was imperative that Turkey had to embrace the values of Western countries. All in all,

³⁰⁹ **Ghazi Mustafa Kemal**; Speech, Leipzig: K.F. Koehler, 1929, pp.377-379, In; **Çalış, Şaban (1996)**; The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, p 63.

³¹⁰ **Kirişçi, Kemal (2006)**: Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, pp. 100-101

one may argue that starting from its establishment in 1923 the Turkish state had embraced the Lockean norms, in which the factor of force played the main role.

Wendt points out that peace is the main driving force behind the second degree of internalization of the culture of anarchies. In the second degree the actors adopt the norms because they believe it is in their self-interest, which makes their behavior towards the norms instrumental. The institution of sovereignty decreases security risks and makes cooperation between states for mutual benefits possible. Considering the history of Turkish foreign policy, one can argue that having internalized the Lockean culture to the first degree after the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Turkey also reached the second degree of internalization in a very short time for two reasons. Firstly, the Ottoman Empire's experience in the internalization of Lockean values to the first degree in its last century had paved the way of the rapid acceptance of Lockean values in republican Turkey. Secondly, the new Kemalist state ideology has also played a substantial role in this process. The founder of the modern Turkish state, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was a convinced Westernist and strongly believed that the future of Turkey was within the Western culture and civilization. He envisaged adopting all Western values and an absolute integration of Turkey into the Western civilization. Atatürk's practice of foreign policy and his commitment to the Westernization of Turkey has shaped the principals of the new Turkish state's foreign policy, which confirms Turkey's adherence to Lockean values:

- Orientation towards the West; adoption of Western values in the every aspect of life
- International peace, derived from the "peace at home, peace abroad" axiom
- Preservation of the status quo, rejection of revisionism and irredentism
- Realism: realization of the country's power limits and rejection of so called "Ottoman adventurism"
- Legality, solving international issues by legal means, such as issues of the Straits and Mosul³¹¹

³¹¹ **Stone, Leonard A. (2004);** Turkish Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity, Insight Turkey, Volume 6, Number 4/2004, p. 71.

Wendt argues that in the third degree case, the states adopt the norms of Lockean culture just because they consider them legitimate and identify themselves with the norms. Wendt makes a distinction between interest and self-interest, and explains interest as follows: “*our behaviour is still interested in the sense that we are motivated to obey the law, but we do not treat the law as merely an object to be used for our own benefit.*” Therefore, in the third degree states follow status quo policies both at the level of behavior and interests. In the Turkish context one may claim that the Turkish state had moved from the second degree to the third degree of internalization in the post Second World War era. Turkey’s membership to the UN and NATO can be considered as the milestones in the internalization of Lockean culture to the third degree. It is in this era that Turkey internalized Lockean values to the third degree.

As discussed in the second chapter, the rationalists claim that the states’ interests and identities are given and are not influenced by the interaction between states. Accordingly, the only change occurs in the behavior of the states, which they modify according to their interests and incentives. On the contrary, constructivists argue that the identities and interests of the states are constructed in the process of interaction between states³¹². Wendt argues that a change in the culture and identities of states occurs via two mechanisms: natural selection and cultural selection. He further argues that natural selection, which is based on the survival of the strongest one, can only explain the emergence and dominance of the Hobbesian culture in the most part of human history; however it fails to explain the survival of small states in the Westphalian era.

Wendt notes cultural selection can explain the transition to a Lockean culture, which has two mechanisms, i.e. imitation and social learning. The first mechanism shapes the identities and interests of states, “*when actors adopt the self-understandings of those whom they perceive as successful.*” both in material and status means. Wendt notes that imitation may change a population’s characteristics within a single generation, whereas natural selection needs many generations for such a change.³¹³ Wendt notes that imitation plays a significant role in “*the tendency of many Third worlds and former*

³¹² Reus-Smit, Christian; Constructivism, p. 223.

³¹³ Wendt, Alexander (2009); Social Theory of International Politics; pp.325-326.

*communist states to adopt the institutional and ideological attributes of Western states”.*³¹⁴ Social learning constitutes the second mechanism of cultural selection, whose “*basic idea is that identities and their corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others... actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how they think Others see or appraise them, in mirror of Others` representations of the Self*”³¹⁵

In the Turkish case, as discussed previously, like many Third World countries the main motive behind the Kemalist identity’s Western orientation is the imitation of Western culture and civilization, which they perceive to be successful both in material means and status. As put forward by Wendt, the imitation of Western values imposed by Kemalist elites on Turkish society has transformed the Turkish state’s characteristics within a single generation from a Hobbesian culture to a Lockean culture. The second mechanism, the social learning, has been also influential in this process, since Turkey gradually Turkey become a part of the Western alliance and institutions such as NATO, OECD and etc., through which Turkish decision makers acquired new identity and preferences. As described in the previous section, international organizations such as NATO and OECD also plays a constructivist role in the identities and interests of the states.

Apart from the mechanisms discussed above, some domestic factors have also played a substantial role in the evolution of the Turkish state’s identity and interests from a Hobbesian to a Lockean culture. To begin with the Turkish state inherited the Ottoman bureaucratic elite, its institutions and political culture. First of all, the main strategy of the Ottoman Empire in its period of decline, i.e. playing one great power against another for survival and the preservation of status quo, was inherited by Turkish state. Secondly, another main feature of Turkish political culture called Sevres Phobia was also inherited from the Ottomans. This phenomenon is responsible for Turkey’s deep skepticisms and cautiousness against other states’ intentions and the conviction that the external world is conspiring to weaken and divide Turkey. Thirdly, to a certain extent Turkey’s long troublesome relations with its neighbors such as Armenia and Greece can also be

³¹⁴ **Ibid.**; p. 341.

³¹⁵ **Ibid.**; p.327.

considered as an Ottoman legacy in Turkish foreign policy. Fourthly, the consistence of the perception of a Russian threat is also a direct result of the long-lasting conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire which caused thirteen Russo-Turkish wars. Fifthly, Turkey also had to take the responsibility of the religious and ethnic minority groups in the former Ottoman regions in Turkey's neighboring countries, who considered the Turkey as their protector.

Finally, the Turkish Army's extraordinary role in Turkish political life may be also seen a legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the Turkish Republic's history, the Turkish military considered itself as the guardian of Kemalist state principles, the guarantor of political stability and "*the embodiment of the soul of the Turkish nation*".³¹⁶ The result of this notion presented itself in the continuous intervention of the Turkish military into political life. The Turkish Army's extraordinary role weakened the role of Turkish governments and civil society in the foreign policy making process, which remained a privilege of the small Kemalist elite consisting of civil and military bureaucracy. The monopoly of Kemalist elites in the foreign policy making process led to another weakness of Turkish foreign policy, which is the lack of strategic thinking and theory. Consequently, no consistent alternative grand strategy to Kemalist foreign policy was developed until the end of the Cold War. Turkish decision makers have adopted a reaction oriented defensive and conservative policy, which almost constantly avoided taking any initiative. This policy manifested itself in Turkish diplomats' and decision makers' main feature, which is the preference of caution to daring action.

Another main feature of Turkish state identity is the fact that Turkish society represents a torn country between East and West. This phenomenon, which is also called the "divided self", has caused great problems in Turkish political life. Turkey's unique geostrategic location had also its imprints on the threat perceptions of Turkish decision makers, who were extremely sensitive to developments in its neighboring regions and cautious towards international and regional changes in the balance of power.

³¹⁶ **Jenkins, Gareth (2007);** Continuity and change: prospects for civil–military relations in Turkey, p. 339.

Considering the history of Turkish foreign policy as discussed above, one can clearly argue that the Turkish state's identity and its foreign and security policy-making culture has mainly been influenced by a Realpolitik view of international relations. The key Turkish decision makers perceived the international environment as anarchical, which required being militarily strong and ready to deploy hard power military force for win-lose outcomes.³¹⁷ National security was considered a vital issue, for which political and economic sacrifices could be made. As previously discussed in this chapter, Turkey's Ottoman past and the Sevres syndrome also contributed the notion that *Turkey is surrounded by enemy states* and the *Turks does not have any ally other than Turks*.

The history of Turkish foreign policy clearly demonstrates that Turkey has not followed a revisionist or irredentist foreign policy and accepted the right of existence of other states, which mainly places Turkey into a Lockean culture. However, Wendt notes that the political culture of a given country does not necessarily reflect the global system. Therefore, the states may live in a Kantian culture in their immediate neighborhood, but find themselves in a Lockean anarchy in the world system.³¹⁸ It is a fact that Turkey is surrounded by Hobbesian anarchy in the Middle East, where the elimination of "Others" and "war of all against all" is the prevailing logic of anarchy. Thus it can be claimed that although Turkey has internalized Lockean culture in the third degree and recognized other states' sovereignty and their right to exist, as a result of the Hobbesian nature of the Middle East, Turkey's foreign policy has faced great challenges which might have caused a return to a Hobbesian culture in Turkey.

All in all, one may argue that Turkey has internalized the Lockean culture to the third degree, which is based on the concept of rivalry rather than cooperation. As a result of this perception and Kemalist foreign policies preferences Turkey had isolated itself from its neighboring countries and regions, and followed a one sided foreign policy strategy, which aimed to integrate Turkey into the Western civilisation and its institutions. Turkey's foreign policy making culture has been mainly shaped by Lockean values and a Realpolitik view of international relations. However the impact of this culture was particularly clear in Turkey's relations in the 90s, when Turkey faced a

³¹⁷ **Kirişçi, Kemal (2006):** Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, pp. 100-101.

³¹⁸ **Wendt, Alexander (2009);** Social Theory of International Politics, pp-246-313.

number of serious security threats from the Kurdish terrorist organization, PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan- Kurdistan Workers Party). This threat brought Turkey into constant conflict with its neighbors, namely Syria, Iraq and Iran, whom Turkey accused of providing support for the PKK. At the same time, Turkey's conflict with Greece and Cyprus reached its peak in 1995, when Turkey declared *casus belli* against Greek claims about Aegean territorial waters. Consequently, in this period Turkey was referred to as a coercive regional power, which was ready to deploy military force to achieve its foreign policy aims.

In this context one may argue that Turkey's foreign policy until the Helsinki Summit in 1999 can be considered to be within a Lockean culture. The dominance of a Lockean culture based on rivalry started to change with the transition to a liberal economy in 1980, long before the Helsinki Summit in 1999. In the era between 1980 and 1999 and afterwards, there are a number of domestic and external factors which paved the way for the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy, which in return promoted the emergence of a Kantian culture based on friendship and cooperation in the Turkish foreign policy culture. The determinants and consequences of this transformation process will be discussed in the coming chapter in more detail.

4. A Holistic Analysis of the Transformation of the Turkish state's Identity, Interests and Foreign Policy (1980-2012)

The main hypothesis of this study is that Turkey's foreign policy has been going through a fundamental transformation process since the end of the Cold War, which began with Turkey's transition to a liberal economic system in 1980. Economic liberalization and many other factors opened Turkish society to the outside world and prepared the basis for the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and interests, which in return reshaped its foreign policy making culture fundamentally. There are several external and internal factors influencing this transformation process, which can be summarized as follows:

- Globalization,
- The end of the Cold War and transformation of the geo-political and geostrategic position of Turkey.
- The EU membership process: Europeanization and democratization,
- The rise of counter elites and ideologies,
- Economic liberalization and the rise of economic politics,
- The rising role of civil society, i.e. NGOs, think tanks and public opinion,
- The rise of the JDP,
- A new grand strategy for Turkish foreign policy: "strategic depth".

All these factors together contributed to the transformation of the Turkish state's identity which in return reshaped Turkish foreign policy in the last three decades. As a result of this, Turkey obtained a multi-dimensional and balanced foreign policy strategy towards various regions and a Kantian culture started to emerge in Turkish foreign policy making after the Helsinki Summit decision to grant Turkey candidate status for EU membership in 1999. Therefore it can be argued that the JDP's foreign policy since 2002 is a reflection of the normalization and transformation of the Turkish state and society. This transformation started with economic liberalization in the 80s, accelerated with the end of the Cold War and reached its peak in the post Helsinki era with the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy and with the implementation of a new foreign policy doctrine, i.e. "strategic depth". Thus it can be claimed that the notion that the JDP's foreign policy practice is just driven by its Islamic orientation may not be accurate.

It is clear that the candidate status for the EU did not transform Turkey overnight and there must be some internal and external factors which facilitated this transformation. One can argue that the roots of this transformation can be traced back to 1980, when Turkey went a fundamental economic transformation, namely the transition to a liberal economic model, which in return affected Turkish foreign policy making and Turkish society radically. It is clear that Turkey was under the influence of a Lockean culture until as late as 1999. However, starting from Turkey's transition to a liberal economic model in 1980, which opened Turkey to the outside world transforming it radically, some internal and external factors facilitated the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy. Thus it can be said that the emergence of a Kantian culture has depended on the interplay of several internal and external factors. Therefore this chapter will include the period between 1980 and 2012, and will analyze the determinants and the results of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. The determinants will be analyzed under two main categories, namely external and internal factors. As mentioned in the second chapter this study will adopt a holistic constructivist approach combining the two facets of international politics, namely internal and external, since this approach might be useful in order to achieve a better understanding of the forces behind the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and interests. At the end of this

chapter the result of this transformation process, namely the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy, will be discussed.

4.1 External Factors:

As discussed in the theoretical chapter, this study will adopt a holistic approach in order to analyze the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. This means this study will take external as well as internal factors into consideration. It seems appropriate to start with the external factors since the developments in the international arena have been one of the main driving forces behind the transformation of Turkish foreign policy.

4.1.1 Globalization

One can argue that the process of globalization is the light driving force behind the drastic changes in Turkish society, which facilitated the transformation of Turkish foreign policy in the last three decades. As put forward by Held et al. globalization is “*the cliché of our times*”. Furthermore it is “*the big idea which encompasses everything from global financial markets to the internet but which deliver little substantive insight into the contemporary human condition.*”³¹⁹ As can be clearly seen from this statement the concept of globalization is very controversial and ambiguous and therefore there is no widely accepted canonical definition of it. Therefore “*globalisation has come to mean a variety of rather different things to a range of different authors.*”³²⁰

Some scholars consider globalization as a new phenomenon limiting its scope to the post Cold War era or post World War II era, whereas others consider it as a long-term phenomenon. For instance Steger identifies “*five historical periods that are separated from each other by significant accelerations in the pace of social exchanges as well as a*

³¹⁹ **Held, David/ McGrew, Anthony/ Goldblatt, David/ Perraton Jonathan (1999)**; *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture*, Stanford University Press, p.1.

³²⁰ **Hay, Colin**; *International Relations theory and Globalization in*; **Dunne, Tim/ Kurki, Milja/ Smith, Steve (2010)**; *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.285

widening of their geographical scope.”³²¹ Whether or not it is a new phenomenon does not change the fact that the contemporary world is facing globalization to a level that was not experienced in history.

In IR theory the main discussion about globalization presents an ontological dispute between the state centrism of neo-realism and non-state centrism of neo-liberalism. Against the neo-realist assumptions which consider the state in the center of international relations, neo-liberals and globalization theories suggest that the nation state is no longer the principal actor in world politics. Accordingly the potential indices of globalization can be summarized as follows:

- *“Cross-border flows of goods, investment and information*
- *Trans-national processes of political deliberation and decision-making*
- *Inter-dependence between states*
- *The development of a world system whose dynamic and developmental trajectory is not reducible to the simple product of the units (states) which comprise it*
- *The proliferation of problems to which global solutions are required*
- *The development of institutions charged with responsibility for fashioning genuinely global public policy”*³²²

Globalization has different dimensions such as economic-technological, political, cultural, and financial. However it has been used primarily as *“a synonym for the effects and development of a neo-liberal global capitalist economy of the last five decades.”*³²³ Therefore it should be noted that in essence globalization is an economic phenomenon as the evolution of the world economy is central to any reasonable account of globalization.

The first dimension, economic-technological globalization, refers to the fact that *“the global economy is now larger, more geographically extensive and produces more goods and service than at any previous point in the history.”* As a result of the rise of multinational and transnational firms the semi-skilled manufacturing jobs have moved to developing countries. The emergence of transnational firms created a globalized

³²¹ **Steger, Manfred B. (2009);** Globalization: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.18-19.

³²² **Hay, Colin;** International Relations theory and Globalization, p. 280.

³²³ **Jones, Andrew (2006);** Dictionary of globalization, Cambridge, Polity, p.113.

world economy. Furthermore “*with new forms of information and communication technologies, and mirrored by global financial integration, the global productive economy has moved beyond the scale of nation states and even regional trading blocs*” The second dimension is political which refers to the increasing power of transnational corporations, global financial integration and supranational institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, resulting in a decline in the nation states’ sovereignty. It is argued that the Westphalian state system is not able to deal with these changes. The third dimension, cultural globalization, focuses on the question of whether or not cultural globalization is contributing to the emergence of a homogeneous global culture, which is mostly associated with Americanization. The last dimension refers to the proliferation of global problems such as climate change to which global solutions are required.³²⁴

Considering the vast literature about this topic it is clear that it is beyond the scope of this study to cover all the discussions and literature around the nature, extent and consequences of globalization. However this does not necessarily mean that the consequences of globalization should not be taken into account in a foreign policy analysis since “*it would be truly extraordinary if the momentous changes in the way ordinary people live throughout the world did not have some impact both on international relations and the theories we develop to understand these relations.*”³²⁵ Thus this study will consider globalization and its consequences at its most general level in order to achieve a better understanding of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy in the last three decades.

According to Jones, in a broader sense “*globalisation can be defined as the growing interconnectedness and interrelatedness of all aspects of society*”.³²⁶ Held et al. developed a more detailed and general definition of globalization. Accordingly “*globalisation is a process (or set of process) that embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions, generating trans-continental*

³²⁴ **Ibid.**; pp. 9-11.

³²⁵ **Brown, Chris/ Ainley, Kirsten (2005)**; *Understanding International Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p. 164.

³²⁶ **Jones, Andrew (2006)**; *Dictionary of globalization*, p.2.

or inter-regional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power."³²⁷ As can be clearly seen from these definitions the core issue in globalization is the increasing relations in every dimension of contemporary life or in Anthony Giddens' words "the intensification of worldwide social relations".³²⁸ In the context of constructivism the increasing relations between societies and states is also important since it claims that the interaction between states may change the identity and interests of the actors which in return may create a new culture of anarchy. In this regard globalism, as in its broader sense, has been playing a significant role in the intensification of Turkey's relations with the outside world, which in return has affected and changed the Turkish state's identity and interests in the last three decades.

It is clear that like any other country Turkey has been strongly affected by the process of globalization. Considering the strategic geopolitical location of Turkey as discussed in the previous chapter (see 3.1.6) one may also claim that the impact of the globalization on Turkey has been more than on other countries in the third world. One can also argue that Turkey's transition to a liberal economic model in 1980 and the integration of the Turkish economy into the world and capitalist economy was a direct result of the globalization process. Alici and Ucal summarized the effect of globalization on Turkish economy as follows:

*"Globalization has started to show its effects on Turkish economy in the form of structural adjustments and legislative regulations in early 1980s, especially after the January 24th decisions. In this context, transition to free market economy, opening to foreign markets, export-led growth, reducing the weight of public sector in the economy, privatization, liberalization of the financial system, facilitating to enter the banking sector, developing non-banking financial institutions, utilization of flexible interest and exchange rates, lifting restrictions in foreign currency and free flow of capital or at least alleviating these restrictions, allowing those living in Turkey to open foreign exchange accounts (FX deposits), establishing a capital market, re-organizing the body of Istanbul Stock Exchange and activating it, encouraging both foreign and local investments, funding public expenses heavily with debt due to loss of public revenue because of tax incentives and discounts could be regarded as the effects of globalization over economy."*³²⁹

³²⁷ Held, David/ McGrew, Anthony/ Goldblatt, David/ Perraton Jonathan (1999); p. 16.

³²⁸ Jones, Andrew (2006); Dictionary of globalization, p.114.

³²⁹ Alici, Asli Akgüç/ Ucal, Meltem Sengül (2003); Foreign direct Investment, Exports and Output Growth of Turkey: Causality Analysis, Paper to be Presented at the European Trade

Before 1980 Turkey implemented an economic model based on import substitution and Turkey was a “closed society” as a result of these economic policies. However the adoption of an export oriented growth policy and the impact of globalization transformed Turkey in three decades into an “open society.” As mentioned before, this transformation had direct consequences on Turkish foreign policy, introducing the obtainment of necessary foreign direct investment and the finding of new foreign markets for Turkish exports to the Turkish Foreign Ministry agenda. The need for fresh markets for Turkish exports forced Turkey to improve its relations with the Eastern bloc and Middle Eastern countries in addition to the existing European markets.

Although there are different indicators for the effects of the globalization stretching from abstract indicators to more material ones, this study will take into consideration the most significant and material ones. For instance, over the period of 1981 to 2011 there was a staggering increase in Turkey’s exports, which rose more than thirty-threefold from \$ 4 billion³³⁰ in 1981 to \$ 134 billion³³¹ in 2010. Another significant rise was in the number of tourists visiting Turkey. Foreign tourist arrivals increased in Turkey between 1980 and 2007 nearly twenty fivefold from 1.2 million to 27 million, which made Turkey a top-10 destination in the world.³³² One of the important indicators of globalization is the percentage of Internet users in a country. Although Turkey was far behind the developed countries in the beginning of the 21th century, it has shown a rapid growth in this era in the last decade. The percentage of the population using Internet in Turkey has risen from %3.76 in 2000 to % 34.8 in 2008.³³³ Furthermore in the last two decades pipeline projects such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC), Nabucco, Blue Stream and etc. carried Turkey to the midst of the energy transport routes between

Study Group (ETSG) Fifth Annual Conference, p.2; Available at <http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2003/papers/alici.pdf> (accessed on 06.07.2010, 14:50)

³³⁰ **Oran, Baskın (Ed.) (2006);** Türk Dış Politikası II, 1980-2001: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular Belgeler Yorumlar (Turkish Foreign Policy II 1980-2001), İletişim , İstanbul, p. 15.

³³¹ <http://www.tim.org.tr/tr/tim-gundem-3.html> (accessed on 02.01.2011, 16:15)

³³² <http://www.kultur.gov.tr/TR/Genel/BelgeGoster.aspx?F6E10F8892433CFF2B81939FD5B60AFAFFDE13C621852F44> (accessed on 02.07.2010, 16:25)

³³³ Source World Bank: Available at: http://www.google.com/publicdata?ds=wb-wdi&met=it_net_user_p2&idim=country:TUR&dl=en&hl=en&q=internet+usage+in+turkey (accessed on 02.07.2010, 16:48)

east and west, north and south. Its strategic location as an energy bridge between various regions has also strengthened Turkey's political power.

Lastly, as mentioned above, another significant symbol of globalization is multinational and transnational firms moving semi-skilled jobs to developing countries. In the last three decades a considerable amount of multinational and transnational firms, such as Ford, Toyota etc., invested in Turkey transporting their semi-skilled manufacturing facilities to Turkish soil. Foreign direct investment in Turkey has flourished in the last three decades reaching 21.000³³⁴ foreign firms investing in Turkey today.

All of the numbers mentioned above indicate an increase in Turkey's relations with the outside world in every dimension of contemporary life. This in return transformed the Turkish state's identity and interests producing a more open and liberal culture, which is substantial for the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkey. As mentioned before, globalization has different dimensions such as economic-technological, political, cultural, and financial, which have been affecting and transforming Turkish society in the last three decades. It is clear that it is beyond the scope of this study to cover all the dimensions and consequences of globalization in Turkey. However, in order to better understand the bigger picture of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy the general consequences of globalization should be taken into consideration.

4.1.2 The End of the Cold War and Transformation of the Geopolitical and Geostrategic Position

Another important factor in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy is the end of the Cold War. It is a fact that the Cold War and Turkey's membership in the NATO increased Turkey's strategic value for Western countries. As a result of this, Turkey enjoyed a considerable amount of foreign financial and military aid throughout the Cold War. However, Cold War power relations also posed lots of limitations for Turkey's foreign policy options alienating Turkey from most of its neighbors. Makovsky summarizes characteristics of Turkish foreign policy until the end of the Cold War as

³³⁴<http://www.treasury.gov.tr/irj/portal/anonymous?NavigationTarget=navurl://ce3dfbf81aace54e4b6d1e21fe4a165f&InitialNodeFirstLevel=true> (accessed on 02.07.2010, 16:48)

follows: *“Throughout the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was typically insular and passive, encapsulated by Turkish diplomats with the saying attributed to Kemal Atatürk “peace at home, peace abroad.” Turkey focused its energy on internal development and sought to avoid foreign tensions that could divert it from that goal... It remained neutral during almost all of World War II, joining the allied side only in the war's waning days with the outcome already decided. Almost from birth, Turkey sought to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union --only Stalin's post-World War II claims on Turkish territory drove Turkey into alliance with the West-- and to demonstrate to its neighbors in former Ottoman Middle Eastern and Balkan territories that it had left its imperial past behind. In the first decades of its existence, Turkey had little interest in its Middle Eastern neighbours, neither to woo, nor antagonize. For the Turkish republic, the Arab world represented the backward ways Turkey itself hoped to shed. Later, when states like Syria and Iraq aligned themselves with the Soviet Union, Ankara had all the more reason to avert clashes”*.³³⁵

The end of the Cold War meant the opening of vast opportunities and challenges for Turkish foreign policy. It is no exaggeration to say that outside of the Soviet Union Turkey was one of the most affected countries by the end of the Cold War as this process transformed Turkey's strategic position significantly.³³⁶ Hale notes that this transformation changed *“Turkey's international environment as profoundly as either of two previous transformations, of 1918-1923 and 1945.”*³³⁷ In the Cold War Turkey was a barrier to the Soviet threat in NATO's southern flank contributing to Western Europe's security. Its strategic value was limited to this role in the Western bloc. However, with the end of the Cold War *“The game that Turkey played for 45 years ended and was replaced by a new game, the rules of which were not yet known”*.³³⁸ Thus it can be said that initially Turkey did not welcome this drastic systemic change, because Turkey developed all its Cold War foreign and security policies according to its strategic importance in the Western alliance against the Soviet threat.

³³⁵ **Makovsky, Alan (1999)**; *The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkey's Role in the Twenty-First Century*, SAIS Review, Volume 19, Number 1, Winter-Spring 1999, p. 93.

³³⁶ **Fuller, Graham E. (1992)**; *Turkey Faces East; New Orientations Toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union*, A rand Paper, Santa Monica, pp. V-VI.

³³⁷ **Hale, William M. (2000)**; *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, Frank Cass, London, p.191.

³³⁸ **Aydin, Mustafa (2004)**; *Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis*, Ankara, p. 62.

Furthermore, the Europeans started to discuss the necessity of NATO, which was thought to have lost its *raison d'être* after the dismantlement of the Soviet Union. However, the developments in the post Cold War era such as the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the “War on Terror” have shown that Turkey’s geopolitical importance for the West has not been diminished. On the contrary, it can be claimed that Turkey has acquired a much more important role for the Western world.³³⁹ In this regard Calleya notes that:

*“contrary to the prediction of some pundits that Turkey’s strategic importance would wane as a result of the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s strategic star has been constantly rising. Its geographic location between Europe and the Middle East has ensured that Turkey plays a pivotal role in the unfolding relationship among the United States, Europe, and Europe’s Middle Eastern neighbours. Turkey’s role in the 1990 – 91 Gulf War re-established its position as an essential component in the Western security alliance at precisely the time when the end of the Cold War forebode that Turkey could become a less significant player in the European region. Turkey’s geostrategic credentials were again in the limelight when it decided to adopt a somewhat obstructionist attitude during the American war against Iraq in 2003, with Turkey denying the United States access to Turkish bases in the run-up to the war.”*³⁴⁰

In this regard former Turkish Foreign Minister (1997-2001) Ismail Cem described Turkey’s foreign policy vision in the post Cold War era as follows: *“We envisage an international mission that is no longer peripheral and confined to the outskirts of Europe. Our mission envisions a pivotal role in the emerging Eurasian reality.”*³⁴¹

As mentioned already, the end of the Cold War was a mixed blessing for Turkey. On the one hand, because of the power vacuum in Turkey’s surrounding regions the number of security threats to Turkey increased significantly. As a result, Turkey found itself in the middle of 13 potential threat producing regions as described by NATO in the post Cold War era. During the 90s Turkey faced ethnic and religious conflicts in its immediate regions, stretching from conflicts in the Balkans, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, to conflicts in the Caucasus, such as Chechnya, Abkhazia and Nagorno-

³³⁹ **Bac, Meltem Müftüler;** Turkey’s Foreign Policy Challenges in the new millennium, Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 1-9.

³⁴⁰ **Calleya, Stephen C. (2006);** EU-Turkish Relations: Prospects and Problems, Mediterranean Quarterly: Spring 2006, p. 43.

³⁴¹ **Cem, Ismail (2002);** Turkish foreign Policy: Opening new Horizons for Turkey at the beginning of a new Millennium, Turkish Policy Quarterly Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 2002, p.2.

Karabakh. Traditionally, Turkey has always sought to stay away from regional conflicts. However the growing public pressure forced Turkey to take a side and follow an active policy in these conflicts.³⁴²

Although the end of the Cold War indicated a decline in security challenges leading to a decreasing role for armies and declining defense spending for some countries, this was not the case for Turkey. Turkey's defense expenditures doubled in the period between 1985 and 1995.³⁴³ Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Turkish Army has always played a substantial role in Turkish political life. In the 80s this was not much visible, as the decisions of Özal did not clash with the Army's preferences. However in the 90s the role and the influence of the Army in Turkish foreign and domestic politics became visible. There were several factors in the rising influence of the Army. Parallel to external security challenges, Turkey witnessed the rise of political Islam leading to the Islamist Welfare Party's election victory in 1995. Additionally, Turkey witnessed increasing terror attacks from the secessionist Kurdish terror organization, PKK, which equated to a civil war. At the same time Turkey's increasing participation in NATO and UN international missions enabled the Army to increase its influence in the decision making process. The Turkish Army's role in the increasing Turkish-Israeli cooperation, in the S-300 Missile Crisis with Greece and Cyprus and the threatening of Syria with war for the expulsion of PKK's leader Öcalan from Syria can be regarded as examples of the increasing influence of the Turkish Army in Turkish foreign policy in the 90s.³⁴⁴ In this regard, in the 90s, Turkish-Israeli relations increasingly became a symbolic battle ground between Islamists and secularists. Altunisik claims that the Turkish Army used Turkish-Israeli relations as an example to demonstrate to the Islamist party government led by Erbakan (1996-1997) its power limitations in foreign policy.³⁴⁵

³⁴² **Aydin, Mustafa (2004);** Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, p. 62-66.

³⁴³ **Makovsky, Alan (1999);** The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkey's Role in the Twenty-First Century, p. 95.

³⁴⁴ **Özcan, Mesut (2008);** Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, p. 96.

³⁴⁵ **Bacik, Gökhan/ Aras Bülent (2004);** Turkey's Inescapable Dilemma: America or Europe, p. 57.

All of these external and internal security challenges led to a securitization of Turkish foreign policy in the 90s, which continued until the EU Helsinki Summit decision to grant Turkey candidacy status in 1999, leading to the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy.

Apart from these negative consequences, this systemic change also opened a vast area to Turkey's influence extending from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall in China. Turkey realized that it could extend its influence in new Caucasian, Balkan and Central Asian countries using its common cultural, religious and linguistic bonds. In this regard former Turkish Foreign Minister (1997-2002) Ismail Cem points out that *“This strategic change corresponds with a new consciousness in Turkey. The role of a shared history and of parallel cultural characteristics is highlighted and put into practice in all spheres of our foreign policy. It is worth noting that there are twenty-six countries with which we have shared a common history, a common state and a common fate for centuries. This background provides for strong economic relationships and a unique platform for political cooperation. In this vast socio-political geography, Turkey has the optimal conditions and the required assets to become a provider of peace, stability and welfare, and to enjoy the opportunities presented by the new “Eurasian Order.”*³⁴⁶

Despite these ambitious plans Turkey could only realize its vision to a small extent as a result of its limited economic and human resources and lack of strategic planning in the 90s.³⁴⁷ Furthermore, Turkey's static and cautious foreign bureaucracy was not prepared for these massive changes and had difficulties in adapting to the new international environment and its requirements.³⁴⁸

Makovsky finds a new activist trend in Turkish foreign policy starting from Turkey's involvement in the Gulf War, contrary to Turkey's cautious defensive foreign policy in the past decades. In the 90's Turkey attempted to acquire a more active foreign policy by initiating and participating in several regional organizations. The formation of the

³⁴⁶ **Cem, Ismail (2002)**; Turkish foreign Policy: Opening new Horizons for Turkey at the beginning of a new Millennium, 2002, p.5.

³⁴⁷ **Bacik, Gökhan/ Aras Bülent (2004)**; Turkey's Inescapable Dilemma: America or Europe, p.56.

³⁴⁸ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, p. 94.

Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) by Turkey's initiation can be seen as an example of this new active foreign policy approach. There are several reasons for Turkey's new activism in the international arena: *“more prosperity; a better-equipped and more experienced military; the decline of neighbouring states; greater regional opportunity; and a greater sense of policy independence marked by the ending of restraints imposed by the Cold War.”*³⁴⁹

Turkish foreign policy in the 90s can be analyzed in three phases. The first phase is dominated by President Turgut Özal's personality and leadership until 1991. Özal's foreign policy style led to dismantlement in the institutionalized foreign policy decision making process. In the second phase between 1991 and 1994 the role of the president declined and the cooperation between Foreign Minister Cetin and the foreign ministry bureaucracy resulted in a relatively stable period in the decision making process. This period was marked with an increasing role for institutions and a decreasing role for leaders and personalities in the formation of Turkish foreign policy. However, in the third phase between 1994 and 1997, a fragmented and competitive approach dominated the Turkish foreign policy process as political instability and weak coalition governments led to a high turnover of foreign ministers, which in return increased the role of the Turkish Army in the formation of Turkish foreign policy.³⁵⁰ After 1997 Ismail Cem served as foreign minister for five years, which brought more stability for Turkish foreign policy. The continuity in the post of foreign minister for five years and Cem's mild personal approach were influential in the relative stability of Turkish foreign policy during this period despite the changes in governments and the economic crisis.³⁵¹

Cem claims that his period differed from conventional Turkish foreign policy as a result of his “realist” approach. He argues that during his period Turkey attempted to improve its relations with several regions using cultural and historical bonds. Accordingly, he notes five factors that supported his policies:

³⁴⁹ **Makovsky, Alan (1999)**; *The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy: Turkey's Role in the Twenty-First Century*, p. 95.

³⁵⁰ **Robins, Philip (2003)**; *Suits and uniforms: Turkish foreign policy since the Cold War*, Univ. of Washington Press, Seattle, pp. 53.61

³⁵¹ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; *Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East*, p. 97.

- A redefinition of Turkish identity as a meeting point between East and West
- The benefits of being an Asian and European country at the same time
- Turkey's significant economic development potential
- Turkey's contributions to peace and stability in a region of instabilities and challenges
- Being a model for other Muslim countries as a secular and democratic country³⁵²

Apart from these developments it should be mentioned that the main cornerstones of Turkish foreign policy, namely its orientation towards West, remained unchanged in the post Cold War period. Turkey continued to apply its conventional foreign policy principles, which were discussed in the previous chapter, in its relations with the newly independent states, whilst evaluating new challenges and opportunities for its foreign policy options. Calis concludes that Turkish foreign policy showed continuity with its conventional foreign policy principles in the 90s. Thus during this period there was no evidence proving that Turkish decision makers attempted to change the basic principle of Turkish foreign policy rather than responding to the challenges within the traditional approach.³⁵³ However this does not mean that nothing changed in this period. Above all, as a result of the transformation of the geopolitical position of Turkey, new vast regions entered into Turkish foreign policy agenda and Turkey started to follow a more multidimensional and active foreign policy approach towards its surrounding regions.

4.1.3 The EU Membership Process: Europeanization and Democratization

Among the external factors contributing to the transformation of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish society, Turkey's relations with the EU can be seen as the most important one. The impact of the European Union on its member and candidate states' domestic political structures is referred to as Europeanization. This process is one of the main driving forces behind the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy. It is

³⁵² **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, p. 97.

³⁵³ **Çalış, Şaban (1996)**; The role of identity in the making of modern Turkish foreign policy, pp.343-344.

clear that EU membership or even prospects of it leads to significant domestic changes in the subject states and in their foreign policies.

Turkey's relations with the European Union started five decades ago when Turkey applied for associate membership to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959. As discussed in the theoretical framework, Wendt argues that imitation constitutes one of the mechanisms of cultural selection, which shapes the identities and interests of the states. It plays a significant role in *"the tendency of many Third worlds and former communist states to adopt the institutional and ideological attributes of Western states"*.³⁵⁴ In the formation of Kemalist identity the imitation of Western countries and its values also played a substantial role since they perceived the West and Europe as successful both in material and status means, which should be imitated and adopted in order to become more successful. Therefore Kemalist elites have always considered being a part of Europe and Western civilization as their ultimate goal. The following statement of the founder of the modern Turkish Republic, i.e. Kemal Atatürk, poses a remarkable example of the logic behind the Kemalist identity. *"The west always been prejudiced against the Turks... but we Turks have always consistently moved towards west... In order to be a civilized nation, there is no alternative"*³⁵⁵

As a result of this notion, membership to the EU and other Western institutions, such as NATO, OECD etc., has been considered by the Kemalist elite as part of Turkey's three centuries long history of modernization and Westernization process, which has been perceived as the only option for Turkey. *"In the post Second World War period, predominantly from the early 1960s onward, eventual membership into the EU has been interpreted as a necessary counterpart, motivating Turkey toward Westernization and modernization, which has been proclaimed as official state ideology."*³⁵⁶ That is why despite its considerable amount of troubles Turkey never gave up its hope to become a part of the European Union and its predecessor institutions during the last five decades.

Despite this long running relationship one can claim that the EU and its predecessor institutions exerted only limited influence on Turkish political life until the late

³⁵⁴ **Wendt, Alexander (2009);** Social Theory of International Politics, p.342.

³⁵⁵ **Hale, William M. (2000);** Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, Frank Cass, London, **p.38.**

³⁵⁶ **Hakki, Murat Metin (2006);** Turkey and the EU: Past Challenges and Important Issues Lying Ahead, Turkish Studies, Volume 7, Issue 3, September 2006, p. 452.

1990s,³⁵⁷ because the Kemalist elites were reluctant to make the necessary political reforms required for EU membership, as this could undermine their status in the Turkish political system. Additionally, Turkey's relations with Europe were strained because of the human rights abuses in Turkey following the 1980 military coup. Despite this troubled relationship neither the EU nor the Kemalist elites in Turkey were ready to break the relations totally because of the high price involved. As a result of this, they played a game which did not produce any results in terms of Turkey's accession to the EU until 1999. Although Turkey had applied for EU membership as early as in 1987 and entered the EU customs union in 1996, the EU did not declare Turkey as a candidate country but referred to it as eligible for membership at its Luxemburg Summit in 1997. The Luxemburg Summit pointed out that *"Turkey did not meet the standards for candidacy, and offered instead a European Strategy based on the exploitation of the integration prospects foreseen under the existing contractual relationships."*³⁵⁸ This rejection was considered discrimination in Turkey, to which Turkey responded by freezing its political dialogue with the EU, threatening to remove its application for membership and annex the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to Turkey. The danger and high costs of an alienation of Turkey from Europe forced the EU to grant Turkey candidate status in its Helsinki Summit in 1999. From many aspects the Helsinki decision can be seen a turning point in the long democratization process of Turkey which started with a vast political and economic reform process, which in one decade transformed Turkey radically.

As discussed in the theoretical chapter, conditionality and power asymmetry are the main features of the relations between the EU and a candidate country. EU as an international institution has compulsory power on its candidate countries. Compulsory power is in effect when one actor can unilaterally force another actor to accept certain policies. The EU exerts compulsory power because of its normative values and the material advantages stemming from prospective membership. The asymmetric relation

³⁵⁷ **Ziya, Önis (2007)**; Conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists: political parties and paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Volume 9, Issue 3, December 2007, p. 247.

³⁵⁸ **Narbone, Luigi/ Tocci, Nathalie (2007)**; Running around in circles? The cyclical relationship between Turkey and the European Union, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Volume 9, Issue 3, December 2007, p. 234.

between the candidate country and the EU makes the candidate countries more vulnerable and open to pressures from the EU to adapt to EU norms, since it forces the candidate countries to adopt certain policies and reform their domestic institutions to reach European standards. Therefore the nature of the relations between the EU and the candidate countries shows a top-down rather than a bottom-up interaction, which should be kept in mind throughout the analysis of the effects of the European Union on Turkish political culture and structures.

It is a fact that the Turkey-EU relationship is two sided. Each side has its own preferences and motives for Turkey's membership in the EU. As discussed above, in the Turkish context the imitation of Western countries and institutions should be seen as the basic factor in Turkey's bid for EU membership since the elites in Turkey have always perceived the West as a model. Thus it can be concluded that the desire to become a European/Western country is the main motive behind Turkey's elites' continuous bid for EU membership. Another important factor in Turkey's desire for an EU membership was Turkey's notoriously bad economic performance until the beginning of the new millennium. Turkey suffered four economic crises between 1994 and 2001, which made the Turkish economy very fragile. Thus the business community also pushed forward for EU membership, since they *"increasingly viewed the EU anchor as a means to consolidate the kind of economic environment conducive to their long-term interests, fearing that the economic reform process itself could easily be reversed in the absence of EU membership prospects"*³⁵⁹

As discussed in the theoretical chapter the EU affects a candidate country through several mechanisms such as adaptations through membership and the socialization of decision makers. Based on this framework, firstly the adaptations through EU membership should be analyzed. Secondly, the socialization of decision makers and its impact on Turkish foreign policy will be elaborated on. Finally, the foreign policy changes on concrete issues such as Cyprus, Greece and Armenia will be analyzed.

As a result of EU conditionality, adaptations through membership lead to significant legal changes in candidate countries. As a candidate country Turkey has had to adapt its institutions and political structures to EU standards in order to become a member state.

³⁵⁹ **Hakki, Murat Metin (2006);** Turkey and the EU: Past Challenges and Important Issues Lying Ahead, Turkish Studies, Volume 7, Issue 3, September 2006, p. 452

First of all, Turkey had to meet the EU Copenhagen political criteria in order to start accession negotiations with the EU. Accordingly any country wishing to enter the EU has to fulfill following criteria: “*stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU; and the capacity to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the objectives of political, economic and monetary union and the adoption of the *acquis* and its effective implementation through appropriate administrative and judicial structures.*”³⁶⁰

As mentioned in the theoretical chapter the transformation depends on the political culture and goodness of fit of the member states. In order to meet the Copenhagen criteria Turkey has had to implement wide ranging political reforms. Considering the history of democratization in Turkey, one can argue that it is a very slow, painful and fragile process, which always requires pressure and incentives from the outside. Between 1987 and 2004 the Turkish Constitution was amended 8 times in order to change the 1982 Constitution imposed by military rule. Additionally, the Turkish parliament also accepted nine harmonization packages between 2002 and 2004 in order to meet the Copenhagen political criteria.³⁶¹ As a result of these legal changes the European council concluded that Turkey had met the political criteria and accession negotiations started on 3 October 2005.³⁶² It is no exaggeration to claim that this was a breakthrough in the history of Turkish-EU relations as well as in Turkish modernization history. Furthermore, it is clear that Turkey would not be able to make these radical reforms without the prospect of an EU membership since this was the main driving force behind the Turkish reforms. However the farthest-reaching constitutional amendment came after 5 years of EU accession negotiations. In order to bring the Turkish Constitution in compliance with EU standards 26 articles of the Constitution

³⁶⁰ **Aydin, Mustafa/ Acikmese, Sinem A. (2007)**; Europeanization through EU conditionality: understanding the new era in Turkish foreign policy, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Volume 9, Issue 3, December 2007, p. 267.

³⁶¹ **Özbudun, Ergun (2007)**; Democratization Reforms in Turkey: 1993-2004, *Turkish Studies*, Volume 8, Issue 2, June 2007, p. 180.

³⁶² **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, p.

were amended with a referendum in October 2010. It is clear that it is beyond the scope of this study to mention all of these legal changes in detail. However the changes which affected the Turkish foreign policy process should be mentioned.

As discussed in the previous chapter the Turkish Army has always played a substantial role in Turkish political life. In the post Helsinki era the removal of military supremacy over civilian rule was the one of the main issues in Turkey in order to reach the Copenhagen criteria. The Army exerted its influence mainly by the NSC. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the legal changes regarding the composition and structure of the NSC resulted in a decrease of military influence in the foreign policy process. (S. Chapter 3.1.5) Kirisci draws attention to the *“erosion of the influence that traditional central players in foreign policymaking, such as the military and civilian hardliners, have enjoyed.”* As a result of the political reforms the *“elected officials are today more likely to have their views and interests taken into consideration than was the case in the past. Furthermore, public opinion and civil society have been able to make their voice heard on foreign policy issues.”*³⁶³

EU also exerts influence on Turkish political culture and institutions via socialization and the social learning of decision makers. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, socialization or social learning is also an important factor in Wendt’s concept of cultural selection, which forms the identities and interests of states. Social learning is *“a process whereby actors, through interaction with broader institutional context, acquire new interests and preferences.”*³⁶⁴ Wendt says that instead of the rationalists’ “simple learning” model, which claims that social learning only affects the behaviors of states, constructivist theories drew attention to “complex learning” which argues that social learning may also affect identities and interests of states. He summarizes his point as follows: *“the basic idea is that identities and their corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how actors are treated by significant Others. This is*

³⁶³ **Kirisci, Kemal (2004)**; Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004), p. 48.

³⁶⁴ **Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999)**; Social Construction and Integration, Journal of European Public Policy 6, no 4, pp. 545 and 548 cited in **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, p. 17.

known as the principle of "reflected appraisals" or "mirroring" because it hypothesizes that actors come to see themselves as a reflection of how they think Others see or "appraise" them, in the "mirror" of Others' representations of the Self. If the Other treats the Self as though she were an enemy, then by the principle of reflected appraisals she is likely to internalize that belief in her own role identity vis-a-vis the Other." 365

In the Turkish context the socialization of decision makers also plays a substantial role in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. The increasing contact between Turkish and EU officials in the troika meetings, summit diplomacy and accession negotiations contribute to the "*socialization of decision makers around the concepts of common reflexes and norms of behaviours and thinking*". This process may positively influence Turkish officials' thinking of "Others" and may help Turkey to overcome the impact of historical fears such as Sevres Phobia. This increasing contact does not only include the military and the foreign ministry bureaucracy but also affects all levels of Turkish bureaucracy, such as the Ministry of the Treasury, Transportation, Health and etc. Furthermore, NGOs and interest groups are also involved in this process as a result of increasing low politics issues such as organized crime, illegal migration and human trafficking. Thus the identities and norms of Turkish bureaucrats from different state institutions as well as Turkish NGOs are increasingly affected by their European counterparts.³⁶⁶ This interaction may have led to a change in the mindset of Turkish decision makers, which might have helped them to internalize the common values of the European Union. In this regard Kirisci demonstrates in his study³⁶⁷ in the examples of Turkey's policies towards Cyprus, Greece and Armenia that "*Turkish Foreign policy mindset is becoming much more open to cooperation, dialogue and the notion of win-win outcomes to international conflicts.*" Thus, as a result of socialization, Turkish decision makers are increasingly turning away from considering international relations from a zero-sum game perspective and embracing a win-win approach.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁵ **Wendt, Alexander (2009);** Social Theory of International Politics, p.327.

³⁶⁶ **Özcan, Mesut (2008);** Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, pp. 150-151.

³⁶⁷ **Kirişçi, Kemal (2006);** Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, p. 18, 51.

³⁶⁸ **Ibid:** p. 51.

One of the staggering examples of the socialization of Turkish decision makers is the attitude of Hilmi Özkök, the Chief of Staff, towards EU reforms. Some scholars argue that in the military's acceptance of its loss of power during the EU reforms the Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök's personality played a substantial role. They argue that because he had spent most of his career in NATO postings, where he became familiar with the ideals of liberal democracies, he decided not to intervene into political life as in the Western democracies.³⁶⁹ Furthermore, during his tenure he also prevented two coup d'état attempts planned by some of his peers. The notion that Özkök's personality was influential in the Turkish Army's non-involvement in Turkish political life during his tenure seems to be accurate because of the attitude of his successors in Turkish political life. Under the command of his successor (Yaşar Büyükanıt) the Turkish Army intervened in the presidential elections in 2007.

The foreign policies of the member states are less affected by Europeanization in contrast to other areas because the integration to the CSFP in the EU is still relatively weak and it has not replaced national foreign policies. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, in the context of the CSFP the required legal changes for candidate countries are limited. They are expected to adopt the *acquis politique*. This means that they have to harmonize their national foreign policies with the positions of the member states within the framework of the CFSP. They are expected not to do unexpected things such as attacking their neighbors, to resolve their border problems peacefully and to have good relations with their neighbor countries. It is argued that, as a result of the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, Europeanization in the foreign policies of candidate countries is much more voluntary and non-hierarchical.

In this context Turkey has to resolve its border problems peacefully, show restraint in its policies and improve its relations with neighboring countries and harmonize Turkish foreign policy with the positions of the member states within the framework of the CFSP. It is this area, in which the most concrete examples of the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy can be observed. Therefore, the changes of Turkish foreign policy towards Turkey's deep rooted issues such as Cyprus and Greece should be analyzed.

³⁶⁹ **Jenkins, Gareth (2007);** Continuity and change: prospects for civil–military relations in Turkey, pp. 343-344.

The Turkish-Greek rapprochement in the last decade can be considered as one of the most obvious results of Europeanization in Turkish foreign policy making. After decades of rivalry and border disputes, which brought two countries to the brink of a war on two uninhabited islets in the Aegean Sea, Turkish-Greek Relations started to improve starting from 1999. It is argued that without the prospect of an EU membership this kind of improvement would not have taken place. The following developments in Turkish-Greek relations were mentioned as the indicators of this rapprochement: *“the increased level of official visits between the two countries, ongoing ‘exploratory talks’ between foreign ministries, the building of direct links between the armed forces of the two countries, the removal of landmines along the border, the reduction of military exercises and the exchange of information about them, as well as the inauguration of a natural gas pipeline project in July 2005. The positive trend at the official level has been accompanied by positive statistics in inter-societal and trade relations, indicating a deepening of the relationship, despite the unresolved underlying disputes regarding the territorial waters, airspace and continental shelf in the Aegean.”*³⁷⁰ In a nutshell, there is a consensus among scholars that the main reason in the change of Turkey’s policies towards Greece was the conditionality of the EU.³⁷¹

EU conditionality was also the main driving force behind the major transformation in Turkey’s Cyprus policy. For decades Turkey was involved in fruitless negotiations in Cyprus aimed to consolidate the status quo on the island. In 2004, Turkey replaced this foreign policy with an active, solution oriented policy, which built on a win-win approach. Turkey campaigned in the Turkish side of the island for the acceptance of the Annan Plan, which aimed for the unification of the Island. In many aspects it was a breakthrough in Turkish foreign policy since *“Turkish policy on Cyprus has evolved from a more nationalist and confrontationist stance to one that accommodates options*

³⁷⁰ **Aydin, Mustafa/ Acikmese, Sinem A. (2007);** Europeanization through EU conditionality, p. 270.

³⁷¹ **See: Kirisci, Kemal (2004);** Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy; **Aydin, Mustafa/ Acikmese, Sinem A. (2007);** Europeanization through EU conditionality; **Hakki, Murat Metin (2006);** Turkey and the EU: Past Challenges and Important Issues Lying Ahead.

open to dialogue, cooperation, win–win solutions, activism and multilateralism.”³⁷² It is clear that in both cases Europeanization explains the major changes in Turkish foreign policy through conditionality.

To sum up, the EU has been a major factor in the democratization and Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy making, transforming its mindset radically. In this context the Helsinki Summit decision to grant Turkey candidate status was a turning point. In the post Helsinki era the EU has exerted enormous influence on Turkish institutions and decision makers through adaptations forced by conditionality and the socialization of decision makers. Consequently, the legal changes required by the EU led to a loss of the Turkish Army’s influence in the formulation of foreign and security policy. Above all, the wide ranging EU reforms brought Turkey closer to European values and its foreign policy closer to a Kantian culture. As a result of this *“Turkey’s political and economic relations with the countries within its vicinity have been improved through an active, cooperative and constructive policy; using diplomacy and trade rather than coercion and pressure. Dialogue and a ‘win–win’ attitude have been mentioned frequently. In regional conflicts, rather than taking sides, Turkey has been adopting a balanced hands-off approach, coupled with mediation efforts and a role of trustworthy regional stabilizer. In other words, Turkey has moved to become a ‘benign regional power’, rather than a post-Cold War warrior.*”³⁷³

4.2 Domestic Factors:

It is clear that beyond the transformation of Turkish foreign policy there are also domestic forces, which facilitated and supported this process. The aim of this section is to provide a comprehensive analysis of these internal factors.

³⁷² Aydin, Mustafa/ Acikmese, Sinem A. (2007); Europeanization through EU conditionality, p. 272.

³⁷³ Ibid.; p. 274.

4.2.1 The Transition to a Liberal Economic System and the Rise of Economic Politics

It might sound odd to claim that a military coup facilitated the emergence of a liberal culture in Turkey.³⁷⁴ However, beside its human rights abuses and its authoritarian rule, the military regime introduced a liberal economic system in Turkey in 1980, which in turn contributed to the embedment of liberal values in Turkish state and society. Consequently, in the past three decades the free market economy and its values settled into Turkish society producing an export oriented business elite and a more liberal political atmosphere.

The conflict between the leftist and rightist ideological camps led to a radicalization of Turkish youth in the 70s with armed clashes, which in return gave the Army the pretext to intervene into Turkish political life directly on 12th September 1980. It was not until the clashes in the street reached their peak, and started to resemble a civil war, that the Turkish Army intervened. There are also indications of an indirect American involvement through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Turkey's second direct military coup.

It is important to note that, unlike the other coups in the past, this time the Turkish General Staff was determined to reshape Turkish society fundamentally. Thus the army seized power completely and remained in power for three years. Before reintroducing civilian rule in 1983 the military imposed a new constitution in 1982, which despite major changes is still in force today. The TGS was reluctant to give complete freedom to civil governments, which resulted in an army controlled system through a number of

³⁷⁴ In this regard Laciner notes that: *"Ironically, the 1980 military coup provided a suitable political base for Özalist foreign, economic and domestic politics, though he was from the same school of thought as Demirel and Menderes. First, the coup eliminated Özal's political rivals by banning old politicians like Demirel, Ecevit, Türkes and Erbakan. Secondly, Özal's cooperation with the Kemalist army legitimated his ideology in the system. Thus Özal found opportunity to banish the military elements gradually from the politics. Third, the lack of political rivals granted Turgut Özal a respite to concentrate on the country's problems. As a result, Özal became one of the most creative and productive political figures in Turkish politics."* **Laciner, Sedat (2003); "Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy?"**, Journal of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 1, Nos.: 1-2, 2003-2004, p. 163

institutional and informal mechanisms. Although the influence of the military was increased in the foreign policy making process, which was granted by the new constitution, it was not visible until the middle of the 90s, when an Islamist party came to power and attempted to change the foreign policy course drastically.³⁷⁵

The three year military rule and the slow return to democracy afterwards had its influence and consequences for Turkish foreign policy as well. The military rule in Turkey and its human rights abuses created tensions between Turkey and the European community. The Western European countries attempted to apply pressure on Turkey to improve its human rights records and its democracy. Because of Turkey's desire to become a part of Western European culture, Turkey was susceptible and responsive to pressures from European countries. However, because of Turkey's growing geopolitical importance due to American strategic interests in the Middle East after the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980, the US was not interested in human rights issues in Turkey.³⁷⁶ Thus, after almost two decades of deteriorating relations, the US and Turkey started to improve their relations significantly. At the same time, in order to overcome European criticism, the military regime in Turkey attempted to improve relations with Islamic countries, in which the

³⁷⁵ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, p. 94.

³⁷⁶ In the beginning of 80s there were significant changes in the international arena. The 80s was referred to as the second Cold War, as the relations between Soviet Union and America deteriorated as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Additionally, the Iranian Revolution increased Turkey's importance for American strategies in the Middle East. Furthermore, the increasing security threats from the Soviet and the uncertainties in Turkey's surrounding region once again decreased Turkey's foreign policy options. Consequently, contrary to previous decades, the 80s witnessed a rapprochement between Turkey and the USA. Thus the 80s represented the increasing influence of the US on Turkish foreign policy. Several agreements concerning military issues and use of military airbases were signed between America and Turkey. All of these resulted in Turkey's return to the Western alliance in the 80s. The result of the increasing Turkish-American cooperation was the deterioration of Soviet-Turkish relations, which continued until Gorbachev was elected as the secretary general of the Soviet communist party in 1985. As a result of this change Turkey's economic relations with the Soviet Union began to improve significantly.

sympathetic attitudes of Middle Eastern countries towards the military regime played a significant role.³⁷⁷

Apart from these developments, Turkey went through a fundamental economic transformation process in this period, which in return affected Turkish foreign policy radically. Instead of the economic model based on import substitution, which was implemented in the past, Turkey began to implement an economic policy based on export oriented growth. From a rigid, centralized economy, the Turkish economy transformed towards a free market system. As a result of this policy, the influence of the business community on foreign policy issues started to increase. The liberal economy was introduced to Turkey with the economic program of 24 January in 1980. This program required considerable amount of net foreign currency inflow into the Turkish economy. This included securing foreign loans, foreign direct investment and increasing Turkey's exports.

The economic liberalization led to staggering changes in Turkish economy and society. Laciner summarizes the economic boom in the 80s as follows: "*the Turkish economy grew at an annual rate of over 5 %, the highest among the OECD countries. The volume of Turkish exports rose from \$ 2,910 million in 1980 to over \$ 20 billion in the 1990s, with an annual increase of 15,6 %; a staggering 350 % increase in 10 years. Moreover, the share of industrial products in Turkish exports rose from 41,1 % to 84 % in 1990. Now only 14 % of the exports were agricultural. Likewise, imports rose from \$ 7,909 million in 1980 to \$ 22.5 billion in 1990 (a 182% increase) while tourism leaped from a marginal industry to a major earner of foreign currency with a increase from \$212 million in 1980 to about \$3 billion in 1990*".³⁷⁸ It should be noted that because of the underground economy in Turkey the real figures may be even higher than the official statistics. Turkish economy in the 80s is described as a miracle economy and a young tiger. Furthermore, this radical economic boom also led to radical changes in Turkish society. Before this transition the Turkish economy had been controlled exclusively by a handful bureaucrats and state sponsored businessmen. However with the transition to a liberal economic model "*the periphery, villagers, workers and*

³⁷⁷ **Dicle, Betül (2008)**; Factors driving Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 32.

³⁷⁸ **Laciner, Sedat (2003)**; "Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy?", Journal of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 1, Nos.: 1-2, 2003-2004, p. 163

*traditional religious groups entered the economy, and as a result, strengthened their autonomy against the core, namely the bureaucracy, the military and the state-created industry”*³⁷⁹

The integration of the Turkish economy into world and capitalist economy was the result of this transformation process. Thus, obtaining the necessary foreign direct investment and finding new foreign markets for Turkish exports entered into the Turkish foreign ministry agenda. Accordingly economic issues became an important factor for Turkish foreign policy making. The need for fresh markets for Turkish exports forced Turkey to improve its relations with the Eastern bloc, Central Asia and the Middle East.³⁸⁰ With the growing economic interdependence and increasing export figures, Turkish businessmen started to impose their own agenda on the Turkish state, manipulating its foreign policy according to their own interests.

4.2.2 The Rise of Counter Elites and Identities

As discussed in the theoretical chapter, constructivism highlights the significant and equal role of norms, material structures and identity in the formation of political decisions.³⁸¹ It suggests that identities shape interests of the states which in return influence their policies. Constructivists drew attention to actors' social identities as *“identities are the basis of interests.”*³⁸² The constructivist school does not dismiss the notion that actors are self-interested however it suggests that this does not provide a sufficient explanation until *“we understand how actors define their selves and how this informs their interests.”*³⁸³

Constructivism argues that national identities are constructed by external as well as internal interactions. As put forward by Kösebalan *“National identity does not emerge*

³⁷⁹ **Ibid.**; p. 164.

³⁸⁰ **Aydin, Mustafa (2004)**; Turkish foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis, pp. 53-54.

³⁸¹ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; Constructivism; in: **Burchill, Scott et. al. (2009)**; Theories of International Relations, p. 212.

³⁸² **Wendt, Alexander (1992)**; Anarchy is what states make of it, p. 398.

³⁸³ **Reus-Smit, Christian**; Constructivism, in: Burchill, Scott et. al. (2009); Theories of International Relations, p. 221.

only out of state-to state interactions in international system, but rather from a clash of competing interpretations of such interactions at the domestic level.”³⁸⁴ Domestically, the identities and interests of states are often shaped by the clash between the dominant and non-hegemonic subnational identities. Therefore, it is not accurate to assume that only dominant identities shape and influence the policies of states since perceptions of politically weak actors might be deeply rooted in society and therefore may survive throughout time and continue to exert their influence on policy debates.³⁸⁵ It is a fact that identities are not fixed and are subject to change over time. Furthermore, as a result of the clashes between different identities new elites may emerge in a society transforming the identity of the state. This new identity in return may result in the redefinition of the interests and policies of the state.

In the Turkish context it can be said that, throughout the history of the Turkish Republic its foreign policy has mainly been shaped by the Kemalist identity. The main elements of this identity are the rejection of the Islamic culture together with Turkey’s Ottoman past and the radical secularization of the Turkish society and the state. As discussed in the previous chapter, this Kemalist project caused a split in Turkish society which divided Turkish society into two main camps. Consequently many scholars labeled Turkey as a torn country since the majority of its population was bound to Islamic culture and values whereas its Kemalist elites identified themselves with Western values. Until the last decade, Turkey’s Kemalist elite, consisting of civil and military bureaucracy, had absolute power in the state apparatus and in the formation of Turkish foreign policy. As a result of their admiration and orientation to the West, these elites alienated Turkey from its neighbors and surrounding regions since they believed that showing interest to the Middle East, Central Asia or Africa represents “backwardness”.³⁸⁶ As mentioned previously, the lack of strategic thinking and alternative strategies for Turkish foreign policy was the result of this phenomenon since

³⁸⁴ **Kösebalaban, Hasan (2008); Torn Identities and Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey and Japan, Insight Turkey, 5-29, Volume 10, Number 1/2008, p.10**

³⁸⁵ **Ibid.**

³⁸⁶ **Özcan, Mesut (2008); Harmonizing foreign policy, p.86.**

*“admiration and application of Western model in Turkey has led Turkish intellectuals not to think about any alternative to the West in foreign policy.”*³⁸⁷

However, starting from 1980s, the Kemalist elite faced a legitimization and identity crisis because their Westernization project failed as a result of *“the negative effects of the top-down implementation of secularism by the secularist elite and the positive effects of neoliberal economic policies as well as relentless efforts towards democratisation.”* in Turkish society.³⁸⁸ The transition to a liberal economic model integrated the Turkish economy into the global economy and rapid urbanization brought conservative masses into cities. Additionally *“the expansion of higher education, mass media, and communications and the development of a very substantial bourgeoisie”*³⁸⁹ facilitated the rise of alternative identities in Turkey. To sum up, in one decade Turkey witnessed *“a total revolution of the social texture from top to bottom”* which allowed many *“repressed, disadvantaged or relatively deprived groups”*³⁹⁰ to begin to articulate their political views more freely than ever before. In this regard Kasaba’s evaluations are noteworthy:

“During the early decades of twentieth century, the tired and defeated people of Anatolia were in no position to debate or resist Ataturk’s radical message. Some were even enthusiastic in supporting the national leader in his determination to remake the Turkish state. By the 1980s, the situation had changed completely. The Turkish people, few of whom now remembered the early years of the republic, had grown extremely suspicious of, and downright cynical about, the latest incarnations of the promises of ‘enlightened and prosperous tomorrows.’ Instead of making further sacrifices for a future that kept eluding them, they were starting to inquire about the histories, institutions, beliefs, identities, and cultures from which they had been forcefully separated. This reorientation of the social compass spread to all segments of the society, not only affecting people’s political outlook but also influencing the way they dressed, which music they created and listened to, how they built their houses and office buildings, and how they thought about the history of modern Turkey...The nature and

³⁸⁷ **Oran, Baskın (Ed.) (2006);** Türk Dış Politikası, p. 46, cited in: **Özcan, Mesut (2008);** Harmonizing foreign policy , p.85.

³⁸⁸ **Yilmaz, Kamil (2009);** The Emergence and Rise of Conservative Elite in Turkey, **Insight Turkey, Volume 11, Number 2/2009, p.114.**

³⁸⁹ **Yavuz, M. Hakan (1998);** Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism, Middle East Critique, 7:12, p. 19.

³⁹⁰ **Simsek, Sefa (2004);** New Social Movements in Turkey since 1980, Turkish Studies, Volume 5, Issue 2, summer 2004, p. 120.

contents of these debates and conflicts show that as a monolithic force that tried to mould Turkish society and mentality, Kemalism is losing its grip”³⁹¹

Externally, the end of the Cold War forced Turkey to face its historical, cultural and religious legacy in its surrounding regions, which increasingly challenged the Kemalist ideology and identity. The conflicts involving Muslims in the Balkans and Caucasus and the emergence of independent Turkic speaking states in Central Asia reminded Turkey of its long forgotten historical responsibilities. Thus *“no matter how hard Turkey tried to escape from its imperial legacy, it has always come back to haunt it.”*³⁹² This transformation in Turkey’s surrounding regions also triggered the articulation of different foreign policy perceptions stemming from different ideologies and identities in Turkey, which were suppressed from the very beginning of the Republic throughout the single party rule and the Cold War era.

Starting from 1980, Yavuz observes *“a profound change in the composition of the Turkish elite as a result of domestic transformations,”* and draws attention to the *“several competing perceptions of “self” and of “others” to inform perceptions of national interests on the part of the nation’s elite.”*³⁹³ The articulation of different foreign policy orientations and interests is the result of this process. Fuller argues that

*“Growing democratisation inside Turkey affects public participation in foreign policy more than ever before, including articulation of interests by private Turkish business interests, Islamic-oriented politicians interested in ties with Muslim world,... broad public opinion that is sympathetic for “Turkish brothers” around the world, and a handful of leftists who find value in Turkey’s closer association with Third World nations than with Western “imperialist” states.”*³⁹⁴

³⁹¹ **Kasaba, Resat (1997);** *Kemalist Certainties and Modern Ambiguities*, In Bozdogan, S., and Kasaba, R. (eds.); *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, Seattle, University of Washington Press, pp. 16-18, cited in **Ahmadov, Ramin (2008);** *Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of Turkish Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party*, *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 7, No. 2 & 3, Summer & Fall 2008, p. 25.

³⁹² **Kösebalaban, Hasan (2008);** *Torn Identities and Foreign Policy*, p.14

³⁹³ **Yavuz, M. Hakan (1998);** *Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo-Ottomanism*, *Middle East Critique*, 7:12, p. 41.

³⁹⁴ **Fuller, Graham E. (1992);** *Turkey Faces East*, p. VI

As stated above, domestically, Kemalist identity was challenged by various ideologies such as Islamism, Turkish and Kurdish nationalism. While the rising Kurdish nationalism and the terrorist activities of the PKK in the 90s provoked an increase of Turkish nationalism,³⁹⁵ the Islamist challenge also made the Army's role in Turkish political life visible since the Turkish Army perceives itself as the guardian of the Republic. President Özal's³⁹⁶ neo-Ottomanism was a response to these challenges, as it attempted to include different identities in the Turkish national identity, which was narrowly defined by the Kemalist elites and had therefore excluded the different identities in the past.³⁹⁷ It should be noted that these ideologies and identities were not a new phenomenon in Turkey since their origins can be found back in the 19th century when the Ottoman Empire faced substantial identity crises. As discussed previously, the last quarter of the 19th century witnessed a long debate among the Ottoman intellectuals to find a new identity for the declining Ottoman Empire. These intellectuals gathered around four political movements, namely Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism and Westernism.

As stated previously, Westernism constitutes the foundation of Kemalist identity, which was the only dominant ideology in the Republic's history until the end of the Cold War. However, the post Cold War era witnessed a revival of the other three ideologies with major modifications. Some scholars³⁹⁸ add conservatism to these three ideologies as well. Thus, considering their support in Turkish society, one can detect four influential

³⁹⁵ Fuller, Graham E. (1992); Turkey Faces East, pp. V-VI

³⁹⁶ The unusual style of Turgut Özal dominated Turkish foreign policy during his tenure (1983-1989 Prime Minister and 1989-1993 President). Özal was a pro American politician with a commitment to a liberal economic system. He attempted to limit the influence of foreign policy bureaucracy in the decision making process, because he believed that the foreign policy elite did not share his vision. Additionally, the 1982 Constitution strengthened the position of the President against the cabinet in the Turkish political System, which had a spillover effect on the foreign policy making process. Until that time the foreign policy bureaucracy had almost absolute power on the foreign policy making process. The decline of the traditional bureaucrat's influence in the foreign policy making process was the result of these circumstances. See Özcan, Mesut (2008); Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, pp. 95-96

³⁹⁷ Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001); Stratejik Derinlik, pp. 85-86

³⁹⁸ Özcan, Mesut (2008); Harmonizing foreign policy, p.85

alternative ideologies in contemporary Turkey, namely Islamism, neo-Ottomanism, conservatism and Turkism, which have distinctive foreign policy perspectives. To say that does not necessarily mean that there is no overlap between these ideologies. In some areas they share common foreign policy goals with different motives, in other areas they do not agree. For instance, although both Islamism and Turkism favor developing relations with the Central Asian states, they differentiate in their motives since Islamism aims to unite all Muslims, whereas Turkism's goal is to unite all Turks. In the coming pages the stance of these identities towards Turkey's foreign policy will be examined.

4.2.2.1 Turkism

Turkism or Turkish nationalism prefers *“a model of Turkish nationalism beyond the Kemalist territorial nationalism and favours cooperation with Turkic people abroad.”* In the rise of Turkish nationalism there are external and internal factors. Externally, the emergence of independent Turkic states in Central Asia and the problems of Turkish speaking communities in the Balkans promoted the old pan-Turkist ideas in Turkey. Internally, the terrorist activities of the PKK and separatist Kurdish nationalism also provoked the rise of Turkish nationalism in Turkey. Turkish nationalism is suspicious about the intent of the EU and its required reforms in Turkey. They also favor military solutions for Turkey's Kurdish issue and support interventionist policies regarding the northern Iraq based Kurdish terrorist organization PKK. Turkism highlights ethnic nationalist values in Turkey. The main pioneer of this movement in Turkey is the Nationalist Action Party (NAP). Although the NAP accepts Turkey's goal of EU membership it is highly suspicious about the intent of the EU and its required democratization reforms in Turkey. Thus it has shown immense opposition to EU reforms during its participation to the coalition government between 1999 and 2002.³⁹⁹ NAP favors the idea of developing economic, cultural and social relations with Turkic speaking countries in Central Asia. It aims to establish a “Ministry of the Turkish

³⁹⁹ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, p.88

World” within the Turkish government and a market union among the Turkic speaking countries.⁴⁰⁰

4.2.2.2 Neo-Ottomanism

It can be said that neo-Ottomanism emerged as a response to the identity crisis Turkey faced in the post Cold War era. Before going into detail about neo-Ottomanism one should remember its origin, namely Ottomanism. As discussed in the third chapter, Ottomanism was also a response to the identity crisis the Ottoman Empire faced in its last century. It aimed to build a new national identity for the multi ethnic Ottoman Empire around the concept of an Ottoman Nation. Accordingly, regardless of their religious-ethnic origin everyone living in the Ottoman state would be equal in rights and duties.⁴⁰¹ It was an attempt to build a new concept of Ottoman identity and citizenship compatible with the rising European values at that time.⁴⁰² However, as a result of the increasing separatist nationalist movements among the Ottoman Empire’s different subjects this project failed at the beginning of the 20th century.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the secular Turkish Republic, Kemalist elites turned away from the Ottoman legacy and did not show any interest in maintaining ties with former Ottoman regions. This isolationism was a result of the preferences of Kemalist ideology and the restrictions imposed by Cold War power relations. After nearly one century, the rise of conservative elites and the end of the Cold War triggered the emergence of neo-Ottomanist ideas under the leadership of Turgut Özal in Turkey.

In a nutshell, neo-Ottomanism favors Turkey’s reconciliation with its Ottoman legacy and the improvement of its economic and cultural ties with the former Ottoman regions. It also attempts to include different ethnic and sectarian identities such as the Kurds and Alevites into the Turkish national identity, since the Turkish national identity has been narrowly defined by Kemalist elites excluding these different identities. Contrary to

⁴⁰⁰ **Hale, William M. (2000);** Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, Frank Cass, London, p.207.

⁴⁰¹ **Akçura, Yusuf (1991);** Üç Tarzı Siyaset, TTK Basımevi, Ankara, s.19

⁴⁰² **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2001),** Stratejik Derinlik, Küre, Istanbul, S.85

what its name reveals, neo-Ottomanism does not envisage building a new empire and pursuing an irredentist or expansionist foreign policy. However, this movement favors expanding Turkey's soft power by improving Turkey's economic and cultural relations with countries that have emerged out of the Ottoman Empire. Yavuz summarizes the concept of neo-Ottomanism as follows: "*Neo-Ottomanism, for the neo-Ottomanists, however, is not an imperialist ideology. Rather, neo-Ottomanism calls for (1) the rearticulation of Turkish nationalism and increased political and cultural tolerance for diversity as in the Ottoman past; (2) the elimination of economic borders among the Balkan, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern countries; and (3) respect for the political borders of neighbouring countries. Neo-Ottomanism does not aim to eliminate state boundaries nor seek a resurrection of an unified Ottoman super-state but rather to create a new sense of a macro-identity among populations that share the Ottoman Islamic heritage.*"⁴⁰³

It should be noted that Özal's neo-Ottomanism was not a fully developed doctrine and had a pragmatic approach towards Turkish foreign policy. It is argued that Özal's neo-Ottomanism was a journalistic endeavor rather than a clear concept developed by academics.⁴⁰⁴ Thus it can be argued that after Özal's tenure neo-Ottomanism stayed as a light figure and exerted only a limited influence on Turkish foreign policy until the JDP came to power in 2002. In this regard in 1998 Yavuz concluded that neo-Ottomanism "*has yet to develop into a fully coherent doctrine or set of ideas firmly endorsed by policy makers*". He also predicted that "*it is more likely that one will see a more pronounced "Islamically" shaped neo-Ottomanist foreign policy in the future.*"⁴⁰⁵

As predicted by Yavuz, one can observe a strong neo-Ottomanist tendency in Turkish foreign policy in the last decade. In this context it is argued that Davutoglu's "strategic depth" doctrine represents the handbook or manifesto of neo-Ottomanism and JDP's foreign policy under Davutoglu's influence has been mainly shaped by his neo-Ottomanist vision. In his influential book i.e. *Strategic Depth*, like other neo-Ottomanists Davutoglu argues that Turkey has to reconcile with its Ottoman legacy and

⁴⁰³ **Yavuz, M. Hakan (1998):** Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux, 40.

⁴⁰⁴ **Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001);** Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: Turkey's Place in the World), Küre, İstanbul, p.90.

⁴⁰⁵ **Yavuz, M. Hakan (1998):** Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux, 41.

improve of its economic and cultural ties with the former Ottoman regions.⁴⁰⁶ In an interview, Davutoglu notes that Turkey is not a classical nation state, and because of its imperial past it has historical duties and cannot isolate itself from its surrounding regions.⁴⁰⁷ In another interview he has argued that *"as much as we don't use this conceptualization, the fact that it is being used against us is either because of misunderstanding or lack of goodwill. I have said that Turkey as a nation-state is equal with any other nation-state of our region whether it is small in population or area. We don't have any hegemony on anyone. Rather what we are trying to do is to contribute to the establishment of a permanent peace in our region. If by order they mean is Pax Ottomana, Pax in the meaning of order, we are trying to establish an order, it is not wrong to say such thing"*.⁴⁰⁸

As can be clearly seen from the statement above, despite their clear neo-Ottomanist ideas, Davutoglu and other prominent JDP figures have always avoided describing their foreign policy vision as neo-Ottomanist because of the negative connotations of this term. In this regard they claim that they do not envisage building a new Ottoman Empire and pursuing an irredentist or expansionist foreign policy. Considering 10 years of JDP praxis in Turkish foreign policy one may claim that their understanding of neo-Ottomanism is to expand Turkey's soft power by improving Turkey's economic and cultural relations with countries that have emerged out of the Ottoman Empire.

4.2.2.3 Islamism

The Milli Görüş (National View) represents the main leading movement of political Islam in Turkey. A former member of this movement, Altan Tan, argues that the idea of Milli Görüş is based on four main principles: *"First of all, it is based on the idea of*

⁴⁰⁶ **Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001);** Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiyenin uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: Turkey's Place in the World), Küre, İstanbul

⁴⁰⁷ **Han, Ahmet. K.;** Ahmet Davutoglu ile röportaj (Interview with Ahmet Davutoglu), in Turkish Times, 15 April- 15 Mai 2004, available at http://kitapyorumu.blogcu.com/is-dunyasi-artik-politikanin-onculerinden_1974912.html (15.10.2008, 16:59)

⁴⁰⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmet_Davuto%C4%9Flu 24.12.2011, 17:03

ümme (Muslim community), “but in this *ümme* Turks are the bosses.”... Secondly, it is nationalist when it comes to the issues concerning Turkey. Third, it promotes statism in the economical sense; and, finally, it has always been very careful and respectful of the military.”⁴⁰⁹ Islam, and moral and spiritual values represent the essence of the Milli Görüş movement. Other goals of the Milli Görüş movement, “such as industrialization, closer ties with other Muslim countries, just economic order, or the establishment of a Greater Turkey”⁴¹⁰, constitute the sub-ideas of this holistic ideology.

The first party of the Milli Görüş movement, National Order Party (NOP), was established in 1970 under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, which was closed down in 1971 on the grounds that its anti-secular actions violated the Constitution. Its successor, the National Salvation Party (NSP), gained 11.8% of votes and 48 seats in the Turkish Parliament in the 1973 general elections. For the first time in the Republic’s history Islamists entered the government forming a coalition government with the RPP in 1974. Despite this success, during their tenure the Islamists were not influential in the formation of foreign policy as this area was controlled exclusively by the secularist Kemalist elite at the time. NSP was also closed down after the military coup of 1980 and was succeeded by the Welfare Party in 1983. Despite their continuous and well organized efforts the Islamists were not able to mobilize Turkish society around their ideology until the end of the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War identity issues entered the political arena, which triggered the rise of the Islamist movement in Turkey. In the 90s Turkey witnessed the continuous rise of the Islamist Welfare Party in domestic politics. Consequently in the 1996 elections the WP became the largest party and Erbakan became the first Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey. Erbakan was keen to apply his Islamist agenda in Turkish foreign policy and followed a clear Islamist oriented foreign policy. For instance, during his tenure Erbakan made his first official visit to Iran and initiated the Developing 8 (D8) project with some Muslim countries. However, the military was determined to protect the secular principles of Turkey and forced Erbakan’s coalition government out of power with a well-organized campaign which was later described as a post-modern

⁴⁰⁹ **Atacan, Fulya (2005)**; Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP, Turkish Studies, Volume 6, Issue 2, June 2005, p. 190

⁴¹⁰ **Ibid.**

coup because of its sophisticated methods. The Turkish judiciary followed suit and closed down the WP in 1998 banning its prominent leaders from political activities for five years for acting against the principle of secularism in the constitution.

The WP was succeeded by the Virtue Party (VP) and its parliamentary group joined this instead. William notes that by 1999 in order to escape another closure the VP “*had dropped the references to a Muslim Union and even accepted the project for Turkish Membership of the EU as the basic goal as well as the need to continue Turkey’s effective role within the NATO.*”⁴¹¹ In this change a reformist group in the VP led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gül were influential. It is argued that “*the post-modern coup initiated a learning process among political islamists, with the latter realizing that a party not respecting secularism would have no chance of sustained and effective participation in the Turkish political system given its constitutional boundaries.*”⁴¹² However, despite these signs of change in its Islamist rhetoric, the VP also could not escape from being shut down by the constitutional court in 2001 for being the center of anti-secular activities.

Consequently the Islamists were divided into two main camps, traditionalists and reformists or innovators. After the closure of the VP by the constitutional court, Recep Tayyip Erdogan established the JDP together with the reformists of the VP and rejected the Islamist rhetoric stating that “*JDP is not a political party with a religious axis.*”⁴¹³ The JDP is labeled by its founders as a conservative democrat party which embraces Turkey’s EU membership bid and liberal economic values. The traditionalist hardliners continued the former Islamist rhetoric and established the FP (Felicity Part) in 2001, which has had a very limited influence in Turkish political life since then.

In sum, Islamism favors a more active foreign policy and aims to increase relations with the Muslim world. For instance, as mentioned above, as soon as Erbakan, Turkey’s first Islamist prime minister came to power in 1996, he attempted to improve Turkey’s relations with Muslim countries such as Libya, Iran and Syria and initiated the D-8 project. Until the late 1990s the Islamist parties opposed the idea of becoming a

⁴¹¹ **Hale, William M. (2000)**; *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, Frank Cass, London, p.207.

⁴¹² **Aydin, Senem/ Cakir, Rusen (2007)**; *Political Islam in Turkey*, Insight Turkey, Volume 9, Number 1/2007, p. 39.

⁴¹³ <http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2001/09/13/27981.asp> (accessed on 19.11.10, 16:00)

member of the EU and advocated a Muslim Union among Islamic states. Furthermore, the Islamists also took a clear negative stance against NATO calling for an Islamic NATO. Finally, the Islamists have a very strong anti-Israeli language calling for Turkey to cut all ties with Israel.

4.2.2.4 Conservatism

Defining the conservative identity in the formation of Turkish foreign policy is a very difficult task because *“it did not appear as compact and autonomous identity but has been displayed as an attitude in several contexts.”*⁴¹⁴ Conservative parties entered into Turkish political life with the establishment of the DP and with the transition to a multi-party system in 1946. The successors of the DP such as the Justice Party (JP) the Motherland Party (MP) and the True Path Party (TPP) can be considered within this category. As will be discussed in the coming pages, to a certain extent Turkey’s ruling party, JDP, may be seen as a conservative party as well.

Conservative identity does not have a clear cut doctrine and it shares some common principles with Islamist, nationalist and Kemalist identities. For instance, in the 90s the conservative parties such as MP and TPP supported Turkey’s bid for EU membership and at the same time they called for developing relations with Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries.⁴¹⁵ Özcan notes that conservative identity *“favours increasing contacts with the Turkic and Muslim groups in the neighboring regions of Turkey, but they are also not against to the EU membership as long as this membership is not against the culture and identity of the Turks.”*⁴¹⁶ Conservative parties such as the DP, JP and MP all promoted the idea of Turkey’s Europeanness and pursued a foreign policy in accordance with the Kemalist Westernization project. However, conservative parties favor a more liberal approach to Islamic values in Turkish society and do not support the Kemalists’ authoritarian Westernization project.

⁴¹⁴ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, p.89

⁴¹⁵ **Hale, William M. (2000)**; Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, p.207.

⁴¹⁶ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, p.89

4.2.3 The Rise of the JDP: Conservative Democrats, Radical Islamists or Neo-Ottomanists?

Among the domestic factors that have exerted an essential influence on the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and interests is the rise of the JDP and therefore it should be analyzed in more depth. It is clear that in the last decade the Justice and Development Party governments have been one of the main driving forces behind the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. Although it is a relatively new party in the Turkish political landscape, the JDP has radically transformed Turkish domestic politics as well as its foreign policy in the last 10 years. Compared to the 90s, which are described as the lost years of Turkey because of political instabilities and economic crises, in the last eight years Turkey has witnessed stable JDP majority governments. The JDP administration successfully made long needed necessary political and economic reforms which led to an unprecedented rapid growth of the Turkish economy and the increase of Turkey's influence in the international arena.

Although it was established just one year previously, in the first general elections it participated in, the JDP gained a stunning 34.29 % of the votes and 363 seats in the 550 member Turkish unicameral parliament in November 3, 2002. All other well established parties except the Republican People's Party failed to pass the 10 % threshold and stayed out of the Turkish parliament. The RPP won 19.38 % of the votes with 178 seats in the parliament.⁴¹⁷ Many analysts described the JDP's landslide election victory as a political earthquake⁴¹⁸ or even a tsunami. As put forward by Özel, in the November 3 elections *"Turkish voters had swept aside a whole cohort of established but corruption-tainted parties, possibly in defiance of the country's politically powerful military, and opted instead for a group of self-avowed "Muslim Democrats" "*⁴¹⁹

⁴¹⁷ **Önis, Ziya/ Keyman, E. Fuat (2003)**; Turkey at the Polls: A new Path Emerges, Journal of Democracy Volume 14, Number 2 April 2003, p. 95.

⁴¹⁸ **Insel, Ahmet (2003)**; The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey, The South Atlantic Quarterly Spring/Summer 2003, p. 306.

⁴¹⁹ **Özel, Soli (2003)**; Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami, Journal of Democracy Volume 14, Number 2 April 2003, p. 80.

There are many reasons for the JPD's unprecedented election victory in 2002. These reasons may be analyzed under two main categories, namely conjunctural factors and deep social transformations which gave birth to the JDP. Firstly the conjunctural factors, which paved the way for the rise of JDP, should be mentioned. Firstly, the Susurluk scandal in 1996 revealed the dirty relations between some state officials, politicians and members of the Turkish mafia, which made the "lawless dirty war that Turkey's shadowy deep state had been waging against"⁴²⁰ Kurdish secessionist movement visible. This in return increased the Turkish public's desire for "a clean society, a transparent state and accountable politicians". However the state apparatus and politicians did not show any interest for this demand and were not ready to make the necessary reforms. Secondly, the postmodern coup in 1997 against Turkey's Islamist government resulted in a learning process among the reformist faction of Islamists who rejected radical views and embraced liberal values and Turkey's EU membership bid. Islamists realized that in order to decrease the influence of the military the only option was the EU reforms. In this regard Dagi's observations are noteworthy:

*"In the wake of the February 28 process, however, the Islamists found themselves on the defensive against the power of the Kemalist-secularist establishment. Fantasies about Islamizing society and the state came to an end; some Islamists declared that the idea of an Islamic state had failed. Islamic elements in Turkey began questioning both the feasibility of Islam as a political project and the conformity of an Islamist political project to Islam itself. Islamic groups, noticing that the social and economic networks of Islam had been damaged most when "political Islam" was at its peak in the late 1990s, started to withdraw their support from Islamist political movements. Many in Islamic circles opted for a conservative-centrist approach that they expected to help them preserve Islamic social and economic networks. The idea of a "social" rather than "political" Islam gained ground. The way was opened for the transformation of political Islam and the emergence of the AKP. For the AKP leaders, it was clear that the rise of political Islam had been detrimental to Islam's social and economic influence in Turkey. A new "conservative democratic" approach, they hoped, would offer a way out of the selfdefeating success that political Islam had experienced in the late 1990s."*⁴²¹

Thirdly the tragic earthquake in 1999, which cost more than 30.000 people their lives, shook the trust of the status quo-oriented middle class towards their state since Turkey's civil and military state apparatus totally failed and was incapable in the face of

⁴²⁰ **Ibid.**; p. 87.

⁴²¹ **Dagi, Ihsan (2008)**; Turkey's AKP in Power, Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 3 July 2008, p. 27.

such a devastating disaster. Consequently “*the social contract between the state and this important segment of society was broken. Thenceforth the drive toward an accountable, transparent, and efficient government ruled by law would go forward on a stronger social basis than ever before.*”⁴²² Lastly the worse economic and financial crises that Turkey has witnessed in its history, which were just before the elections in 2001, also mobilized electorates around the JDP, which they perceived a new and untested party.

In a nutshell, all these conjunctural factors paved the way for a new party which called for further democratization, the EU membership, the rule of law, economic growth and anti-corruption measures and good governance. Özel concludes that “*The net results of Susurluk, the coup, the quake, and the economic downturn have been surging pro-EU sentiment, a broad-based demand for further democratic reform, and fury directed at any and all institutions— no matter how previously sacrosanct—deemed responsible for the calamities of recent years.*”⁴²³

Apart from these conjunctural factors, a deep running social transformation in Turkish society may be considered as the main driving force behind the rapid rise of the JDP in Turkish political life. As mentioned previously, as a result of Turkey’s transition to a liberal economic model, a new conservative middle class that is religiously observant emerged in Turkey starting from the 80s. This new class gradually challenged the old statist and protectionist economic structure which had been controlled exclusively by a handful bureaucrats and state sponsored businessmen represented by TÜSIAD (Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen). Consequently a new conservative middle class represented by MÜSIAD (Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) began to replace the old secular traditional middle class. In this regard Insel’s observations are noteworthy:

“The conservative cultural affinity between the traditional class of provincial artisans and traders on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the small- and midrange enterprisers who live mostly in midsize cities and some of whom are employer and employee simultaneously, and the young executives who have received university education, especially in technical fields, caused these groups to become united and to

⁴²² Özel, Soli (2003); Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami, p. 90.

⁴²³ Özel, Soli (2003); Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami , p. 91

*constitute the nucleus of a new middle class. The great distance separating the traditional republican bourgeoisie from this new middle class, which is culturally conservative, politically nationalist and moderately authoritarian, economically liberal, or rather, on the side of free enterprise, became considerably more marked during the last period.).*⁴²⁴

Turkey's integration into the world economy and the customs union with the EU in 1996 forced this new conservative middle class towards an export oriented growth strategy, which radically changed their perceptions of the EU and globalization. As a result of this deep running social transformation, *“even farmers, small businesspeople, and less-skilled workers who once supported antiglobalization Islamist or nationalist parties now vote for the avowedly pro-market and pro-EU AKP.”*⁴²⁵ According to many observers, this new middle class, also called the “Anatolian tigers”, represented by MÜSIAD and TUSKON (The Confederation of Turkish Businessman and Industrialists), may be considered as the main driving force behind the rise of the JDP in Turkish political life. In the November 3 elections in 2002 the JDP took over the representation of this rising new middle class from other center right parties such as TPP and MP that lost almost all of their electoral support because of their inefficient policies in the 90s.

The 10 year history of the JDP proves that it is not a temporary political party and has solid roots in Turkish society. In this regard it is noteworthy that the JDP's success story continued in all elections in which it has participated to date. So in the 2004 local elections the JDP increased its votes to 42.18 % and in the 2007 general elections it won nearly half of the votes with a staggering 46.58 %.⁴²⁶ For the first time in its history JDP witnessed a slight decrease in its votes in the 2009 local elections, in which it won 38.18 % of the votes. However in 2010 the JDP amended 26 articles of the Turkish Constitution, which was put to a referendum on 12 September 2010. Despite the tremendous vote “no” campaign led by opposition parties the amendments were accepted with a 58 % “yes” vote. Although the amendments were supported by other small groups and parties, it can be concluded that the JDP increased its popularity

⁴²⁴ **Insel, Ahmet (2003)**; *The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey*, pp. 297-298.

⁴²⁵ **Özel, Soli (2003)**; *Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami*, p. 86.

⁴²⁶ **Ahmadov, Ramin (2008)**; *Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of Turkish Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party*, p. 15.

among Turkish electorates because of the democratic nature of the amendments. Thus the general expectation was that the JDP most likely would hold its votes and majority in the parliament in the coming general elections in June 2011. This notion has been proven accurate in the June 2011 general elections, in which the JDP showed an unprecedented victory increasing its votes to %49.83. This success made the JDP the only party in Turkish history that won three consecutive general elections with increasing its votes each time.

As mentioned above, the JDP was established under the leadership of Erdogan in 2001 by the reformist faction of Turkey's Islamist movement after the closure of the VP by the constitutional court. It is argued that from the very beginning of the Milli Görüş movement it had internal problems and conflicts which did not cause a division until the closure of VP in 2001 by the constitutional court. However, with the closure of the VP the reformist faction of the Milli Görüş movement established a new party and rejected the principles of their former ideology and declared that they took off the shirt of the Milli Görüş. Despite their Islamist background, the prominent figures of JDP such as Erdogan and Gül argue that they have changed their ideological views and label their party as conservative democrat. However, what many scholars points out is the fact that the JDP represents the coalition of different conservative and moderate Islamist groups and lacks a clear ideology because of the ambiguity of the concept of conservative democracy, which needs to be defined clearly.⁴²⁷

In its party program the JDP rejects the use of religious symbols and values for political purposes and at the same time calls more religious freedom for pious people: *“Our Party refuses to take advantage of sacred religious values and ethnicity and to use them for political purposes. It considers the attitudes and practices which disturb pious people, and which discriminate them due to their religious lives and preferences, as anti-democratic and in contradiction to human rights and freedoms. On the other hand, it is also unacceptable to make use of religion for political, economic and other interests, or to put pressure on people who think and live differently by using religion.”*⁴²⁸

⁴²⁷ **Atacan, Fulya (2005);** Explaining Religious Politics at the Crossroad: AKP-SP, Turkish Studies, Volume 6, Issue 2, June 2005, p. 189.

⁴²⁸ <http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html#2.2> (accessed on 19.11.10, 16:06)

Many analysts such as Dagi⁴²⁹, Ahmadov⁴³⁰, Heper⁴³¹, Hale⁴³² and others accept this self-definition and label the JDP as a conservative or Muslim democrat party. For instance a prominent Turkish scholar Soli Özel defines the JDP as a conservative party and draws attention to Rustow's studies about democratization, who suggests that *"we should allow for the possibility that circumstances may force, trick, lure or cajole nondemocrats into democratic behaviour and that their beliefs may adjust in due course by some process of rationalization or adaptation."*⁴³³

The 10 years of JDP rule in Turkey also confirm this claim, as the JDP has shown significant differences compared to hard line Islamists in terms of its foreign and economy policies. For instance, unlike the hardline Islamists who oppose an EU membership of Turkey, the JDP embraced Turkey's EU membership goal and made the necessary political and economic reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria since *"the only way for this party to survive in power and endure is through a liberal transformation of the Turkish polity and its civilianization. This explains why the AKP's drive for EU accession is genuine: It is a matter of enlightened self-interest, and the party clearly knows it."*⁴³⁴ Furthermore, in sharp contrast to Islamists who advocate statist economy policies and oppose privatizations, the JDP favors a free liberal market economy and implemented an unprecedented privatization program during its 8 year tenure.

⁴²⁹ **Dagi, Ihsan (2008)**; Turkey's AKP in Power, Journal of Democracy Volume 19, Number 3 July 2008.

⁴³⁰ **Ahmadov, Ramin (2008)**; Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of Turkish Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party, p. 28.

⁴³¹ **Heper, Metin (2003)**; The Justice and Development Party: Towards a Reconciliation of Islam and Democracy in Turkey?, Tel Aviv University The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies The Annual Georges A. Kaller Lecture March 16, 2003.

⁴³² **Hale, William (2005)**; Christian Democracy and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts, Turkish Studies, Volume 6, Issue 2, June 2005, pp. 293 – 310.

⁴³³ **Rustow, Dankwart, A. (1999)**; Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, in **Anderson, Lisa (1999) (ed.)**; Transitions to Democracy, New York, Columbia University Press, 20, Cited in **Özel, Soli (2003)**; Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami, Journal of Democracy Volume 14, Number 2 April 2003, p. 93.

⁴³⁴ **Özel, Soli (2003)**; Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami, p. 93.

Only a few controversial analysts accuse the JDP of having a hidden agenda and describe it as a radical Islamist party. Considering the 8 year JDP tenure in Turkey and its pro-EU stance it can be said that those who describe the JDP as a radical Islamist party, such as Bassam Tibi⁴³⁵ and Daniel Pipes,⁴³⁶ base their opinions on ideological prejudices and lack clear evidence for their claims. Wishful thinking might be the correct description for this sort of analysis.

Although the JDP labels itself as conservative democrat some analysts also suggest that the JDP is following a neo-Ottomanist foreign policy agenda. Considering the 10 years of foreign policy praxis of the JDP it can be concluded that it represents a conservative democrat party with light neo-Ottomanist motives in its foreign policy. The JDP's neo-Ottomanism aims to increase Turkey's soft power by improving Turkey's economic and cultural relations with countries that emerged out of the Ottoman Empire. However, the prominent figures in the JDP always reject that they have a neo-Ottomanist vision since the term itself indicates an expansionist and imperialist foreign policy and therefore has negative connotations. This does not change the fact that the JDP's foreign policy praxis demonstrates features of a peaceful neo-Ottomanist vision. As the foreign policy of the JDP has mainly been shaped by Ahmet Davutoglu's "strategic depth" doctrine, the impact of the neo-Ottomanist ideas in this doctrine and how it led to an emergence of Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy will be analyzed in the next section in more depth.

⁴³⁵ For instance Tibi claims that *"What the AKP seeks is.....a strategy for a creeping Islamization that culminates in a Shari'a (Islamic law) state not compatible with a secular, democratic order."* **Tibi, Bassam (2009)**; Islamists Approach Europe Turkey's Islamist Danger, Middle East Quarterly Winter 2009, p. 47

⁴³⁶ Pipes, a well-known neo-con, claims that *"Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan... plans to undo the secular Atatürk revolution of 1923-34 and replace it with the Shari'a. I predicted the leadership of his Justice and Development Party (known by its Turkish initials, AKP) will use the democratic process only so long as this serves its purpose. It will circumscribe, or even terminate, political participation when the right moment comes. The end result, I predicted, could be an "Islamic Republic of Turkey."* Pipes Daniel; Is Turkey going Islamist. Available at: <http://www.danielpipes.org/2670/is-turkey-going-islamist> (accessed on 06.12.10, 19:06)

4.2.4 A New Grand Strategy for Turkish Foreign Policy: The “Strategic Depth” Doctrine

As discussed in the third chapter, one of the main weaknesses of Turkish foreign policy until the beginning of the new millennium was its lack of strategic thinking and theory. The official Kemalist ideology was unable to cope with the enormous systemic and social changes that took place after the end of the Cold War. It was clear that Turkey needed a new grand strategy which took the new realities into consideration. With his book, *Strategic Depth*, published in 2001 it was Davutoglu who undertook the grand task of the reinterpretation of the Turkish geopolitical and geostrategic position, providing Turkish foreign policy with a fresh grand strategy. However, at that time Davutoglu was only an academic who had no influence in the decision making process of Turkish foreign policy. In this regard one should note that the JDP’s victory in the elections of 2002 was a major breakthrough which changed the course of events. Immediately after the new government was formed, Davutoglu was appointed as Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to the prime minister and began to implement his new grand strategy.

It is a fact that since it came to power in 2002 the JDP has dramatically changed the political and economic landscape of Turkey. Today Turkey is a very different country to what it used to be one decade ago. Furthermore, it is also clear that Turkish foreign policy also has been dramatically affected by the JDP’s almost one decade of rule, which along with the other factors has triggered the transition to a Kantian culture. In the emergence of Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy one should also examine the role of the “strategic depth” doctrine. The majority of analysts agree that the most important factor in the JDP’s foreign policy is the “strategic depth” doctrine developed by Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu. For instance, Walker states that “*the implications of the strategic depth doctrine are manifest in all aspects of Turkey’s national security and foreign policy decisions*”⁴³⁷ and it has gradually become hegemonic in Turkish foreign

⁴³⁷ Walker, Joshua W. (2007); Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of Turkey's New Foreign Policy Doctrine, Insight Turkey, Volume 9, Number 3/2007, p.33.

policy in the last decade.⁴³⁸ Along with the other internal and external factors analyzed in this chapter, this doctrine has played a significant role in the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and its foreign policy making, which in return has also transformed how the Turkish state defines its interests. Therefore this chapter analyzes the features of the "strategic depth" doctrine in depth and its role in the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and interests, which led to an emergence of Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy in the last decade.

4.2.3.1. The Architect of the New Doctrine: Ahmet Davutoglu

As mentioned above, there is consensus that Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoglu has been the intellectual architect and mastermind of the JDP's foreign policy in the last decade. The foreign policy magazine has listed him among the "Top 100 Global Thinkers" in 2010 and 2011.⁴³⁹ Mark Parris, former American ambassador to Turkey, has labeled him as Turkey's Henry Kissinger.⁴⁴⁰ Looking into his biography one can claim that Davutoglu represents the elites of the new rising conservative class in Turkey. He was born in the middle of Anatolia into a middle class family in 1959 in Konya. His family belongs to nomadic Turcoman tribes who migrated to Turkey from Central Asia centuries ago. After graduating from the renowned Istanbul Erkek Lisesi (High School), he studied Economics and Politics at the prestigious Bogazici University (former Robert College). He earned a master's degree in Public Administration and a PhD degree in Political Science and International Relations at the same University.⁴⁴¹ Davutoglu speaks German, English, Arabic and Bahasa Malaysia. In 1994 the American University Press published his doctoral thesis, which analyzed Western and Islamic political Theory,

⁴³⁸ **Walker, Joshua W.;** The sources of Turkish Grand Strategy- Strategic Depth and Zero Problems in Context, in Kitchen, Nicholas (Ed.) (2011); Turkey's Global Strategy, LSE IDEAS, p.6, available at <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR007.aspx> (accessed on 24.12.2011; 16:36)

⁴³⁹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmet_Davuto%C4%9Flu (accessed on 25.12.2011; 14:58)

⁴⁴⁰ **Zengin, Gürkan (2010);** Hoca: Türk Dış Politikasında Davutoğlu Etkisi (Teacher: The Influence of Davutoglu on Turkish Foreign Policy), İnkilap, İstanbul, p.58.

⁴⁴¹ **Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001);** Stratejik Derinlik, p. IV.

with the title “*Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory.*”⁴⁴²

He taught at the Marmara University between 1993 and 1999 where he became a full professor in 1999. He also taught in Malaysia and conducted research at the Cairo University for his PhD thesis. Furthermore, he worked at Beykent University in Istanbul as the chairman of the Department of International Relations. His postdoctoral publications include *The Civilizational Transformation and The Muslim World*, *Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth)*, and *Küresel Bunalım (The Global Crisis)*. He has also published many articles which include critiques of the theories of Samuel Huntington (“Clash of Civilizations”) and Francis Fukuyama (“End of History”).

Before the JDP came to power in 2002 and was even founded, Davutoglu published his signature book *Stratejik Derinlik* (“Strategic Depth - International Position of Turkey”) in 2001, in which he developed a grand strategy for Turkish Foreign policy in the post Cold War world. The book had reached 13 editions in its first year and brought Davutoglu national and international recognition. Consequently, even before the JDP came to power Davutoglu was asked by Turkish President Demirel to write a report about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and his *Strategic Depth* book became a handbook in the military academies.⁴⁴³ Currently in its 73th printing, the book has become a handbook for those who want to have a better understanding of Turkish foreign policy under the JDP’s almost one decade rule. This also explains why it has been translated to Arabic, Greek, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Albanian. Davutoglu intended to write two other books in line with *Strategic Depth*, namely “Historical Depth” and “Philosophical Depth”. However when the JDP came to power in 2002 he was appointed as the chief advisor on foreign policy issues and was granted a title of ambassador in 2003, which put him away from his academic research. From 2002 until 2009 he was the behind the scenes mastermind of a new assertive pro-active Turkish foreign policy. Finally, in 2009 Prime Minister Erdogan appointed him as the foreign minister of Turkey, a post which he holds up until today.

Reading *Strategic Depth* one can clearly realize that Davutoglu is not an ordinary academic, who focuses only on one subject. He favors interdisciplinary research and

⁴⁴² <http://www.newsweek.com/id/224713> (accessed on 25.12.2011; 14:58)

⁴⁴³ **Zengin, Gürkan 2010**; Hoca: Türk Dış Politikasında Davutoğlu Etkisi, p.83.

encourages his students to follow suit. Apart from his formal studies he is interested in philosophy, geography, geo-politics, literacy, sociology, history of civilizations and religions. During his educational life he read Western classics as well as Islamic classics. He refuses the Euro centrism in historical writing and, as his doctoral thesis title reveals, he suggests that in the analysis of history alternative paradigms and contribution of other civilizations should be taken into consideration.⁴⁴⁴ Therefore it is not surprising to see that the new grand strategy developed by Davutoglu aims to broaden Turkish foreign policy towards the regions such as the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia, which had been neglected during the most of the Republic's history.

4.2.3.2 Principals of the New Doctrine and Its Implementation

According to Davutoglu his vision of “strategic depth” has five principals, which will be analyzed in the coming pages in detail in order to achieve a better picture of the “strategic depth” doctrine. His principals for Turkish foreign policy can be summarized as follows:

- Pivotal country: Turkey is a country with multiple identities in terms of geography and history, which cannot be reduced to one unified category.
- Balance between security and democracy: In order to create an area of influence in Turkey's surrounding regions a balance between security and democracy has to be achieved. That means Turkey's soft power should be its democracy, attracting other countries in its surrounding regions.
- Zero problems and maximum cooperation: Turkey needs to implement a zero problem and maximum cooperation policy which aims to improve its relations with its neighbors and create economic interdependence.

⁴⁴⁴ Lecture by Ahmet Davutoglu at the UETD Austria (Union of European Turkish Democrats) on Turkish Foreign Policy, 18.10.08.

- Multi-dimensional foreign policy: Turkey has to implement a multi-dimensional foreign policy developing its relations with the neighboring regions such as the Balkans, Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia. Turkey should not regard its relations with global actors such as the USA, EU and Russia as competitive but complementary.
- Rhythmic diplomacy: Turkey has to increase its diplomatic activities and also has to be strongly presented in international organizations and forums such as NATO, the UN, the OIC and other vital institutions.⁴⁴⁵

a. The Re-evaluation of the Geopolitical and Geostrategic Position: Pivotal Country

As discussed in the third chapter, during most of the Republic's history, one can say until the end of the Cold War, Turkey has implemented a one dimensional Western oriented foreign policy strategy. The main pillars of the Kemalist foreign policy as discussed in the third chapter were isolationism, Western orientation and the Sevres Phobia. The result of this policy was the alienation of Turkey from its neighbors and immediate regions such as the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia. Kemalist elites considered Turkey as a country surrounded by enemy states and were ready to use hard power in order to protect Turkey's interests.

During the Cold War, the West considered Turkey as a frontier and barrier country in the struggle against communism. The Turkish establishment tried to use the communist threat as a bargaining chip in order to secure financial and military aid from Western institutions and countries. Turkey followed a passive and status quo oriented foreign policy agenda, which avoided taking any major initiative. As discussed above, the end of the Cold War created a power vacuum in Turkey's immediate neighborhood with security challenges and possible opportunities. In the post Cold War era the old policy of isolationism and Western orientation simply was not enough to overcome the challenges created by this major systemic international change. Thus it was clear that

⁴⁴⁵ **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008);** Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, pp.77-84.

Turkey needed to reinterpret its geopolitical position. As discussed above, first Turgut Ozal (president 1989-1993) and then Ismail Cem (foreign minister 1997-2001) tried to achieve a multi-dimensional foreign policy strategy in order to overcome the challenges in the post Cold War era. However they were not successful in their efforts for of a number of reasons. Firstly, their strategies were not based on a clear, coherent concept developed by academics. Secondly, during the 80s and 90s the Kemalist establishment was reluctant to accept a major shift in Turkish foreign policy. Finally, the 90s in Turkey were marked with the unstable coalition governments, which were unable to implement a multi-dimensional foreign policy strategy.

In this context, with his book *Strategic Depth*, it was Davutoglu who reinterpreted the geopolitical position of Turkey, laying down the foundations of a new grand strategy in the post Cold War era. The main argument of Davutoglu is that a country's value in the international system is based on its historical and geographical depth. He argues that geography does not change; however its interpretations are subject to change in the course of history.⁴⁴⁶ He rejects the notion that describes Turkey as a bridge country that connects West and East, stating that a bridge is a passive and an artificial creation. Taking into account Turkey's special geographic position which connects various regions, Davutoglu considers Turkey as a central and pivotal country which has multiple identities. He stresses that as a major country in the midst of the Afro-Eurasia landmass, Turkey is a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one, unified category. Accordingly Turkey is a Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf, and Black Sea country all at the same time. Davutoglu notes that *"A central country with such an optimal geographic location cannot define itself in a defensive manner. It should be seen neither as a bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier country, nor indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of the Muslim world or the West."*⁴⁴⁷

Davutoglu's reinterpretation of Turkey's geography is based on the concept of adjacent land and maritime basins that describe Turkey's potential sphere of influence in its surrounding regions. Davutoglu notes that Turkey needs to strengthen its economic and

⁴⁴⁶ Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001); *Stratejik Derinlik*, p. 116.

⁴⁴⁷ Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008); *Turkeys Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007*, pp.78-79.

cultural ties with these regions to create economic and cultural interdependence which in return will promote stability, prosperity and peace for Turkey and its neighbors. He argues that *“Turkey should make its role of a peripheral country part of its past, and appropriate a new position: one of providing security and stability not only for itself, but also for its neighbouring regions. Turkey should guarantee its own security and stability by taking on a more active, constructive role to provide order, stability and security in its environs.”*⁴⁴⁸ He describes the adjacent basins of Turkey as follows:

- Turkey’s adjacent land basin: the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus
- Turkey’s adjacent maritime basin: the Black Sea, the East Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf, the Adriatic, the Caspian and the Red Sea,
- Turkey’s adjacent continental basin: Europe, North Africa, South Asia, Central Asia and the Far East.⁴⁴⁹

To sum up, one can argue that with the reinterpretation of Turkish geopolitics and by describing Turkey as a pivotal country Davutoglu has achieved a paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey regained its self-confidence in the international arena, engaging in a hyper active diplomacy which put Turkey in the spotlight of world attention in the last decade.

b. Zero Problem and Maximum Cooperation Policy with Neighboring Countries

As discussed in the third chapter, since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Kemalist elites defined Turkey as a country surrounded by hostile states and were reluctant to engage in a serious form of cooperation with them. The Turkish foreign policy making culture has mainly been shaped by a Realpolitik view of international relations. The Kemalist establishment considered the international environment as anarchical, which required being militarily strong and ready to deploy hard power and military force for win-lose outcomes.⁴⁵⁰ Turkey’s Ottoman past and the

⁴⁴⁸ **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008)**; *Turkeys Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007*, p. 79.

⁴⁴⁹ **Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001)**; *Stratejik Derinlik*, p 118.

⁴⁵⁰ **Kirişçi, Kemal (2006)**; *Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times*, pp. 100-101.

Sevres Syndrome also contributed to this perception which was manifested in the popular Turkish saying that *Turkey is surrounded by enemy states* and the *Turks does not have any ally other than Turks*. Turkey was in constant conflict with its neighbors, which brought Turkey twice to the brink of war with Greece and Syria in the 90s. Consequently, up until the beginning of the new millennium Turkey was regarded as a coercive regional power, which was ready to deploy military force to achieve its foreign policy aims.

One of the principals of Davutoglu's "strategic depth" doctrine is the zero problem policy with neighbors. Accordingly, Turkey needs to implement a zero problem and maximum cooperation policy aiming to improve its relations with its neighbors to create economic interdependence and stability in its surrounding regions. One may claim that in the emergence of Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy the concept of zero problems with neighbors has played a substantial role, since it has replaced the policy of confrontation and conflict with cooperation and dialogue.

Turkey borders 8 countries on land, namely Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Azerbaijan (the exclave of Nakhchivan). Additionally, in a broader sense, Cyprus can be considered as Turkey's neighbor as well, as it has an open access to Turkey via the sea and it is located in the immediate reach of Turkey. When the JDP came to power in 2002 Turkey had essential disputes with almost all of its neighbors except Azerbaijan. Davutoglu proclaimed that Turkey aims to achieve zero problems with its neighbors by settling the disputes diplomatically and by increasing the economic and cultural interdependence. The last decade has witnessed a number of ambitious and assertive foreign policy initiatives by the JDP government in order to achieve this aim. It is no exaggeration to say that this has meant a paradigm shift in Turkey's relations with its neighbors. Above all it has changed the image of Turkey in the international arena from a conflict and status quo oriented coercive regional power to a cooperation and solution oriented benign regional power.

Today, despite some setbacks with Syria, Cyprus and Armenia, Turkey has improved its relations with most of its neighbors dramatically. It is clear that it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the relations of Turkey with its neighbors in every aspect. However relations with each country will be analyzed by pointing out the main milestones in the

realization of the zero problem policy. Since the relations with Greece and Cyprus have been analyzed in the previous sections (4.1.3), they will be not included in this part of the study. However, one should also acknowledge the role of Davutoglu in the improvement of the relations between Turkey and Greece and also in the dramatic change that took place in Turkey's Cyprus policy in 2004. According to Davutoglu, the most striking examples of the zero problem policy have been the improvement of the relations with Syria and Georgia.⁴⁵¹ Therefore it will be appropriate to start the analysis with Turkish-Syrian relations.

Turkish-Syrian relations had been always troubled up until the last decade. Syria had territorial claims in Turkey (Hatay) and was supporting and sheltering the Kurdish separatist movement, PKK, in its territory. The strained relations reached to the point that Turkey and Syria came to the brink of a war in 1998, when Turkey threatened Syria with military intervention unless it expelled the rebels from its territory. Facing potential military intervention Syria decided to expel the head of the PKK and closed down its training camps.⁴⁵² Consequently Turkey and Syria signed a protocol in Adana, which drew the framework for cooperation against terrorism. Since then Turkish-Syrian relations have drastically improved. Turkey and Syria have signed a considerable amount of bilateral agreements and Memorandums of Understanding (around 50 just in 2009) which drew the framework in various areas such as politics, security, commerce, culture, health, agriculture, environment, transportation, education and water.⁴⁵³

In 2004 Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad paid a visit to Turkey, which was the first ever presidential visit in 50 years of relations. Turkey and Syria signed a free trade agreement in 2007, which increased the trade volume between the two countries dramatically from 729 million US dollars in 2000 to 2,754 million US dollars in 2008.⁴⁵⁴ In 2010 Turkey's imports from Syria amounted to 663 million USD and

⁴⁵¹ **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008)**; Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, p. 80.

⁴⁵² **Larrabee, Stephen (2007)**; Turkey Rediscovered the Middle East, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No.4, July/August 2007, p. 109.

⁴⁵³ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-syria.en.mfa> (accessed on 10.01.2012; 11:11)

⁴⁵⁴ **Hale, William (2009)**; Turkey and the Middle East in the New Era, Insight Turkey, Volume 11, Number 3/2009, p. 152.

Turkey's exports to Syria were worth 1.85 billion USD. Furthermore, in 2009 Turkey and Syria established the "High Level Strategic Cooperation Council" which was assembled for the first time at ministerial level on 13 October 2009 in Gaziantep with the participation of 10 ministers from the two countries. In 2009 Turkey and Syria signed a visa exemption agreement aiming to increase the tourism between the two countries, which doubled the touristic visits between two countries.⁴⁵⁵ The relations reached such an excellent point that in 2007 Davutoglu argued that the improvement of Turkey's level of relations with Syria constituted an example for the rest of the region.⁴⁵⁶

However the Turkish-Syrian relations once again became strained when wide spread mass protest for democracy in Syria started in March 2011 was increasingly met by the harsh violence of the Syrian security forces. Firstly, Turkey opted to keep the diplomatic channel open and tried to encourage the Syrian regime to introduce wide ranging political reforms. However, with the increasing numbers of civilian casualties and bombing of Syrian cities by the Syrian Army, Turkey had to distance itself from the Assad regime and called for an immediate stop to civilian massacre. This resulted in harsh sanctions by the Syrian government towards Turkish imports to Syria. Although the relations have reached a low point now, if the revolution in Syria succeeds, one may expect that the relations between two countries might exceed the previous level of cooperation, since a democratic government in Syria would be much more interested in good relations with the best established democracy in the region, i.e. Turkey.

As put forward by Davutoglu, one of the best examples of the zero problem policy with neighbors is Turkey's relation with Georgia,⁴⁵⁷ which has reached the point of maximum cooperation between two countries. Today Turkey and Georgia enjoy excellent relations in all areas such as tourism, education, trade and etc. For instance in order to increase the bilateral visits Turkey and Georgia not only introduced a visa free regime but also made it possible for their citizens to travel to each other's country with

⁴⁵⁵ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-syria.en.mfa> (accessed on 10.01.2012; 11:11)

⁴⁵⁶ **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008);** Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, p. 80.

⁴⁵⁷ **Ibid.**

their national identity documents. Another example of the excellent cooperation between the two countries is the Georgian Batumi Airport, which is also used by Turkish Airplanes as a joint airport to reach the Turkish cities in the northeast of Turkey such as Artvin. Both countries also cooperate in international projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline⁴⁵⁸ and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railway which connects Turkey to Azerbaijan via Georgian territory⁴⁵⁹. Turkey and Georgia signed a free trade agreement which brought the trade volume between the two countries to 1.104 billion USD in 2010, which makes to 16.5% of Georgia's total foreign trade.⁴⁶⁰

Considering Turkey's relations with its neighbors one may claim that the real challenge for the zero problem policy is Turkey's troubled relationship with Armenia which has suffered from the tragic events that took place in the last decades of Ottoman Empire. In order to overcome the issues between the two countries in 2005 Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan sent a letter to the Armenian President Kocharian for the establishment of a historical commission which will study the mutual killing of Armenians and Muslims during World War I⁴⁶¹. In 2009, despite domestic and Azerbaijani pressure, the Turkish government signed two protocols with Armenia which provided a framework for the establishment of diplomatic relations and the improvement of bilateral relations between the two countries⁴⁶². The ratification of protocols was suspended by Armenia in 2010 due to the opposition of the Armenian constitutional court.⁴⁶³ In this regard one should also consider the fact that Armenia has

⁴⁵⁸ **Karagiannis, Emmanuel (2004)**; The Turkish-Georgian partnership and the pipeline factor, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Volume 6, Issue 1, April 2004, pp. 13–26.

⁴⁵⁹ **Smith, David J. (2007)**; Georgia's Railway to NATO Passes through Turkey, *Turkish Policy Quarterly* Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall 2007, pp. 61-69.

⁴⁶⁰ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-georgia.en.mfa> (accessed on 12.01.2012; 14:06)

⁴⁶¹ **Iskandaryan, Alexander (2009)**; Armenian- Turkish Rapprochement: Timing Matters, *Insight Turkey*, Volume 11, Number 3/2009, pp.37-45.

⁴⁶² **Görgülü, Aybars (2009)**; Towards a Turkish-Armenian Reapprochment, *Insight Turkey*, Volume 11, Number 2/2009, pp.19-29.

⁴⁶³ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-armenia.en.mfa> (accessed on 13.01.2012; 13:23)

built its national identity around the “genocide” claims, which makes the questioning of the events almost impossible. As a result of this hard position from Armenia, Turkey could not achieve its aim of improving relations with Armenia in the last decade. However, it is also clear that it demonstrated its willingness to take courageous steps in order to address long frozen conflicts with its neighbors.

In the implementation of the zero problem policy one should also mention the dramatic changes in Turkish-Iranian relations. According to a former Turkish prime minister, up until 2001 Turkish-Iranian relations “*were neither black nor white, but a shade of gray*”.⁴⁶⁴ Although the two countries share one of the oldest borders in the Middle East which was drawn by an agreement between the Safavid Empire and the Ottoman Empire in 1639, there has been always a sense of rivalry and enmity in the bilateral relations because the two countries have been the leader of two different rival interpretations of Islam, that is to say Shia and Sunni Islam. Therefore Turkey and Iran have had a troublesome relationship during much of their history. The relations weakened especially after the Iranian Revolution and during the 90s when Turkey accused Iran of sheltering and supporting the PKK and also supporting Islamist terrorism in Turkey. However this rhetoric changed dramatically after the JDP came to power in 2001. After the second Gulf War the growing influence and strength of separatist Kurdish movements in both countries brought Turkey and Iran closer⁴⁶⁵. In 2004 Turkey and Iran signed a number of agreements in the area of economics, which also included an agreement for cooperation in the fight against Kurdish terrorism. As a result of this new sense of cooperation, the Turkish-Iranian trade volume has grown almost tenfold from 1.2 billion dollars in 2001 to 10.6 billion dollars in 2010.⁴⁶⁶ Turkey also has been actively involved in the efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the dispute around Iran’s nuclear program. In 2010 Turkey and Brazil successfully brokered and signed a nuclear fuel swap deal with Tehran, which was rejected by US and its allies. As a result of this, together with Brazil, Turkey vetoed the UN Security Council

⁴⁶⁴ **Murinson, Alexander (2006)**; The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy, Middle Eastern Studies, November 2006, Vol. 42, No. 6, p. 957.

⁴⁶⁵ **Ögütçü, Mehmet (2007)**; Turkey: A Major Regional Power to Engage or Confront Iran, Insight Turkey, Volume 9, Number 2/2007.

⁴⁶⁶ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-iran.en.mfa (accessed on 12.02.2012; 15:06)

resolution on the fourth round of sanctions on Iran in June 2010. There is a clear logic behind Turkey's attitude towards this issue, because since the beginning of the dispute Turkey has been advocating a diplomatic solution and rejecting economic and other sanctions against Iran fearing that it will affect the Turkish trade with Iran.

Turkey has also been enjoying excellent relations with its north-western neighbor, Bulgaria, since the fall of communism in Bulgaria in 1989. Turkey has supported Bulgaria in its bid to join NATO and the EU. There are regular high level visits between the two countries⁴⁶⁷. The Turkish-Bulgarian bilateral trade volume has reached 2.4 billion Euros in 2010. 1500 Turkish companies have invested in Bulgaria and Turkish investments in Bulgaria amounted to one billion US dollars in 2010. In 2001 Turkey made Bulgarian citizens visa exempt in their visits to Turkey, which increased the number of Bulgarian tourists to Turkey to 1.226.543 in 2010.⁴⁶⁸

Considering Turkey's relations with its neighbors one can say that the invasion and the following instability in Iraq since 2003 constituted one of the substantial challenges for the implementation of the zero problem policy in Turkish foreign policy. It should be noted that from the beginning Turkey has opposed the invasion of Iraq because of its fears of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, which may have a spillover effect onto Turkey's Kurds. Therefore, although backed by the JDP leadership, the majority of the Turkish Parliament with the support of 90 JDP MPs rejected a government motion on the deployment of American troops in southeast Turkey to open a new invasion route into Iraq.⁴⁶⁹ Since then Turkey has made the preservation of territorial integrity of Iraq its main priority. On its official page Turkish MFA states that "*Turkey strongly*

⁴⁶⁷ **Bishku, Michael B. (2003);** Turkish-Bulgarian Relations: From Conflict and Distrust to Cooperation, *Mediterranean Quarterly*: Spring 2003, 77-94.

⁴⁶⁸ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-bulgaria.en.mfa> (accessed on 12.02.2012; 15:40)

⁴⁶⁹ **Robins, Philip (2007);** The Opium Crisis and the Iraq War: Historical Parallels in Turkey-US Relations, *Mediterranean Politics*, Volume 12, Issue 1, March 2007, p. 21

supports Iraq's sovereignty, stability, political unity and territorial integrity. We attach importance to remaining in equal distance to all segments of the Iraqi society"⁴⁷⁰

In 2003 just before the invasion of Iraq, Turkey initiated the "Iraq's Neighboring Countries Process" in order to find a solution to the crisis and instability in Iraq. After the invasion Turkey also played a substantial role in the integration of the Sunni majority in Iraq into the political system and also mediated between Shia and Sunni groups in Iraq in order to prevent a sectarian civil war. Davutoglu claims that with its efforts Turkey contributed to prevention of a possible disintegration of Iraq. He states that "*Turkey's influence on the fragmented groups within Iraqi society, its efforts to bring together Iraq's neighbors around a common platform, its persuasive diplomacy over the USA, and its principled relationship with the Iraqi government have all played an unprecedented role in these efforts.*"⁴⁷¹

In the context of maximum cooperation with neighboring countries Turkey established the "High Level Strategic Cooperation Council" with Iraq in 2008. In 2009 Davutoglu as foreign minister made a historical visit to Erbil first time ever in Turkish history and met with the Kurdish autonomous region's president, Masoud Barzani.⁴⁷² This visit signaled a radical change in Turkish foreign policy since for decades Turkey ignored the Kurdish political entity in northern Iraq. After this visit in 2010 Turkey opened a consulate general in Erbil. As a result of this close cooperation Iraq became the second largest trading partner of Turkey in 2011.⁴⁷³ Today Turkish companies are involved in different projects in all regions of Iraq.

Having analyzed the improvements of Turkey's relations with its neighbors in the last decade, it should be also noted that recently Davutoglu has been heavily criticized that his policy of zero problems has collapsed due to the deteriorating relations with Syria,

⁴⁷⁰ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-iraq.en.mfa> (accessed on 27.03.2012; 11:07)

⁴⁷¹ **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008);** Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, pp.77-86.

⁴⁷² <http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?nr=223&lngnr=12&smap=02010100&anr=32216> (accessed on 27.03.2012; 11:45)

⁴⁷³ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-iraq.en.mfa> (accessed on 27.03.2012; 11:07)

Cyprus, Armenia and Israel. Davutoglu maintains that his policy has been successfully implemented. He argues that as an academic, who taught international relations theory, he knows that it is almost impossible to have excellent relations with all neighbors at the same time. However, he suggests that what he aimed to achieve with his motto was a mentality change in Turkish foreign policy making regarding the relations with its neighbors. He also aimed to improve Turkey's image in the international arena. He concludes that the concept of the zero problem policy has achieved its goals by improving overall relations with neighboring countries, by improving the mutual friendship amongst the populations, by changing the mentality of Turkish foreign policy by implementing the win-win approach in its agenda and also by altering Turkey's image in the international arena positively.⁴⁷⁴

Considering Turkey's troubled relations with its neighbors in the past one should acknowledge that Davutoglu achieved a mentality change in Turkish foreign policy in the last decade. All in all, one can say that what Davutoglu initiated as a zero problems policy with Turkey's neighboring countries one decade ago transformed itself into a maximum cooperation policy in all aspects ranging from economic to cultural cooperation.

c. Multidimensional Foreign Policy: Developing Relations with Neighboring Regions

Recently there has been much criticism in Western media that Turkey's foreign policy axis is shifting away from Europe and USA. Some Western analysts argue that Turkey is becoming more interested in the Middle East and Russia and accuse the JDP government of a creeping Islamisation of Turkey. However, as discussed previously (See 4.1.2) one should regard Turkey's new active foreign policy "*as a response to structural changes in its security environment since the end of cold war.*"⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷⁴ Interview with Ahmet Davutoglu on CNN Turk, available at: <http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/turkiye/09/18/davutoglu.da.mitin.arkasinda/629646.0/index.html> (accessed on 04.01.2012; 14:58)

⁴⁷⁵ Larrabee, Stephen (2007); Turkey Rediscovered the Middle East, p. 103

As discussed in the third chapter, during the much of the Republic's history Turkey's Kemalist elites followed a one sided foreign policy strategy, which aimed to Westernize Turkish society as that would lead to an integration of Turkey into European civilization. In their focus on Europe and America the Kemalist elites neglected Turkey's relations with the other regions which in return reduced Turkey's foreign policy options and created a dangerous dependency on Western European countries and the USA both economically and politically. Additionally, the Cold War power relations also forced Turkey to side with Western countries against an immediate Soviet threat.

In his "strategic depth" doctrine Davutoglu criticizes this one sided foreign policy practice of the Kemalist elites and argues that Turkey should redefine its geopolitical and geostrategic position by acknowledging its multiple identities that make it as a central and pivotal country in the heart of the Eurasian landmass. According to Davutoglu the third principle of the "strategic depth" doctrine is the adherence to a multidimensional foreign policy strategy. Davutoglu suggests that especially in the post Cold War era Turkey needs to develop its relations with its surrounding regions as well as with the regions beyond Turkey's immediate proximity such as Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia- Pacific and Latin America. In this regard it should be noted that Davutoglu does not envisage reducing or cutting Turkey's ties with Western countries. On the contrary he argues that Turkey needs to have a balanced foreign policy strategy which is not built on a one-sided approach. Davutoglu refuses the accusations of a shift of axis in Turkish foreign policy and insists that Turkey's relations with various global actors are complementary. In this regard the following statement of Davutoglu is noteworthy: *"Turkey's relations with other global actors aim to be complementary, not in competition. Such a policy views Turkey's strategic relations with the United States through the two countries' bilateral ties and through NATO, and considers its membership process to the EU, its good neighborhood policy with Russia, and its synchronization policy in Eurasia as integral parts of a consistent policy that serves to complete each other"*⁴⁷⁶

It is clear that it is beyond the scope of this study to analyze Turkey's relations with all its neighboring regions in detail. In order to achieve a better understanding of the new

⁴⁷⁶ Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008); Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, p.82

multidimensionalism in Turkish foreign policy, the developments in Turkey's relations with Sub-Saharan countries will be examined as a case study. Based on the principle of multidimensionalism, it is not surprising that Davutoglu announced in 2005, the very same year in which Turkey started its accession negotiations with the EU, as the year of Africa in Turkish foreign policy. It is no exaggeration to say that one of the staggering examples of Davutoglu's multidimensionalism can be seen in Turkey's opening up to Sub-Saharan Africa since 2005, which was based on a plan developed by former Foreign Minister Ismail Cem in 1998.⁴⁷⁷ However it should be noted that the opening to Africa only entered into the agenda of Turkish foreign policy in 2005 which Davutoglu declared as the year of Africa. As a result of this new strategy Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan visited Ethiopia and South Africa in 2005, which was the first official prime ministerial visit to a country below the equator.⁴⁷⁸

It is interesting to see that both former social democrat foreign minister Ismail Cem and Davutoglu have been criticized by the Kemalist establishment and secular media outlets for their focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. Their main argument, "*What business does he have in Sudan?*"⁴⁷⁹, reveals the mindset of the secular establishment in Turkey. Principally they oppose developing ties with regions which they perceive as backward and only to have business with 'civilized' Western countries. Needless to say, they represent an absurd and childish approach in the age of globalization, when all the global actors are heavily involved in Sub-Saharan Africa both politically and economically.

Despite this criticism the JDP government pursued its opening up to Africa policy passionately. Consequently, Turkey increased its efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa and obtained an observer status in the African Union in 2005. In 2008, the AU summit held in Addis Ababa declared Turkey as a strategic partner. In the same year the "Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit" convened with the participation of 49 African countries in

⁴⁷⁷ **Hazar, Numan;** Turkey's Opening up to Africa, Asam Perspective, August 2008, No 4, p.7. Available at: <http://www.asam.org.tr/temp/temp777.pdf> (accessed on 06.03.2012; 14:58)

⁴⁷⁸ **Özkan, Mehmet;** Turkey Discovers Africa: Implications and Prospects, SETA Policy Brief, September 2008, No. 22, p. 3.

⁴⁷⁹ **Hazar, Numan;** Turkey's Opening up to Africa, p.6.

Istanbul which marked the beginning of a new era in the relations. Turkey also decided to increase its diplomatic presence in Sub-Saharan Africa by opening 15 new embassies and 3 TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency) offices. Currently Turkey has 15 embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa and 3 TIKA offices in Addis Ababa, Khartoum and Dakar.⁴⁸⁰ As a result of this new activism Turkey's exports to Sub-Saharan African countries increased from 430 million USD in 2002 to 3,635 billion USD in 2012.⁴⁸¹

One can find other striking examples of Turkey's new multidimensional foreign policy strategy in other regions such as the Balkans, the Middle East, Latin America, Central Asia, Russia and etc. For instance following the year of Africa in 2005 the year 2006 was declared as "The Year of Latin America and the Caribbean" in Turkish foreign policy. Furthermore, Turkey began to implement a strategy to increase visa free countries all around the world for Turkish passport holders. Consequently the number of countries allowing Turkish citizens to pass their border without a visa increased to 72 in 2012⁴⁸².

However, as mentioned above, it is beyond the scope of this study to cover all these areas. Nevertheless one should acknowledge that in the last decade Turkish foreign policy acquired a new multidimensional approach and Turkish diplomacy started to involve different regions which increased Turkey's diplomatic presence in its neighboring regions in the last decade considerably. For instance, Turkey has been actively involved in the conciliation talks and mediations between Israel and Syria, Sunni and Shia groups in Iraq, Bosnia and Serbia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the political crisis in Lebanon regarding the presidential elections and in the Iran's nuclear crisis with the West.

In sum, Davutoglu considers "*Turkey's engagements from Chile to Indonesia, from Africa to Central Asia, and from EU to OIC... part of a holistic approach to foreign*

⁴⁸⁰ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa> (accessed on 06.03.2012; 14:58)

⁴⁸¹ <http://www.ekonomi.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=7145D543-D8D3-8566-4520DFB6CC4A86BA> (accessed on 03.04.2012; 11:32)

⁴⁸² <http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=85798> (accessed on 03.04.2012; 13:51)

policy.” He claims that “*these initiatives will make Turkey a global actor as we approach 2023, the one hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish republic.*”⁴⁸³

d. Rhythmic Diplomacy: Presence in International Organizations and Public Diplomacy

What Davutoglu calls rhythmic diplomacy⁴⁸⁴ and others hyperactive diplomacy⁴⁸⁵, constitutes the fourth principle of the “strategic depth” doctrine. Davutoglu describes the main aim of his concept of rhythmic diplomacy as “*to intervene consistently in global issues using international platforms, which signifies a transformation for Turkey from a central country to a global power.*”⁴⁸⁶ In order to carry out such an ambitious policy Davutoglu has shown incredible physical effort by undertaking 100 foreign visits in just one year as foreign minister in 2009, which includes 28 to European, 27 to Middle Eastern, 18 to Balkan, 9 to Asian countries and 8 to the United States.⁴⁸⁷

Davutoglu argues that in order to achieve this goal both state and non-state actors have to be involved in Turkey’s new rhythmic diplomacy concept. He acknowledges “*Turkey’s success is not only the result of state policies, but also the activities of civil society, business organizations, and numerous other organizations, all operating under the guidance of the new vision. The state’s macro strategy is in conformity with the micro strategies of individual people, corporations, and civil society organizations.*”⁴⁸⁸

“Rhythmic diplomacy” means that Turkey should increase its presence in the field of international diplomacy by increasing its diplomatic initiatives, playing a mediator role

⁴⁸³ **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008)**; *Turkeys Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007*, p.96.

⁴⁸⁴ **Ibid.**; p. 82.

⁴⁸⁵ **Meral, Ziya/ Paris, Jonathan (2010)**; *Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity*, *The Washington Quarterly*, 33:4, pp 75-86.

⁴⁸⁶ **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008)**; *Turkeys Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007*, p.83.

⁴⁸⁷ **Meral, Ziya/ Paris, Jonathan (2010)**; *Decoding Turkish Foreign Policy Hyperactivity*, p. 80.

⁴⁸⁸ **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008)**; *Turkeys Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007*, p.83

in international disputes, actively involving in various international organizations and hosting summits of important international organizations such as NATO and the OIC.⁴⁸⁹ In the last decade Turkey was able to host and initiate a considerable amount of international summits and conferences such as the NATO Summit in 2004, OIC Summit on the Somalia humanitarian crisis in 2011, a series of conferences on Iraq's neighboring countries, a "Friends of Syria" conference on the Syrian crisis in 2012, the UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries in 2011 in Istanbul and etc.

Furthermore, in the last decade Turkey has increased its presence in various international and regional organizations which include the following;

- Turkey obtained an observer status in the African Union in 2005 and the African Union declared Turkey as a strategic partner in 2008. In the same year the first "Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit" was convened in Istanbul.
- In 2009, after an extended campaign with the backing of 151 countries, Turkey was elected for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council for two years.
- Turkey obtained an observer status in the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Association of Caribbean States and the Organization of American States.

Additionally, Turkey also aims to increase its presence in international organizations by appointing Turkish diplomats in key positions in various international organizations. There are many examples of this new approach, which includes the following appointments of Turkish diplomats to various important posts in international organizations:

⁴⁸⁹ Aras, Bülent (2009); *The Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy*, Insight Turkey, Volume 11, Number 3/2009, p 134.

- In May 2005 a Turkish economist Kemal Dervis was elected unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly as the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which is the third-highest ranking post in the United Nations. He served between 2005 and 2009.
- In 2005 Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, a Turkish academic was elected as the Secretary-General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, a post he holds up until today.
- In May 2008, another Turkish academic Mahmud Erol Kilic was appointed as the Secretary-General of the Parliamentary Union of the OIC Member States.
- In 2010 a Turkish diplomat, Ambassador Hüseyin Diriöz, the Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to the Turkish president, was appointed as Deputy Secretary-General of NATO in charge of Defense Policy and Planning.
- Between 2010 and 2012, a Turkish politician, Mevlut Cavusoglu was the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.
- In 2003 a Turkish politician and former foreign minister, Hikmet Cetin, was appointed NATO Secretary General's Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan. He held the command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan until 2006.

In the last decade Turkey also increased its efforts in the area of public diplomacy aiming to promote Turkish culture and language abroad. For this purpose Turkey has established the Yunus Emre Foundation in 2007 as a state foundation under Law 5653 passed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The purpose of the foundation was identified in the law as follows: *“To promote Turkey, its cultural heritage, Turkish language, culture and arts, develop Turkey’s friendship ties with other countries, establish and manage cultural centers abroad to increase cultural exchange”*.⁴⁹⁰ Davutoglu, who is also the chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Yunus Emre

⁴⁹⁰http://www.yunusemrevakfi.com.tr/turkiye/index.php?lang=en&page=67&anIicat_2=0&anIitm_2=4 (11.04.12;12:00)

Foundation, points out that “*the mission of Yunus Emre Institute is related to Turkish Foreign policy’s strategic dimension and popularization of Turkish Language, protection of Turkish cultural heritage and the dissemination of Turkish culture to the outside world*”.⁴⁹¹ He argues that this will enable Turkey to place its historical-cultural richness into its current foreign policy strategy. Consequently, the Yunus Emre Institute has opened 18 Yunus Emre Turkish Culture centers all around the world, including: Brussels, Sarajevo, Tirana, Cairo, Skopje, Astana, London, Damascus, Pristine, Prizren, Tokyo, Beirut, Bucharest, Constanta, Tehran, Amman, Fojnitsa, Tbilisi.⁴⁹²

Having realized the importance of development assistance in public diplomacy, the Turkish state also established its official technical aid agency TIKA as early as 1992. However it was not until the JDP government came to power in 2003 that TIKA became an essential part of Turkish foreign policy in the developing world. In this regard Fidan and Nurdun point out the fact that “*although TIKA was initially established for the purpose of helping transition economies in Central Asia, Caucasus and the Balkans, from 2003 onwards, TIKA began to reach out to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries and African countries.*”⁴⁹³ TIKA cooperates with Turkish NGOs and coordinates Turkey’s development assistance towards Turkey’s surrounding regions such as the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Africa and the Middle East.⁴⁹⁴ In 2010 Turkey’s governmental and non-governmental development assistance amounted to one

⁴⁹¹ **Kaya, Ayhan/ Tecmen, Ayse (2011)**; The role of common cultural heritage in external promotion of modern Turkey: Yunus Emre Cultural Centres, Working paper No: 4 EU /4/2011, The European Institute of Istanbul Bilgi University, p. 11.

⁴⁹² <http://www.yunusemrevakfi.com.tr/turkiye/index.php?lang=en&page=53> (11.04.12;12:10)

⁴⁹³ **Fidan, Hakan/ Nurdun, Rahman (2008)**; Turkey's role in the global development assistance community: the case of TIKA (Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency), Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, Volume 10, Issue 1, April 2008, p. 99.

⁴⁹⁴ **Kulaklikaya, Musa/ Aybey, Ali (2008)**; An Emerging Donor in Mediterranean Basin: Turkey, Mediterranean Yearbook, 2008, pp. 263-268

and a half billion dollars annually⁴⁹⁵ and the number of TIKA offices abroad reached 22 in 20 countries in 2007.⁴⁹⁶

4.2.5 The Rising Role of Civil Society: NGOs, Think Tanks and Public Opinion

In the emergence of Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy one should also analyze the impact of the rising role of civil society in the Turkish political system, i.e. NGOs, think tanks and public opinion. It is widely accepted that civil society plays a crucial role in the consolidation of democracy in a liberal political system. Furthermore it is clear that the improvements in the democratic standards of a country force the government of this country to take its public opinion, NGOs and think tanks into consideration in the formulation of foreign policy issues. In the emergence of a Kantian culture, civil society also plays a very substantial role, since it can force governments to follow a more restrained foreign policy strategy in order to settle the disputes peacefully, which is the basis of a Kantian culture.

In the literature one can find various definitions of civil society. Yet, one can summarize these definitions under two main categories, i.e. the liberal and the critical approach. According to the liberal approach civil society can only be defined in a liberal democratic political system. It considers civil society as the counterweight that checks and balances the dominant role of the state. In this context Hall argues that civil society is *“the self-organisation of strong and autonomous groups that balance the state”*.⁴⁹⁷ Another scholar, Diamond considers civil society to be *“the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the*

⁴⁹⁵ Speech Delivered by H.E. Mr. Abdullah Gül, President of the Republic of Turkey to the General Debate of the 65th Session of the UN General Assembly, **Available at:** <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/speeches-statements/344/77346/speech-delivered-by-he-mr-abdullah-gul-president-of-the-republic-of-turkey-to-the-general-debate-of-.html> (Accessed on 05.11.2011, 15:16)

⁴⁹⁶ **Kulaklikaya, Musa/ Aybey, Ali (2008);** An Emerging Donor in Mediterranean Basin: Turkey, p. 263.

⁴⁹⁷ **Simsek, Sefa (2004);** The transformation of civil society in Turkey: from quantity to quality, Turkish Studies, Volume 5, Issue 3, Autumn 2004, p. 50.

state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared values.”⁴⁹⁸ In the liberal approach Gellners’ definition can be regarded as the most comprehensive definition, in which he argues that “*Civil society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.*”⁴⁹⁹

The critical approach argues that the concept of civil society should be separated from the liberal democratic context. This approach considers the state and society as the products of a common political culture, in which the main struggle may arise within the state and civil society rather than between them. Therefore civil society may develop and flourish in nondemocratic political systems without producing liberalization in the political system. Consequently one may find civil societies in patriarchal, Islamist, communist and fascist political systems.⁵⁰⁰ Briefly this approach argues that the attitudes of civil societies towards democratization depend on circumstances and therefore “*different (or the same) civil organisations at different times and under different circumstances may support democracy as well as authoritarian and totalitarian rules.*”⁵⁰¹

Apart from this theoretical debate, this study will be based on the assumptions of the liberal approach since the Turkish political system is more compatible with the liberal approach. According to this approach large scale citizen participation in civil society organizations constitutes one of the most concrete features of a liberal democratic system. These organizations check and balance undemocratic tendencies of states and play a substantial role in the consolidation of democracy.

Given the history of the Turkish Republic one cannot claim that Turkey has a strong civil society tradition. On the contrary, it can be said that the role of NGOs, think tanks and public opinion is relatively a new phenomenon in Turkish political life because of Turkey’s strong state tradition. It is widely accepted that Turkey constitutes “*an example of a “strong state,” that is, a society in which the state is at the center of public*

⁴⁹⁸ **Grigoriadis, Ionnis, N. (2009);** Trials of Europeanization, p. 41

⁴⁹⁹ **Simsek, Sefa (2004);** The transformation of civil society in Turkey, p. 51.

⁵⁰⁰ **Grigoriadis, Ionnis, N. (2009);** Trials of Europeanization, pp. 41-42

⁵⁰¹ **Simsek, Sefa (2004);** The transformation of civil society in Turkey, p. 51.

policymaking and the notion of state sovereignty is highly developed and unalloyed. The idea of the strong state does not necessarily imply a powerful or capable state in practical terms (although, overall, the Turkish state has played this role in some areas) but rather a pervasive, doctrinal attachment to the primacy of the state... For almost 80 years, the Turkish state has had a pervasive role in virtually all aspects of Turkish life... Economic policy was shaped from the center on a statist pattern, with high levels of government ownership and oversight."⁵⁰²

As mentioned above, until the end of the 80s the Turkish state had absolute power over Turkish society and strictly controlled any kind of social movement and organization. There were 38,354 NGOs in Turkey before the September 12 military coup in 1980, out of which almost 20.000 were closed down by the military regime.⁵⁰³ Following the coup, the 12 September military regime imposed constitutional and legal restrictions on civil society organizations. Article 33 of the 1982 Constitution imposed by the military regime prohibited associations *"from pursuing political aims, engaging in political activities, receiving support from or giving support to political parties, or taking joint action with labor unions or public professional organisations or foundations. Associations could normally be dissolved by a decision of a judge or suspended by the competent (administrative) authority pending a court decision in cases where delay was deemed to endanger the indivisible integrity of the state...."*⁵⁰⁴ The law on associations of 1983 that regulated the activities of civil society organizations followed the same authoritarian logic. This law banned any association that aimed to engage activities on the behalf of region, race, social class, religion or sect. Associations were not allowed to have relations with international organizations and to use different languages other than Turkish in their official writings. As a result of these strict restrictions, associations were under maximum state control and constant threat of closure.⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰² **Larrabee, F. Stephen/ Lesser, Ian O. (2003);** Turkish foreign policy in an age of uncertainty, Rand, Santa Monica Californien, p.21

⁵⁰³ **Simsek, Sefa (2004);** The transformation of civil society in Turkey, p. 48

⁵⁰⁴ **Grigoriadis, Ionnis, N. (2009);** Trials of Europeanization, p. 56

⁵⁰⁵ **Ibid.;** p.57.

The post Cold War world witnessed a spread of “*the western model of democracy and its associated concepts such as civil society and the notion of non governmental organisations (NGOs.)*” Turkey was no exception in this new trend, which was referred by Huntington as the “third wave”.⁵⁰⁶ Additionally Turkey’s transition to a liberal economic model and its basic democratic reforms paved the way for the toleration of NGOs and their activities to a certain extent in the beginning of 90s.⁵⁰⁷ Furthermore, as a result of increasing Turkish-EU relations, EU also started to exert its influence on the Turkish political system through conditionality and adaptations. In this regard, EU started to focus on the problems of Turkish civil society and considered the absence of a strong civil society in Turkey as one of the main reasons for Turkey’s weak democratic standards.

Therefore it is not surprising that the first amendment to the illiberal Article 33 of the 1982 Constitution came with the customs union agreement between Turkey and EU in 1995. Turkey had to amend the article in order to overcome opposition by the European Parliament. As a result of this amendment associations were allowed to engage in political activities and to cooperate with political parties and other organizations. The closure of associations by the decisions of administrative authorities had to be approved by a court decision.⁵⁰⁸

From the 90s onwards, thousands of NGOs have been established in Turkey. For instance, the number of NGOs in Turkey has reached around 61.000 in 2004.⁵⁰⁹ Despite this staggering increase in the quantity of NGOs their role in Turkish political life in the 90s remained very limited because of slow democratization reforms and the strong state tradition, which put the political NGOs under immense state pressure. During the 90s the civil society organizations that were linked to Kurdish, Islamist and human rights groups were under permanent state persecution. For instance, in 1999 it was reported that 30 NGOs closed down and 387 of them were harassed by Turkish authorities.⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰⁶ **Simsek, Sefa (2004);** The transformation of civil society in Turkey, p. 48.

⁵⁰⁷ **Simsek, Sefa (2004);** New Social Movements in Turkey since 1980, Turkish Studies, Volume 5, Issue 2, Summer 2004, p. 112.

⁵⁰⁸ **Grigoriadis, Ionnis, N. (2009);** Trials of Europeanization, p. 57

⁵⁰⁹ **Simsek, Sefa (2004);** The transformation of civil society in Turkey, p.48.

⁵¹⁰ **Ibid.;** p. 49.

It should be noted that NGOs do not constitute a homogenous group and there are various NGOs which have different interests and political views. In the Turkish case NGOs are divided along the main political ideologies. Although this fragmentation hindered a solid cooperation among the different NGOs, with the help of the prospect of an EU membership during the 90s the NGOs started to raise the issues of human rights and a more pluralistic democracy, and demanded wide ranging reforms in the Turkish political system. *“Among other things, civil society organizations have demanded reforms that include the reorganization of the dual structure of the judiciary (civil and military) and a check of military courts by the higher civilian courts where necessary. Civil society organizations also have played an active role in the public administration reform discussions. A wide range of civil society organizations, including municipalities, employee associations, trade unions, and the like commented on the new reform draft and have accentuated their demands about the new law...”*⁵¹¹

For the rights of civil society the real revolution came with the EU reforms packages after Turkey was granted candidate status at the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999. The EU considered the lack of freedom of association as one of the main issues in the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria. Between 1999 and 2004 Turkey made the necessary political reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. In this context the Article 33 of the Turkish Constitution that guaranteed the freedom of association was amended in 2001. Furthermore, the law on associations was amended five times under the EU reform packages. (March 2002, August 2002, January 2003, July 2003 and July 2004). In the last amendment a brand new law on associations was adopted, which lifted all the restrictions imposed on associations.⁵¹²

These wide ranging EU reforms strengthened Turkish democracy and the freedom of associations which in return led to an increase in the role of civil society in Turkish political life. As mentioned above, starting from the 90s the NGOs in Turkey began to increase their role in the democratic consolidation process with the help of the prospect of an EU membership. Toros argues that NGOs *“for the first time in Turkish politics,*

⁵¹¹ **Toros, Emre (2007);** Understanding the Role of Civil Society as an Agent for Democratic Consolidation: The Turkish Case, Turkish Studies, Volume 8, Issue 3, September 2007, p. 411.

⁵¹² **Grigoriadis, Ionnis, N. (2009);** Trials of Europeanization, p. 58-60.

*started to articulate and represent the interests of various social segments and managed to transmit these demands to political actors and state elites relatively effectively.”*⁵¹³

In terms of public visibility and organizational power the earthquake in 1999 may be considered as a turning point for NGOs in Turkey. In the first three days after the earthquake the Turkish state apparatus had totally failed to organize help efforts and attend to the basic needs of the affected people, whereas Turkish NGOs reached the disaster affected area faster than state institutions and in a much more organized manner. For instance just in the province of Adapazari 55 different NGOs were active in providing makeshift camps for survivors.⁵¹⁴ This huge tragedy demonstrated to the Turkish public the capabilities and utility of the NGOs as a government counterpart in Turkey.

Apart from these positive developments it should be noted that compared to Western liberal democracies Turkish civil society still plays a very limited role in Turkish political life. Simsek notes that *“some characteristics of Turkish civil society such as the multitude of NGOs and the existence of an individualistic culture are adequately developed to support democracy. On the other hand, in terms of its autonomy against the state and military power, its participation in the decision-making process, its fragmented structure and its quality, Turkish civil society is still very far from contributing to democratization.”*⁵¹⁵

Although civil society does not play a substantial role in Turkish political life as in the case of other Western democracies, they still have a considerable amount of influence that is rising almost continuously. This rising role of civil society in Turkish political life has its impacts on Turkish foreign policy making as well. In this context the role of civil society in the formation of Turkish foreign policy will be analyzed mainly under three areas, i.e. the role of NGOs, think tanks and public opinion.

⁵¹³**Toros, Emre (2007);** Understanding the Role of Civil Society as an Agent for Democratic Consolidation, p. 397.

⁵¹⁴ **Toros, Emre (2007);** Understanding the Role of Civil Society as an Agent for Democratic Consolidation, p.411.

⁵¹⁵ **Simsek, Sefa (2004);** The transformation of civil society in Turkey: from quantity to quality, p. 68.

As already mentioned above, the Turkish state was built on a strong state tradition, which did not allow participation of NGOs in the political system until recently. The foreign policy making was no exception in this strong state tradition and stayed as a privilege of a limited number of bureaucrats. They considered “*civil society... as a threat and non-governmental organisations were readily associated with foreign influence and seen as a tool of external agents.*”⁵¹⁶ Consequently, until the end of the Cold War, there was absolute dominance of Kemalist elites in the making of Turkish foreign policy. However, as a result of the transformation that the Turkish state and society has been going through in the last two decades, NGOs have flourished in Turkey. Furthermore, the EU reforms have strengthened civil society and Turkish NGOs have started to acquire a role in the foreign policy making process which was regarded as the privilege of state officials until the end of the millennium.

Today, one can find examples of NGO involvement and cooperation in the formation of both low and high policy issues in Turkish foreign policy. Examples for the cooperation between Turkish state institutions and NGOs in low politics issues can be found in the combating of women trafficking and illegal migration. In this regard, various Turkish state institutions are involved in the cooperation with NGOs such as the Human Resources Development Foundation (HRDF) and the International Organization for migration and etc.⁵¹⁷

In the last decade the Turkish NGOs have also been increasingly involved in the areas of high politics issues too. In 1995 Turkish NGOs lobbied for the adaptation of the customs union agreement by the European Parliament. However the real change came with the Helsinki Summit decision to grant Turkey candidate status, which paved the way of the increasing role of civil society in Turkish political life. For instance, after the Helsinki Summit Turkey had to make wide ranging legal reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. Between 1999 and 2002 Turkey was ruled by a weak coalition government that was split in terms of required EU reforms. In the adaptation of fiercely debated EU reform packages in Turkey, Turkish pro-EU civil society groups such as TÜSIAD, the Economic Development foundation (IKV) and other ad hoc groups such as the Europe Movement (Avrupa Hareketi) and their well led media campaign were

⁵¹⁶ **Kirişçi, Kemal (2006):** Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, p. 38

⁵¹⁷ **Kirişçi, Kemal (2006):** Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, pp. 38-41.

influential in the mobilization of MPs that were needed to adopt the EU reforms. Kirisci concludes that *“Civil society and the media played a crucial role in weakening the hold of the national security discourse and priorities over one of the most critical issues concerning Turkey’s future: membership of the EU.”* 518

Another example of the involvement of NGOs in high politics issues is the Turkish policy change towards Cyprus in 2004. Turkish NGOs were also influential in this drastic change of policy. Turkish NGOs such as TUSIAD and TESEV (The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) lobbied for a change of stance in Turkey’s status quo oriented Cyprus policy and supported the JDP government in its decision to accept the UN’s Annan Plans against military and civil bureaucracy. In sum, Turkish NGOs such as TÜSIAD, IKV and TOBB (The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) have played a very constructive role in Turkey’s relations with the EU. 519

Apart from this, the Turkish state also realized the soft power of NGOs in the international arena and started to consider Turkish NGOs as a means to extend its influence and prestige in Turkey’s surrounding regions. Today, a considerable amount of Turkish NGOs, mostly charity organizations, are involved in educational and health development projects around the globe. In this regard, one should pay extra attention to the activities of Fethullah Gülen’s movement. Starting with the end of the Cold War this movement has founded hundreds of Turkish schools around the world, which teach Turkish language and culture among their official curricula. In 2003 there were *“more than 300 private high schools and seven universities affiliated with the Gülen community, with 26,500 students and over 6000 teachers around the world. In Turkey alone there are over 150 private schools, including Istanbul’s Fatih University.”*⁵²⁰ One can suggest that their number has risen considerably from 2003 onwards. In the last two decades Turkish politicians from different ideological backgrounds such as Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Mesut Yılmaz, Tayip Erdogan have always

⁵¹⁸ **Kirişçi, Kemal (2006):** Turkey's foreign policy in turbulent times, pp. 42-43.

⁵¹⁹ **Özcan, Mesut (2008);** Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, p.101.

⁵²⁰ **Gulay, Erol N. (2007);** The Gülen Phenomenon: A Neo-Sufi Challenge to Turkey’s Rival Elite?; Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 37–61, Spring 2007, p. 43.

supported and encouraged the activities of these schools and visited these schools in their foreign visits to different countries.

In addition to Turkish schools, Turkish charity organizations such as the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) (est. 1992), Deniz Feneri Association (Light House (est. 1996), Kimse Yokmu (Is Anybody There est. 2004) etc. started to engage in humanitarian aid and development projects around the globe with the end of the Cold War. With the Gaza flotilla massacre by Israeli navy commandos in May 2010 the IHH became the most well-known among these organizations. One may claim that the IHH, which started its humanitarian aid activities with the beginning of the Bosnian War in 1992 and extended its projects to 120 countries in 2010, represents the rising power of Turkish NGOs in the international arena in the last two decades. The Gaza flotilla incident brought Turkish charity organizations into the spotlight of world attention and forced Turkey to sever its ties with Israel. Apart from this negative incident Turkish state officials are well aware of the fact that Turkish charity organizations increase Turkey's prestige and extend its influence in the international arena and therefore support and facilitate these NGOs in their activities. In this regard the following statement of the architect of JDP's foreign policy, Davutoglu, is noteworthy: *"Turkish Civil Society organisations form an integral part of the bigger picture defined as foreign policy. All of these elements have become part of Turkey's new international vision."*⁵²¹

In the rising role of civil society the influence of public opinion in the making of Turkish foreign policy is also substantial. As mentioned above, until the end of the Cold War Turkish foreign policy making remained the privilege of Kemalist elites and the demands and opinions of the public were not taken into consideration in the decision making process. However, starting from 90s the role of public opinion in the making of Turkish foreign policy started to increase.⁵²² In the beginning of the post Cold War era the improvements in communication technologies helped the Turkish public to receive more information about the situation of Muslim and Turkic communities in the Caucasus and Balkans. This led to increasing public pressure on the Turkish foreign

⁵²¹ **Davutoğlu, Ahmet (2008);** Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007, p 84.

⁵²² **Fuller, Graham E. (1992);** Turkey Faces East, p.4.

policy towards the conflicts in Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya and East Turkistan.⁵²³ In this regard Bulut concludes that “*Religious identity, the use of religious themes in politics, and a perception of religion as an important force in politics have influenced the way Turkey – comprising a variety of state and societal actors – reacted to conflicts in South East Europe.*” in the post Cold War Era.⁵²⁴ However, despite the growing influence of public opinion it cannot be concluded that the decision makers made their decisions according to public demands in the 90s. The lack of Turkey’s democratic standards was the main reason for the dominant role of the elites. Hale notes that “*state actors apparently continued to be the dominant decision makers during the 90ies.*”⁵²⁵

The turning point came with the EU reforms after Helsinki in 1999. As discussed above, these wide ranging reforms strengthened Turkey’s democracy and decreased the dominance of elites in the decision making process. In the past decade, Turkish public opinion has played an increasing role in the formation of Turkish foreign policy. The democratic reforms forced the governments to take public opinion into consideration in vital foreign policy decisions. The increasing role of public opinion can be seen in Turkey’s policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For instance, during the 90s, because of lack of democratic standards and the strong role of the Turkish Army in the decision making process, governments were able to ignore the criticisms of the public in their cooperation with Israel. However with growing democratization, the demands of the public were much more reflected in the policies of the Ecevit (1999-2002) and Erdogan (2003 - to date) governments, which adopted a much more balanced policy towards this conflict.⁵²⁶

The most staggering example in the role of public opinion on Turkish foreign policy is Turkey’s refusal to allow US troops to invade Iraq using Turkish territory. Contrary to the expectation of many analysts, the transfer of US soldiers via Turkish territory to northern Iraq was rejected by Turkish parliament on 1 March 2003. This rejection was to a certain extent related to the harsh opposition of the Turkish public towards the

⁵²³ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, p. 96.

⁵²⁴ **Bulut, Esra (2004)**; The Role of Religion in Turkish Reactions to Balkan Conflicts, p.13.

⁵²⁵ **Hale, William M. (2000)**; Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, p. 205.

⁵²⁶ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, p.167.

invasion of Iraq. In this example the fierce opposition of the Turkish public towards an involvement of Turkey in the invasion of Iraq forced Turkey to adopt a more restrained policy towards Iraq.

Think tanks are the most vital institutions of a civil society that can influence foreign policy making profoundly. As discussed in the previous chapter one of the main features of the Turkish foreign policy culture is its lack of strategic thinking and theory. Until the end of the Cold War Turkish foreign policy was mainly controlled by the Kemalist elites who did not show any interest in alternative foreign policy strategies.⁵²⁷ The post Cold War era and Turkey's EU membership process decreased the role of Kemalist elites in foreign policy making and opened the way for the articulation of different foreign policy options. In this regard it is clear that think tanks are vital institutions for any country to develop strategies and provide expert advice on international issues. In the Turkish context think tanks are a new phenomenon starting with the end of the Cold War. Since then a considerable number of think tanks aiming to develop foreign policy strategies have been established in Turkey:

- TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation)
- SAM (Center for Strategic Research) Est. by Turkish Foreign Ministry in 1995
- USAK (International Strategic Research Organization)
- TASAM (Turkish Asian Center For Strategic Studies)
- GASAM (South Asian Strategic Research Center)
- SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research)
- TEPAV (Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey)
- TURKSAM (Turkish Center for International Relations Strategic Analysis)

Despite the increase in their quantity, the influence of think tanks in the foreign policy making process is still very modest compared to other Western countries because of the

⁵²⁷ Davutoglu, Ahmet (2001); *Stratejik Derinlik*, pp. 48-52.

authoritarian character of Turkish politicians and bureaucrats. Özcan notes that “*although some of these institutions have proved their viability, time is needed for think tanks to mature in Turkey.*”⁵²⁸ Apart from this negative legacy, one should realize that the think tanks are on their way to become important actors in Turkish foreign policy making. There are examples of coordination between state officials and various think tanks such as TESEV, SETA and etc. These think tanks provide alternative and realistic foreign policy strategies aiming to increase friendly relations with surrounding regions. They also balance the one-dimensional orientation of Kemalist elites in Turkish foreign policy. Therefore they also make a vital contribution to the emergence of Kantian values in Turkish foreign policy.

4.3 Conclusion: The Emergence of Kantian Culture

As discussed in the theoretical chapter Wendt argues that the behavior of consolidated liberal democracies in the post Cold War era “*seems to go well beyond a Lockean culture.*” He points out the fact that, contrary to Lockean culture, the North Atlantic states and many others have settled their disputes peacefully, and they have acted as a team in terms of their security in the post Cold War era. Consequently he claims that an emergence of Kantian culture - derived from Immanuel Kant’s “perpetual peace” – can be observed among the nations of Western democracies. He argues that in the Kantian culture the states consider each other as friends. Accordingly, the non-violent method of dispute settlement and mutual assistance in case of a security threat towards any members of the security team are the two rules of the Kantian culture.

As discussed in the previous chapters, starting from the establishment of the Turkish Republic its foreign policy had been shaped by the Kemalist identity and its interests. It is argued that throughout the history of the Turkish Republic the Lockean values were internalized to the third degree and Turkey was under the influence of Lockean culture until as late as 1999. Yet, starting from 1980 the dominance of this culture was challenged by a number of internal and external developments, which resulted in the

⁵²⁸ Özcan, Mesut (2008); Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East, p.155.

emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy in the last decade. In this chapter the role of the following factors in the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy have been discussed;

- Globalization,
- The end of the Cold War and transformation of the geo-political and geostrategic position of Turkey,
- The EU membership process: Europeanization and democratization,
- The rise of counter elites and ideologies,
- Economic liberalization and the rise of economic politics,
- The rise of the JDP,
- A new grand strategy for Turkish foreign policy: “strategic depth”
- The rising role of civil society, i.e. NGOs, think tanks and public opinion.

To begin with, it is argued that the phenomenon of globalism as in its broader sense was responsible for the intensification of Turkey’s economic-technological, political and cultural relations with the outside world in the post 1980 era. As discussed in the theoretical chapter the interaction between states may change the identity and interest of the actors which in return may create a new culture of anarchy. In this regard the process of globalization has played a constructivist role by changing the Turkish state’s identity and interests. Like many other countries, Turkish state and society has been experiencing an unprecedented increase in its relations with the outside world in every dimension of contemporary life in the last three decades. This interaction transformed the Turkish state’s identity and interests producing a more open and liberal culture, which is substantial for the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkey. One can also consider Turkey’s transition to a liberal economic model in 1980 and the integration of the Turkish economy into the world and capitalist economy as a direct result of the globalization process.

Along with globalization, the transition to a liberal economy also played a significant role in the transformation of foreign policy. Before 1980 Turkey represented a closed society and a statist economy, which was based on import substitution. The introduction of a liberal economy, export oriented growth policy and the impact of globalization transformed the Turkish state and society in three decades into an “open

society.” The transition to a liberal economic system in Turkey in 1980 contributed to the embedment of liberal values in Turkish state and society. Consequently, in the past three decades the free market economy and its values settled into Turkish society producing an export oriented business elite and a more liberal political atmosphere. This had direct results on Turkish foreign policy, which is now tasked with finding the necessary foreign direct investment and foreign markets for Turkish exports, which in return has forced Turkey to abandon its isolationist foreign policy strategy towards its neighboring regions.

In this regard, the end of the Cold War can be seen as a blessing for Turkey, since it has opened a vast area to Turkish economic and cultural influence such as Central Asia, Caucasus and Balkans, which were isolated from Turkey since the beginning of the Cold War. This meant both opportunities and challenges for Turkish foreign policy. Yet the lack of strategic thinking, political instability, and financial crisis in the 90s prevented Turkey from developing a grand strategy in the post Cold War era.

In this regard, it was Davutoglu who took the challenge of developing a grand new strategy that took the new challenges and opportunities in the post Cold War era into consideration. The “strategic depth” doctrine offers a new interpretation of Turkey’s geopolitical position in the world. It describes Turkey as a pivotal country with multiple identities in the midst of Eurasia, which has to follow a multidimensional foreign policy strategy. Consequently it argues that Turkey has to change its policy towards its neighbors, based on rivalry and isolation, to a zero problem and maximum cooperation policy based on friendship and interdependence. Davutoglu’s multidimensionalism and zero problem policy, which has been successfully implemented by the JDP governments in the last decade to a certain extent, symbolizes a major break with the Kemalist identities foreign policy strategy based on one-dimensionalism and rivalry.

In the post 1980 era, with the influence of democratization, Europeanization and liberalization, the dominance of Kemalist elites and Kemalist identity has been increasingly challenged by the rise of new counter identities such as Islamism, Turkism, neo-Ottomanism and conservatism. In this regard the JDP represents the rise of the conservative businessman and masses in Turkish politics, which reject the Kemalist isolation of Turkey from its surrounding regions. It represents a

conservative democrat party with light neo-Ottomanist motives in its foreign policy strategy, which is mainly shaped by Davutoglu's "strategic depth" doctrine. The JDP's neo-Ottomanism aims to increase Turkey's soft power by improving Turkey's economic and cultural relations with countries that emerged out of the Ottoman Empire.

The political reforms for further democratization in Turkey in the last three decades also paved the way for the increasing role of civil society in the foreign policy making process. Turkish NGOs and think tanks gradually became more and more influential on foreign policy in this era, which was shaped absolutely by military and civil Kemalist elites in the past. Furthermore, the democratization reforms also resulted in the increasing role of public opinion in foreign policy issues. Consequently, one can argue that the increasing influence of civil society has played substantial role in the embedment of Kantian values in Turkish society.

It is a fact that the EU constitutes the main driving force behind the Europeanization and democratization of Turkish foreign policy making, transforming its mindset radically. The European Union exerts top-down influence on candidate states' domestic political structures, which is referred to as Europeanization. As discussed previously, this process can be considered to be one of the main influential factors in the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, conditionality and power asymmetry are the main features of the relations between the EU and a candidate country. EU as an international institution has also compulsory power on its candidate countries. The EU exerts compulsory power because of its normative values and its material advantages stemming from a prospective membership. In this context the Helsinki Summit decision to grant Turkey candidate status was a turning point. In the post Helsinki era the EU has exerted enormous influence on Turkish institutions and decision makers through adaptations forced by conditionality and socialization of decision makers.

The legal changes required by the EU as described in the Copenhagen criteria led to a loss of the Turkish Army's influence in the formulation of foreign and security policy. Above all, the wide ranging EU reforms brought Turkey closer to European values and its foreign policy closer to a Kantian culture. In order to become a member of the EU Turkey has had to resolve its border problems peacefully, show restraint in its policies

and improve its relations with neighboring countries and harmonize Turkish foreign policy with the positions of the member states within the framework of the CFSP. It is this area, in which the most concrete examples of the Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy in Turkey's deep rooted issues such as Turkish Greek rapprochement after 1999, Turkey's acceptance of Annan Plan for the unification of Cyprus in 2004, and the signing of protocols with Armenia can be observed.

As discussed in the theoretical framework, Wendt argues that imitation and social learning constitute the two mechanisms of cultural selection, which play a significant role in the identity change of states. Accordingly, the many Third World countries and former communist states adopt the institutional and ideological attributes of Western states, because they perceive them successful. In the Turkish case, as discussed in the third chapter, the imitation of the West and Europe can be regarded the foundation of the Turkish Kemalist state's identity. Thus the majority of Turkish elites have always considered Turkey's membership to the European Union as their ultimate goal. Not only the Kemalist identity but also the other identities such as Turkism, neo-Ottomanism, conservatism and to a certain extent also Islamism, has perceived the West as so successful that it has to be imitated. Islamists only disagreed in the nature of imitation, which they argued should only include the technological achievements of Western civilization. Therefore one can argue that the imitation of European countries has been the main driving force behind the emergence of Kantian values in Turkish foreign policy.

Apart from imitation, social learning also plays a substantial role in the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. In this regard one should note that Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952, a founding member of the UN, and a candidate of EU membership since 1987. The increasing contact between Turkish, UN, NATO and above all EU officials in the troika meetings, summit diplomacy and accession negotiations contribute to the "*socialization of decision makers around the concepts of common reflexes and norms of behaviours and thinking*". This increasing contact does not only include the military and the foreign ministry bureaucracy but also affects all levels of Turkish bureaucracy, such as the Ministry of the Treasury, Transportation, Health and etc. Furthermore NGOs and interest groups are also involved in this process as a result of increasing low politics issues such as organized crime, illegal migration and human trafficking. Thus the identities and norms of Turkish bureaucrats

from different state institutions as well as Turkish NGOs are increasingly affected by their European counterparts.⁵²⁹

As discussed before, at a macro level the rules of Kantian culture such as the non-violent method of dispute settlement and the mutual assistance result in pluralistic security communities and collective security systems. Wendt argues that the main aim of a pluralistic security community is to settle the disputes among its member states, whereas the main aim of a collective security system is to resolve the disputes between the community and non-member states. Wendt argues that a collective security system does not have to be universal and states may establish collective security systems “*within relatively autonomous regional subsystems or security complexes*”. Consequently, in this context one may describe the NATO as a security community, whose main logic is “one for all, all for one”. In the Turkish case one should note that Turkey became a member of NATO as early as 1952. However it is clear that Turkey’s membership to NATO did not stem from its acceptance of Kantian values at that time, which was obvious in Turkey’s consistent suspicion of Western countries and its policies based on rivalry until as late as 1999. Yet, as mentioned above one may claim that Turkey’s membership to NATO has played an important role in the socialization of its decision makers, which paved the way in the emergence of a Kantian culture in the post Helsinki era.

As mentioned before, there are three influential factors in the adaptation of cultural norms by actors: force, price and legitimacy, which are a reflection of the “*three different degrees to which a norm can be internalized and thus as generating three different pathways by which the same structure can be produced*.”⁵³⁰ Consequently it is argued that a culture can be internalized in three different degrees. In Turkey’s transition from the Lockean values to Kantian norms, one can argue that force has been the main factor along with the imitation of the West and social learning through interaction between Turkish decision makers and NATO and EU officials. In order to be accepted into the European Union, Turkey has had to accept the Kantian values that

⁵²⁹ **Özcan, Mesut (2008)**; *Harmonizing foreign policy, Turkey, the EU and the Middle East*, pp. 150-151.

⁵³⁰ **Wendt, Alexander (2009)**; *Social Theory of International Politics*; p. 250.

are based on the mutual friendship and cooperation. Furthermore, the new rising conservative elites in Turkey, represented by the JDP, have perceived the accession to the European Union as the stabilizer of Turkish democracy, with which they cut the mighty Turkish Army's influence in Turkish politics. Furthermore, the new geopolitical realities in the post Cold War era and the needs for fresh markets for Turkish exports also forced Turkey to abandon its old isolationist foreign policy strategy towards its surrounding regions, which was shaped by the Lockean perception of rivalry. Finally the "strategic depth" doctrine with its principals of multidimensionalism, interdependence and friendly relations with neighboring countries provided the much needed grand strategy for Turkish foreign policy in the post Cold War era. All in all, one can argue that in the last decade Turkey has been internalizing Kantian values to the first degree, which is an ongoing process along Turkey's accession negotiations with the EU.

5. Conclusion

Today the very foundation of Turkish foreign policy seems to be transformed radically which shows substantial differences compared to its features and characteristics just one decade ago. This study aimed to analyze the deep running processes and the factors behind this rapid transition which occurred in such a short time. It is argued that this transformation started with the transition to a liberal economy in the 80s, then accelerated with the effects of the end of the Cold War in the 90s, and finally came to a turning point with the JDP's rule and the Europeanization in Turkey in the last decade. Consequently, the Turkish state's identity and interests have been transformed, which resulted in the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy. In order to achieve a clear understanding of this transition, the evolution of the Turkish state's identity (i.e. the Kemalist identity) and its interests were analyzed in the third chapter. Then in the fourth chapter the factors behind the transition from a Lockean culture to Kantian culture were examined. In order to provide the readers with an overall picture of this transition, the results and findings of this research will be summarized in this chapter.

In order to explain the transformation of Turkish foreign policy, this study applied holistic constructivism, which combines the internal and external factors in foreign policy analysis. In general terms, constructivism argues that international relations are socially constructed and the states' identities and interests are indigenous to the interstate interaction, which means they are not given and subject to change in the course of interaction. Furthermore, this theory argues that the identities constitute the

basis of the interests of the states. Finally, it argues that agents and structures are mutually constructed. In the analysis of Turkish foreign policy the arguments of conventional constructivism has been taken into consideration, since they offer various practical theories for the analysis of international relations. In this regard the arguments of systemic-level, unit-level and holistic-level constructivism were discussed in the theoretical framework. Special attention was paid to the culture of anarchies theory of Alexander Wendt, who argues that anarchy does not always lead to self-help systems, and three different sorts of anarchy cultures based on enmity, rivalry and friendship have developed during the course of history.

The third chapter analyzed the evolution of the Turkish state's identity and interests after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. As part of the holistic constructivist approach, the external and internal factors in the making of the Turkish state's identity and interests have been included in this chapter. In this chapter it is argued that, with the establishment of Turkish Republic in 1923 Turkey totally abandoned the Hobbesian culture of the Ottoman Empire and accepted the existential rights of other states and the norms of a Lockean culture to the first degree. In this regard the factor of "force", as explained by Wendt, has been influential in Turkey's rejection of the Ottoman Empire's conquest oriented policy, since Turkey could no longer afford this materially given the post world war power relations and Turkey's ruined economy and population as a result of subsequent wars from 1912 to 1923.

Furthermore, it is argued that after the internalization of the Lockean culture to first degree, Turkey had also reached the second degree of internalization in a very short time, in which actors adopt the norms because they believe it is in their self-interest, which makes their behavior towards the norms instrumental. It is argued that the transition from the first degree to the second degree occurred in a quite short time, because starting from the 18th century the Ottoman Empire was forced by European powers to comply with the Lockean values. This became obvious in the 19th century, when preserving the status quo became one of the pillars of Ottoman foreign policy and the Ottoman state was included in the state system of Europe. Thus this early Ottoman experience in the internalization of Lockean values to the first degree helped the new Turkish state to internalize the Lockean values to the second degree in a relatively short time. The imitation of Western countries was also an important factor in Turkey's

internalization of Lockean values to the second degree, since it constituted the foundation of Kemalist ideology in Turkey, which aimed for the total Westernization of Turkish society and its culture. The Kemalists, and above all the founder of the modern Turkish State, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was convinced that it was Turkey's self-interest to adopt all Western values and to integrate Turkey into Western civilization absolutely. Atatürk's practice of foreign policy and his commitment to the Westernization of Turkey shaped the principals of the new Turkish state's foreign policy, which confirmed Turkey's adherence to Lockean values. Finally, as put forward by Wendt, in the third degree of internalization the states comply with the norms because they perceive them legitimate. Subsequently, the states adopt status quo policies both at the level of behavior and interests. In the Turkish context it was argued that it had moved from the second degree to the third degree in the post Second World War era, which was symbolized by Turkey's membership to the UN and NATO.

As mentioned above, the constructivists argue that the identities and interests of the states are constructed in the process of interaction between states. According to Wendt, there are two mechanisms of cultural change at the micro level: natural selection and cultural selection. He argues that in the transition to the Lockean culture the process of cultural selection plays the main role via two mechanisms, i.e. imitation and social learning. It is argued that in the internalization of Lockean culture in Turkish foreign policy, imitation and social learning have been also influential. Firstly, the Kemalist ideology's main aim was the imitation of Western culture and norms. Secondly, this resulted in Turkey's gradual integration into the Western alliance and institutions such as NATO, OECD and etc during the course of the Republic's history, through which Turkish decision makers acquired new norms and identity preferences. Considering the history of Turkish foreign policy one can clearly argue that Turkey rejected the revisionist or irredentist foreign policy aims and accepted the right of existence of other states, which mainly places Turkey into a Lockean culture.

It is argued that the Kemalist identity has been the main driving force behind the Turkish foreign policy interests during the much of the Republic's history. Furthermore it is also argued that, although the Kemalist identity rejected the Ottoman legacy, it has inherited the following elements from the Ottoman Empire:

- Its bureaucratic elites, its institutions and its political culture,
- Playing one great power against another for survival and the preservation of the status quo,
- Sevres Phobia and deep skepticisms and cautiousness against other states' intentions and the conviction that the external world is conspiring to weaken and divide Turkey,
- Troubled relations with post Ottoman national states surrounding Turkey,
- Perception of a Russian threat,
- The responsibility of the religious and ethnic minority groups in the former Ottoman regions in Turkey's neighboring countries,
- The Turkish Army's extraordinary role in Turkish political life

It is discussed that the Turkish Army has played an extraordinary role in the making of Turkish politics at the expense of Turkish governments and civil society. Furthermore, the military and civilian Kemalist bureaucracy has exerted an absolute control in the making of Turkish foreign policy in the first seven decades of the Turkish Republic. As argued before, Turkey represents a torn country between East and West. During the Republic's history, the Kemalist establishment isolated itself from the conservative masses of Turkish society. The result of the Kemalist monopoly in foreign policy making was the lack of strategic thinking and theory in Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, due to the Sevres Phobia, the Kemalist elites were extremely suspicious about the intentions of other states, which they considered rivals who planned to divide Turkey. Thus, during the much of its history Turkish foreign policy makers have adopted a reaction oriented defensive and conservative policy, which almost constantly avoided taking any initiative. In this regard it is argued that the Turkish state's identity and its foreign and security policy making culture have mainly been shaped by a Realpolitik view of international relations. The Kemalist elites considered the international environment as anarchical, which required being militarily strong and ready to deploy hard power military force for win-lose outcomes.

To summarize, one may argue that during the Republic's history Turkey internalized the Lockean culture to the third degree, which was based on the concept of rivalry rather than cooperation. As a result of the Lockean logic of rivalry and Kemalist foreign

policies preferences, Turkey isolated itself from its neighboring countries and regions and followed a one sided foreign policy strategy, which aimed to integrate Turkey into the Western civilization and its institutions. Yet, even in their aim to integrate Turkey into the Western world, the Kemalists were extremely cautious because of their suspicion about the intentions of Western countries due to the Sevres Phobia syndrome.

This study argued that the dominance of a Lockean culture and the Kemalist identity in Turkish foreign policy has been challenged by various developments starting from the 1980s. Consequently, the main argumentation of this thesis is that Turkish foreign policy has been going through a transformation process in the last three decades. Thus, applying the holistic constructivist approach the following internal and external factors behind the transformation of Turkish foreign policy have been analyzed in the fourth chapter: Globalization, the end of the Cold War, The EU membership process, the rise of counter elites and ideologies, economic liberalization, the rise of the JDP, the “strategic depth” doctrine and the rising role of civil society.

To begin with, it is argued that as a result of globalization in the post 1980 era, Turkey has witnessed an unprecedented intensification of its economic-technological, political and cultural relations with the outside world, which has played a substantial role in the emergence of liberal values in Turkish society. Turkey’s adoption of a liberal economic model in 1980 and the integration of the Turkish economy into the world and capitalist economy was a direct consequence of globalization. In a very short time Turkey was transformed from an import substitution based statist economic model to export and growth oriented liberal economic model, which transformed the Turkish state and society in three decades into an “open society.” The liberal economic model, it is argued, contributed to the embedment of liberal values into Turkish state and society and produced an export oriented business elite and a more liberal political atmosphere. Another direct result of liberalization and globalization on Turkish foreign policy was the renouncement of the Kemalist isolationist policy towards Turkey’s neighboring regions because Turkey had to find the necessary foreign direct investment, and foreign markets for Turkish exports. In this context, one should also consider the consequences of the end of the Cold War. It is argued that it marked an unprecedented opportunity, since an immense geography from Central Asia to the Balkans that had been isolated from Turkey since the beginning of the Cold War was opened to Turkish economic and

cultural influence for the first time in the Republic's history. However, Turkey was caught unprepared for this major systemic change in the international arena and was unable to take the maximum advantage of it because of the lack of strategic thinking, political instability, and financial crises in the 90s.

In this regard, it was Davutoglu's "strategic depth" doctrine that has provided Turkish foreign policy with a new grand strategy that reinterpreted Turkish geopolitical position in the world with regard to post Cold War power relations. Rejecting the Kemalist isolationist and one dimensional foreign policy strategy, Davutoglu described Turkey as a pivotal country with multiple identities which has to adopt a multidimensional foreign policy strategy. Furthermore, he criticized Kemalist foreign policy strategy based on rivalry and isolation towards Turkey's neighbors and argued that in the post Cold War era Turkey needed to adopt a zero problem and maximum cooperation policy based on friendship and interdependence towards its neighbors. The "strategic depth" doctrine that has been implemented by the JDP administration since its takeover of power in Turkey was marked with a break with the Kemalist identity's foreign policy preferences.

Apart from these developments, starting from the 1980s the Kemalist identity has been increasingly challenged by the rise of alternative identities such as Islamism, Turkism, neo-Ottomanism and conservatism in Turkish politics, and by the increasing influence of democratization, Europeanization and liberalization in Turkish society and state. Consequently, the Kemalist establishment began to lose its grip on Turkish state and society in the 90s. One should also consider the rise of the JDP in Turkish politics within this context, which symbolizes the increasing influence of the conservative identity, businessman and masses in Turkish politics. This identity rejects the Kemalist isolation of Turkey from its surrounding regions. It is argued that the JDP can be described as a conservative democrat party with light neo-Ottomanism motives in its foreign policy strategy that is built around the "strategic depth" doctrine. In this regard one should also note that rather than building a new Ottoman empire, this neo-Ottomanism envisages an increase of Turkey's soft power by creating economic and cultural interdependence in Turkey's immediate neighborhood. Thus it is argued that by focusing on cultural and economic interdependence this strategy was based on the friendly relations with other states, which also along other factors was influential in the emergence of Kantian values in the Turkish society and state.

Another factor in the emergence of Kantian values in Turkish foreign policy has been the increasing role of civil society in the foreign policy making process, an area that had been exclusively controlled by the Kemalist establishment in the past. The triggers of the increasing role of the civil society have been the democratization process and the European Union reforms in the last three decades, which have played a substantial role in the embedment of Kantian values in Turkish society.

Finally, it is argued that Europeanization has been the main driving force behind the emergence of Kantian values in Turkish foreign policy in the last decade. In this regard, it is argued that the EU Helsinki Summit decision in 1999 to grant Turkey candidate status for membership can be seen as a turning point. Candidate states' political structures are exposed to the top down pressure, which is labeled as Europeanization. Two main features of this top down relationship are conditionality and power asymmetry. Candidate countries are subject to the compulsory power of the EU as an international institution, which stems from its normative values and its material advantages from a prospective membership. In this context it is argued that in the post Helsinki era the EU has exerted top down pressure with compulsory power on Turkish institutions and decision makers through adaptations forced by conditionality and the socialization of decision makers. Subsequently, in order to reach the Copenhagen criteria the EU reform packages accepted by the Turkish parliament, which resulted in the decrease of the Turkish Army's role in the formulation of foreign and security policy. Europeanization was visible in Turkish foreign policy, which dictated Turkey to resolve its border problems peacefully, show restraint in its policies and improve its relations with neighboring countries. Turkish Greek rapprochement after 1999, Turkey's acceptance of the Annan Plan for the unification of Cyprus in 2004 can be seen as the most concrete examples of Europeanization in Turkish foreign policy making. Yet one may claim that, above all, the most substantial results of the wide ranging EU reforms have been the emergence of European values and a Kantian culture in the Turkish state's identity.

As described in the theoretical framework, in the identity change of states there are two mechanisms: imitation and social learning. In this regard it is argued that as was the case in the emergence of Lockean values in the post Ottoman era, the imitation of

European countries has been the main driving force behind the emergence of Kantian values in Turkish foreign policy. In addition to imitation, social learning also has been very influential in the transformation of the Turkish state's identity and interests. In this regard, the increasing contact between all levels of Turkish bureaucracy and Western institutions such as the EU, NATO and the OECD contributed to the socialization of Turkish decision makers around the values of a Kantian culture.

Furthermore, as put forward by Wendt, at a macro level the logic of Kantian culture produces pluralistic security communities, which aim to settle the disputes among its member states, and collective security systems, which seek to resolve the conflicts between the community and non-member states. In this regard it is argued that Turkey's membership to NATO since 1952, which constitutes a collective security system, has been also substantial in the socialization of Turkish decision makers around the concept of Kantian values. Nonetheless, it is argued that Turkey's NATO membership was not due to its adoption of Kantian values at that time, which was obvious in Turkey's Cold War policies based on suspicion and rivalry to Western and other countries. However, one can argue that the six decade relationship between Turkey and NATO has paved the way for the emergence of Kantian values through the socialization of Turkish decision makers.

As discussed in the second chapter of this study the cultures of anarchy can be internalized in three different degrees, in which three factors, namely force, price and legitimacy, constitute the main driving forces behind the actors' adaptation of the values of a certain culture of anarchy. In this context it is argued that Turkey has internalized the Kantian values to the first degree, in which the factor of "force" was essential along with imitation and the socialization of decision makers. In this regard it is argued that Turkey was forced to comply with Kantian values based on mutual friendship and cooperation in order to be accepted into the European Union. Moreover, the JDP was also forced to follow a pro-EU policy, as it perceived the EU as a counterbalance to the Turkish Army's extraordinary role in Turkish political life. Consequently, with the help of EU reforms the JDP was able to reduce the military's influence, which consolidated Turkish democracy in the last decade. Furthermore, Turkey was also forced to comply with Kantian values and abandon its isolationist policies due to its need for new export markets and its new geopolitical satiation in the post Cold War world. Thus the rivalry based Lockean culture of Turkish foreign policy has been gradually replaced by the

friendship and interdependence based Kantian culture. Finally, one should also note the role of the “strategic depth” doctrine in this process, which formulated a new grand strategy for Turkey around the concept of multidimensionalism, interdependence and friendly relations with Turkey’s neighboring countries and regions. In this regard, it is argued that above all Davutoglu achieved a paradigm change in Turkish the foreign policy making culture with the “strategic depth” doctrine’s principals. To sum up, it is argued that Turkey has been internalizing the Kantian values to the first degree in the last decade, which is still an ongoing process.

As put forward by Wendt “*the longer a practice has been in existence the deeper it will be embedded in the individual and collective consciousness.*” Thus one may claim that a return to Lockean culture in Turkey seems very unlikely, since it will be embedded in Turkish political culture more deeply considering Turkey’s deeply institutionalized relations with Western institutions such as the EU, NATO and the OECD. However, one may claim that it will heavily depend on Turkish-EU relations and Turkey’s admission into the European Union in the immediate future. As a result of this one may argue that Turkey’s membership in the EU will be the main asset in the deeper internalization of Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy.

In conclusion, this study has argued that during its first seven decades Turkish foreign policy had been shaped by the Kemalist identity’s Lockean understanding of anarchy. During the Republic’s history Turkey internalized this culture to the third degree, which was based on rivalry and suspicion of other states’ intentions. The Kemalist identity’s isolationism and one-dimensionalism were the direct results of its adherence to a Lockean culture as well as its Westernization ideology. Yet starting form 1980s this culture has been challenged by a number of developments, which in the end resulted in the emergence of a Kantian culture in Turkish foreign policy. Consequently, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a radical change, adopting a new outlook with much emphasis on multidimensionalism, economic and cultural interdependence, friendly relations, self-confidence and soft power. Yet this new policy strategy does not mean that Turkey will abandon one of the main pillars of its foreign policy, namely its Western orientation. Therefore, it is argued that rather than symbolizing a creeping Islamisation and a breakaway from the West, the JDP’s foreign policy strategy reflects the deep running structural and cultural change in Turkish foreign policy foundations.

Consequently, one may expect that the post-JDP governments, regardless of their ideological backgrounds, will pursue a similar multidimensional and self-confident foreign policy strategy stemming from the values of a Kantian culture.

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Publication

- *Kurdish israelischen Beziehungen im Nordirak, Verschwörungstheorie oder Konzept einer realpolitischen Kooperation, (Kurdish- Israeli Relations in Northern Iraq: A Conspiracy Theory or Realpolitical Cooperation), VDM Publishing, August, 2009, Saarbrücken.*

Languages:

- **German:** Advanced
- **English:** Advanced
- **Turkish:** Mother Tongue
- **Ottoman Turkish:** Intermediate